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Relocating Transitional Justice from International Law to Muslim-majority Legal Systems:  
Concepts, Approaches and Ways Forward 
Faced with the constant challenge of adapting to different contexts, the current understanding of transitional 
justice held by worldwide institutions, NGOs, donors and successor administrations cannot rely on 
international law alone as a framework of reference for the design and implementation of transitional 
processes - although the identification, interpretation and uses of local norms is inherently problematic. This 
thesis considers the tension between different rules applicable to transitional justice and explores their 
coexistence in the context of legal pluralism, drawing on comparative law perspectives to investigate the 
distinctive concept of legal truth and the victims’ right to it, within the broader transitional aims of 
accountability, justice and reconciliation after a history of serious abuse. The particular focus on Muslim-
majority legal systems provides further appreciation of how transitional justice can be relocated from 
international law to a given local setting, discussing the difficulties in doing so and the possible solutions 
with reference to Islamic law and jurisprudence. Rejecting the universalist v relativist deadlock in favour of 
an interpretation of international law which is permeable to local practices (also channeled through states), 
this thesis argues that comparative law can help uncover the legal formants of a system and piece together a 
global set of rules for transitional justice which rely on different normative provenances. Based on a victim-
centred approach to transitional justice and the acknowledgement of structural power struggles within 
societies facing radical political change, this work argues that local and global norms of transitional justice 
have the potential to cross-fertilise in delivering the key transitional aims. Cultural ownership of rules should 
not be limited to international actors, national or community leaders: if local unofficial norms resonate with 
victims and survivors of abuse, provided they do not contrast the transitional objectives, they are likely to 
contribute to given processes, and in turn influence the global paradigm of transitional justice.   !!
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Introduction
Introduction 
The Arab Uprisings have sparked an interest in the potential of transitional justice across North Africa and 
the Middle East. This prospect raises the doctrinal question of how to transfer the international paradigm of 
transitional justice (TJ) into a local setting characterised by a Muslim-majority population. Are the rules of 
public international law (PIL), international human rights, criminal law and humanitarian law (IHRL, ICL 
and IHL) the only relevant sources for TJ processes in those contexts? Or can the localisation of TJ draw on 
a wider range of norms, including unofficial and religious laws? This thesis provides a nuanced analysis of 
the relocation of TJ from the international paradigm to Muslim-majority legal systems and investigates the 
possible synergies between PIL and Islamic law in furthering the transitional aims of accountability, justice 
and reconciliation. In particular, it investigates the key themes of the international paradigm of TJ – truth-
seeking, the formation of collective memories and the victims’ right to know the truth – in relation to Islamic 
jurisprudence and practice.   1
Since its establishment as a field, the greatest challenge for transitional justice has been the reconciliation 
between the overarching international framework of reference and the local unofficial norms that inform its 
applicability in specific contexts. This tension has brought to light ‘the disconnections between international 
legal norms and local priorities and practices’, destabilising ‘the orthodox transitional justice paradigm’,  2
towards the potential creation of ‘a truly inclusive transitional justice paradigm’.  While the relativism v 3
universality debate in international law and human rights continues to pose a conceptual hurdle to the 
localisation of TJ, this research demonstrates it is not insurmountable. Moreover, the interaction between 
international laws and local norms applicable to TJ processes in Muslim-majority settings may help develop 
a global paradigm which does not restrict itself to PIL and official state law. 
This thesis contributes to the quest for the connection and the connecting of international law and local 
norms in the developing global framework of reference for transitional justice. It considers how unofficial 
rules and normative principles relevant to communities facing transitions can support applicable international 
laws. It does not  specifically look at the role of formal state law which is typically contested in times of 
transition: instead, the focus of this work is on PIL and informal norms. Drawing on comparative methods to 
reassess the relativism v universality debate, this research reviews the key concepts and approaches for 
relocating TJ from international law to specific settings, and then tests those propositions in relation to 
Muslim-majority legal systems. The research problems set out grapple with the tension between different 
rules applicable to TJ in pursuit of accountability, justice and reconciliation after a history of serious abuse. 
As well as offering theoretical insights into the topic for both lawyers and other scholars, this work also has a 
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practical application in informing the way we think legally and politically about the design and 
implementation of transitional justice in specific contexts.  
Research Questions 
This research seeks to reflect on two intertwined questions: How can we interpret the relocation of TJ from 
an international paradigm (based on PIL) to local settings? And how do norms emerging from local settings 
inform a more global paradigm of TJ (based on a broader set of norms than PIL)? In exploring these issues, 
this study will consider in particular whether truth-seeking, the formation of collective memories and the 
victims’ right to know the truth – the cornerstones of the international paradigm of TJ – are equally 
significant in Muslim-majority legal systems, investigated as an example of a local setting.    
The aim of this thesis is to provide further insight into the challenges of relocating TJ concepts and tools 
from international law to local settings, testing some of the key concepts in relation to Muslim-majority legal 
systems. In particular, this work seeks to critically reassess the normative framework of TJ based on formal 
international law and considers the contribution to that paradigm by informal unofficial local laws based on 
the cultures, customs, traditions and religions of the surviving communities. This work explores whether the 
development of a global law of TJ may draw from the local norms that give bottom-up credence to top-down 
international law rules. By adopting the under-utilised perspectives of comparative law, this research also 
probes the potential of comparative methods in understanding local norms and employing them creatively to 
support the aims of transitional justice (accountability, justice and reconciliation).  
In developing the analysis, two intertwined critical perspectives on embracing local norms will be explored. 
Firstly, caution must be exercised to avoid exacerbating power dynamics imposed by both international and 
local norms, which may operate as a sophisticated instrument of power and violence, especially in fragile 
transitional contexts. Secondly, as the primary moral stakeholders of TJ are the victims and survivors of past 
abuse, it is crucial to give them a voice in the development of TJ. For this reason, truth-seeking activities and 
the formation of collective memories are understood in this thesis as closely connected to the victims’ right 
to know the truth and instigate judicial proceedings and extrajudicial mechanisms as part of the process. The 
right to the truth, therefore, may help apportion responsibilities for past abuse, and at the same time support 
the emancipation of previously marginalised groups and individuals.   
Methodology 
Drawing on Sacco’s methods of comparative law, this thesis interprets the legal formants and cryptotypes of 
societies experiencing TJ.  This approach helps explore two possibilities: firstly, it enables the translation of 4
the international paradigm of TJ (based on PIL) to local settings through a critical comparative appraisal of 
what specific rules seek to achieve. Secondly, it facilitates the contribution of local rules to the establishment 
of a global paradigm of TJ based on PIL as well as on cross-cultural appreciation of norms, linked to notions 
of jus commune and jus gentium.  This creative use of comparative law seeks to bring to light the coexistence 5
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of different norms in understanding the localisation of TJ; it thus makes use of existing and new synergies to 
pursue the transitional aims of accountability, justice and reconciliation more effectively on the basis of a 
variety of sources. 
The research conducted for this project is mostly desk-based, chosen as the most appropriate means to 
consider the theoretical questions and aims of this thesis. The Islamic law sources and commentaries 
reviewed are in English as this author is not fluent in Arabic. As the events of the Arab Uprisings were 
unfolding in parallel to this study, the possibility to conduct fieldwork and interview stakeholders of those 
nascent TJ processes was dismissed because the temporal proximity of events rendered them too fluid to 
enable a meaningful analysis. Moreover, the subject-matter of this law-oriented thesis did not require first-
hand ethnographic inquiry in situ or participant observation. Nevertheless, the direction of this work was 
informed by participation in numerous conferences, workshops and events for academics and practitioners in 
Europe and the Middle East, where I was able to situate my ideas within the broader debate on applying 
transitional justice in specific settings, including Muslim-majority ones. The informal conversations in those 
circumstances, while not structured as part of the methodology, were of great use in developing the thesis 
and articulating its key arguments.  
Can Transitional Justice Relocate to ‘Muslim-majority’ contexts? 
The term ‘context’ is used in this thesis to indicate the discrete setting in which TJ operates that can be 
analysed through a legal lens or from the perspective of other disciplines; whereas the specific phrase ‘legal 
system’, borrowed from comparative legal studies,  describes the complex interplay between norms, 6
practices and actors of a given context that affect how the law operates (referred to by Rodolfo Sacco as 
‘legal formants’ ). A careful examination of all applicable norms in societies facing transition is required to 7
ensure the formalisms of international law and official domestic law (not addressed in this thesis) do not 
eclipse relevant local unofficial law. In order to analyse the local rules that govern a community experiencing 
TJ, the perspectives of international law and human rights can be complemented by the interdisciplinary 
perspectives of socio-legal studies, legal anthropology, IR, legal and political theory, and even cultural, 
religious and theatre studies. In that regard, the methods of comparative law offer a range of analytical tools 
to interpret the complex interaction between competing norms, which in turn helps understand how TJ can be 
relocated from its international paradigm to local, Muslim-majority settings.  
Another notable feature of the study of transitional justice is the context of legal pluralism, where 
international law coexists with a potentially infinite inventory of local norms – including unofficial, informal, 
religious, traditional and customary rules.  The gradual dominance of international law in this field has 8
sought to provide a uniform set of guidelines for global policymakers, national leaders and local actors 
dealing with a legacy of gross human rights violations during authoritarianism, conflict and other forms of 
past violence. Yet, international law (and its agents and proponents) cannot afford to turn a blind eye to local 
rules and conceptions of justice, as this implies the imposition of an inadequate form of TJ from the outside, 
and the obscuring of the the role played by local noms. Alongside the more distant notion of international 
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law, the language and cultural familiarity of local norms are more likely to resonate with survivors; the two 
sets of norms, moreover, cannot be presumed to clash, though disagreements can surface and cannot be 
ignored. Thus, both external and internal stakeholders of TJ initiatives will find it worthwhile to engage with 
local, unofficial and informal norms that guide the social behaviour of communities, alongside the emerging 
international framework of reference.  
The subject-matter of this thesis – localising transitional justice from international law to specific settings – 
finds a contemporary application in the context of the Arab Uprisings, in which Muslim-majority populations 
are facing a political shift, legacies of institutional violence and socio-economic injustices. This research 
identifies and analyses some of the main issues and tensions within the pluralistic legal systems of those 
contexts, in which international law, local norms and Islamic principles coexist, and face questions of 
transitional justice as a complex whole. In light of legal pluralism, considering the potential of comparative 
law helps understand how transitional justice is relocated from international law to specific settings, which 
then presents Muslim-majority legal systems as an example of a much broader issue. These topics require 
consideration for their political significance, and this thesis provides a fresh take on the main concepts and 
approaches to shed addition light on the localisation of TJ from the global to the local level. 
Structure 
This thesis interrogates the main issues in relocating transitional justice from international law to a local 
setting, and in particular in Muslim-majority legal systems, over six substantive chapters, each addressing a 
specific sub-issue of the overall research question. This structure traces the steps taken to unravel the 
research question: after setting out the key concepts of the international paradigm of TJ, it explores truth-
seeking, collective memories and the right to the truth as cornerstone notions. Then, it sets out the 
comparative tools that help relocate TJ, critically explores Muslim-majority legal systems and finally tests 
the international paradigm of TJ – and in particular the means to uncover the truth – vis-à-vis Islamic law.   
What are the rules of transitional justice? The first chapter introduces transitional justice and its distinctive 
concepts, presenting an overview of its applicable rules within a context of legal pluralism. In particular, it 
critically discusses the core applicable provisions of international criminal, human rights and humanitarian 
law, also addressing the rule of law dilemma  and the links with peace and development,  before addressing 9 10
the role of local norms. This reading captures the social and political power dynamics between those who 
shape the process and the beneficiaries, uncovering the instrumental uses of culture, tradition and religion 
alongside the rules of international law that may all shape transitional justice. 
How does the law shape collective memories of violence? The second chapter addresses the role of the truth 
in transitional justice with regards to the formation of historical narratives that impact the core aims of 
accountability, justice and reconciliation. The process of uncovering the truth about historical violence 
potentially sets in motion the sanctioning of perpetrators, victims’ reparations and psychological healing, as 
well as institutional reform. In particular, this part explores the distinctive features of the legal truth (separate 
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from historical/factual truth) constructed through formal truth-seeking processes like trials and truth 
commissions,  which shape collective memories of past abuse.   11
Which international instruments enable survivors to access the truth? The third chapter examines the 
emerging right to the truth under international law. It provides a comparative appraisal of global instruments 
and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American and European human rights systems, and considers the 
significance of the recent El-Masri judgment.  Based on the role of the judiciary in articulating the legal 12
truth discussed in the previous chapter, the right to the truth is viewed from an individual and a collective 
perspective in transitional contexts and, more broadly, in situations of strained rule of law. 
Which conceptual tools help localise TJ? The fourth chapter explores the possibilities of comparative law in 
assisting with the localisation of transitional justice as well as in outlining a global set of rules for transitional 
justice that takes stock of a context of legal pluralism and draws from a variety of sources. Given its focus on 
understanding the complex workings of legal systems as opposed to only finding solutions to problems, 
comparative law is suited to the critical study of local settings in which the international paradigm of TJ may 
be localised. By using comparative law strategically, international lawyers may also be able to contribute 
further to the developing global paradigm (jus commune/jus gentium) of TJ. 
What are Muslim-majority legal systems? The fifth chapter evaluates the key features of Islamic law with a 
view to relocating transitional justice from international law to Muslim-majority settings, exploring how 
contemporary legal systems are influenced by shari’ah, both organically and through the agency of certain 
institutions and individuals.  Building on the analysis set out in the previous chapter, it discusses the 13
tradition and practice of Islamic law – which falls short of constituting a discrete and organic corpus of law – 
as legal formant of Muslim-majority legal systems capable of influencing rules both from the top-down and 
the bottom-up. This chapter also presents an example of how religious institutions have creatively 
reinterpreted the sources to respond to the pressing socio-political realities of transitional justice in the 
context of the Arab Uprisings.  
How does TJ and its particular truth-seeking aim translate into Muslim-majority contexts? The sixth, and 
final, chapter brings together the ideas discussed in the previous chapters in relation to Islamic law. It 
discusses the localisation of some of the core aspects of the international paradigm of TJ in Muslim-majority 
legal systems – especially the notion of legal truth and the emerging right to the truth. It also looks at how 
Islamic law and practice compare to TJ concepts based on PIL, but also how it may contribute to an 
emerging global paradigm of TJ that looks beyond official state laws. By assessing the overlap between the 
substantive and procedural principles of Islamic law with IHRL and ICL,  it explores how the concept of 14
legal truth in the Islamic legal tradition may contribute to the international right to the truth as a component 
of the global paradigm of TJ. 
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Ways Forward 
Responding to the pressing need to rethink the rules of this field as a combination of global and local norms, 
this study offers a fresh insight into the relocation of transitional justice from international law to specific 
settings, and in particular Muslim-majority contexts. Through a comparative law lens, this thesis uncovers 
some of the peculiarities of Islamic law as an example of how local norms are able to accommodate the 
international paradigm of TJ. Truth-seeking, the formation of collective memories and the right to the truth 
provide some insight into how substantive and procedural rules overlap in TJ and Islamic law and can be 
used to further transitional aims as part of the relocation process. That discussion also points to how local 
norms contribute to the formation of global rules of TJ, which may be enriched by a more diverse set of 
norms drawn across different legal systems and traditions.  
This research reveals an overall cross-fertilisation between international law and local norms in TJ at local 
level as well as globally, minimising the relativism v universality cliché. In fact, by deliberately ignoring 
unofficial norms in the relocation of TJ, the international paradigm of TJ is unlikely to attain global 
significance and recognition across different societies. Islamic law – and many other unofficial norms – may 
contribute to the global paradigm of TJ that in turn reflects the possibility of a jus commune/jus gentium of 
TJ which no longer relies on state law and instead is more responsive to informal norms. Indeed, where the 
application of state law is suspended due to its violent and oppressive use in the past, transitional contexts 
face a normative gap at local level that could be partly filled partly by unofficial norms. This study on the 
relocation of TJ to Muslim-majority legal systems explores the possibility of PIL furthering the transitional 
aims of accountability, justice and reconciliation as understood in local norms, which in turn feed into the 
emerging global paradigm of TJ, where the right to the truth is instrumental in building collective memories 
of a violent past.    
!
Postscripts: 
1. Arabic terms are transliterated in simplified form to facilitate legibility.  
2. Journals and publishers are frequently cited in their common abbreviated form.  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Chapter 1
1. Introduction  
Societies  facing a legacy of gross human rights violations during authoritarianism, conflict or other forms of 1
violence, including economic violence,  have sought to creatively design and implement means to address 2
systematic past abuses. Participants in transitional justice (TJ) processes, survivors (victims and perpetrators) 
as well as international actors, have creatively adapted and interpreted existing sources of law to the aims of 
transition. International law and local conceptions of justice, taken together, have attempted to address the 
past and set out a more just future, based on a decent standard of living, freedom from violence and the 
possibility of participation in the political life of a community. The distinctive force of transitional justice is 
to rebuild the future by uncovering and challenging the past, through mechanisms such as trials, truth 
commissions, lustrations, amnesties, institutional reform and constitutional adjustments (to name a few).  
Transitional justice has become a catch-all phrase to describe the dynamic composite processes of policies 
and mechanisms that seek to address the legacy of serious abuse carried out in authoritarian regimes or 
conflicts. However, transitional justice also carries a distinctive conception of law and legality linked to 
periods of radical political change. The UN-defined goals of transitional justice – accountability, justice and 
reconciliation – can be achieved through a variety of means, some of which require a flexible approach to the 
applicable legal framework in deference to political necessities. For that reason, the discovery of the truth 
about a legacy of abuse, and the possibility to manage competing narratives about the past, forms the starting 
point for change. Transitional justice therefore tries to systematise ‘knowledge about the cause-and-effect 
relationships between justice measures and transitions’.  As truths are uncovered, responsibilities 3
apportioned, and the foundations for a more just community are laid as part of TJ processes, individuals, 
communities and states start facing the past.  4
This chapter presents the distinctive concepts of transitional justice and its pluralistic normative framework, 
which, notably, synthesise different branches of international law and unofficial norms of a given context, 
alongside domestic rules (which are not addressed directly in this thesis). After introducing transitional 
justice, it will address international criminal, human rights and humanitarian law (ICL, IHRL and IHL) as 
components of its framework of reference. Finally, it will consider how legal pluralism informs TJ through a 
range of applicable local norms, which may promote a sense of cultural ownership by survivors. This 
perspective captures the social structures and power struggles of the actors that shape each transitional justice 
process, in which strategic applications of law coexist with political uses of culture, tradition and religion.  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2. Transitional Justice: A Re-Introduction 
For lawyers as well as non-lawyers ‘transitional justice’ has become a panacea for addressing the legacy of 
grave and widespread human rights abuses, applicable to both post-authoritarianism and post-conflict 
situations.  One of its principal advocates describes it as ‘a universal policy tool’ that ‘resolves an apparently 5
endless number of problems’.  Indeed, a variety of both ordinary and extraordinary mechanisms, processes 6
and policies fall within the scope of transitional justice.  This section provides a critical overview of the 7
current understandings of transitional justice, its definitions, laws and applications, and lists its main aims 
and mechanisms to achieve them. 
It has been noted that definitions of transitional justice reflect two – not necessarily competing – approaches 
to the topic. The first indicates an umbrella term for the ‘full range of processes and mechanisms’ that make 
up TJ, while the latter captures the more theoretical ‘modified notion of justice inherent in these policies’.  8
Notably, the UN describes transitional justice as: 
The full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of 
large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may 
include judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with different levels of national involvement (or none at all) and 
individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination 
thereof.   9
This definition recognises transitional justice not as a static moment or act, but as a dynamic, on-going 
process originating from a society’s willingness to confront egregious past violations of rights. This process 
comprises three specific and mutually reinforcing aims: ensuring accountability, serving justice and 
achieving reconciliation. It encompasses both judicial means and non-judicial means, at domestic, regional 
and international levels. Therefore, any given TJ process may include a combination of the following 
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measures: successor trials (both criminal and non-criminal), truth commissions,  lustrations (vetting),  10 11
restorative measures (reparations, restitutions, etc),  constitutional and legal reform,  reforming the 12 13
security sector,  opening and making secret files accessible, memorialisations,  public apologies,  state-14 15 16
building (and trust-building) activities,  amnesties,  and more, linked to the rule of law,  democratisation 17 18 19
and human rights promotion.  
The second approach is more theoretical than the first, focusing on the distinctiveness of transitional justice 
as a concept rather than on its mechanisms. Writing in his academic capacity, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence Pablo de Greiff has noted that 
‘in the wake of massive abuses, some of the ‘ordinary’ expectations concerning what justice requires will not 
be satisfied’.  Discussing its key peculiarities, Ruti Teitel has famously described transitional justice as 20
‘caught between the past and the future, between backward-looking and forward-looking, between 
retrospective and prospective’, spanning between the past regime, and the desired (liberal) shift.  Others 21
have also suggested that transitional justice tends to serve interim purposes rather than permanent goals,  22
indicating its time-span as one of its distinctive features. 
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Political contexts also affect the peculiarities of transitional justice. Historically, it is linked to events such as 
post-World War II trials, the dissolution of the USSR and the shift away from authoritarianism in Latin 
America (in more general terms, the ‘third wave of democratisation’ ).  Its connection to democratisation 23 24
and nation-building reaffirms it political nature.  This is because: 25
Transitional justice mechanisms aspire to catalyze processes of deep social change at the global, national and 
local levels, transitional justice, by its very nature, dwells in the realm of politics and public affairs.  26
Politics remains a key aspect of current ‘steady-state’ transitional justice, characterised by the normalisation 
of previously very exceptional measures.  Teitel argues that the establishment of the International Criminal 27
Court (ICC) has entrenched the ‘Nuremberg model’ through ‘the creation of a permanent international 
tribunal appointed to prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as a routine matter under 
international law’,  which still does not subtract transitional justice from the realm of politics and certainly 28
does not equate it to ICL.  
In general, transitional justice is the ‘conception of justice associated with periods of political change’,  29
described by Teitel as the ‘self-conscious construction of a distinctive conception of justice associated with 
periods of radical political change following past oppressive rule’.  This suggests that the very notion of 30
justice in times of political transition is modified – regardless of whether the mechanisms adopted are 
ordinary (such as trials) or extraordinary (such as truth commissions or amnesties). In this context, politics 
inform the norms applicable to transitions,  and at the same time the law shapes the political 31
transformation.  Teitel recognises these normative shifts as a defining feature of transitions, whereby ‘legal 32
practices bridge a persistent struggle between two points: adherence to established convention and radical 
transformation’.  As such, transitional justice balances elements of continuity and change.  33
The lack of ‘clear rules and criteria’ to guide transitional justice has pressed scholars such as Kai Ambos to 
call for a ‘judicializ[ation of] the politics of transitional justice’,  which is gradually happening through 34
international law’s dominance of the field. But while international law undoubtedly provides a framework of 
reference, it is less suited to evaluating the impact of transitional justice on the proposed beneficiaries. 
Political criteria are still more likely to guide assessments of transitional justice (e.g. the effectiveness of 
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political reforms, democratic process, judicial system, etc).  Moreover, the results may only show in the 35
long term.  As such, cognate disciplines beyond law and politics may assist in the evaluation task and 36
highlight some of the problems of TJ.  
Acknowledging the difficulties of measuring transitional justice, Colleen Duggan identifies three broad types 
of challenges: conceptual, contextual and practical.  In particular, a ‘host of social justice goals that are 37
usually ascribed to international development’ as well as donor-driven evaluation parameters may fail to 
understand whether the needs of the beneficiaries have been met.  Identifying the victims  and giving them 38 39
a voice in ‘victim-oriented model of social reconstruction for transitional countries’ is essential but not 
easy.  Moreover, time poses additional issues: many evaluation methods and impact assessments are 40
unsuited to capturing the gradual, subtle and long-term effects of transitional justice.   41
In light of the lack of clear rules and uncertain evaluation criteria, it is crucial to remain mindful of the 
limitations of transitional justice. Kai Ambos describes justice in the context of transitions as ‘an ideal of 
accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of 
wrongs’.  This romantic vision has seen TJ evolve from its original applications in the context of post-42
authoritarianism,  to post-conflict scenarios,  and even in ongoing conflict.  Today, it has found a place on 43 44 45
the international peace and security agenda at the UN Security Council.  But transitional justice may lose its 46
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intended purpose if stretched too far,  because the progressive enlargement of its agenda is likely to 47
disappoint the expectations of surviving beneficiaries (and eventually even donors). 
In brief, transitional justice can be understood as a range of mechanisms and policies associated with a 
society’s desire to face a legacy of past abuse at times of radical political change, as well as the distinctive 
notion of justice associated with those aims in transitional contexts. Its ambitious aims are accountability 
(truth), justice and reconciliation, which are pursued by both judicial and extrajudicial means, notably 
including trials, truth commissions, inquiries and vetting. More broadly, however, the social justice goals of 
transitional justice merge with developmental aspirations of political reform and redistribution of resources 
as well as power, which are almost impossible to measure from a legal angle alone. The steady-state 
transitional justice established by the creation of permanent bodies under international criminal law (ICL) 
may not, therefore, be a sufficient framework of reference for the discipline. The sections that follow will 
discuss the contributions of ICL and human rights to understandings of transitional justice based on 
international law, and then provide an analysis of the complementary legal sources that may inform the 
process locally.   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3. Transitional Justice and International Criminal Law  
In light of the previous discussion, the focus of this section will be the relationship between transitional 
justice and international criminal law (ICL). Criminal trials at domestic and international level constitute a 
common feature of TJ and often coexist with other mechanisms, such as truth commissions. Nevertheless, 
tensions between competing transitional aims of reconciliation and accountability (which includes criminal 
retribution) have been identified within broader debates of ‘truth v justice’.  But the coexistence of 48
reconciliation and retribution within TJ suggests, instead, that these two aims are complementary.  As such, 49
the function and applications of criminal trials is informed by the range of transitional aims of accountability, 
justice and reconciliation.  
A recurrent problem of criminal trials in TJ is that they may be ‘show trials, unbefitting a democracy’ and 
concealing ‘manifestations of victor’s justice’.  In the context of current steady-state transitional justice,  50 51
ICL has become a key component of the applicable legal framework, exposing even the ICC to such 
criticism. Against this backdrop, the greater emphasis on fair trial guarantees and victim’s rights in 
international human rights law (IHRL) – which permeates and is also capable of triggering criminal justice  52
– may temper some excessively punitive effects of penal law.  
Naomi Roht-Arriaza identifies two main approaches to understanding the relationship between transitional 
justice and ICL.  On the one hand, their interrelation is based on transitional justice functioning as a 53
precursor to ICL, filling in gaps or providing alternatives to prosecutions, for example through reparations.  54
On the other hand, the two may run parallel to each other, as ICL seeks primarily to ‘enforce the law’ 
regardless of the circumstances,  whereas transitional justice commands greater flexibility. Both approaches 55
and a shared history inform the special relationship between transitional justice and ICL. And precisely 
because international criminal justice as a field ‘has developed at the intersection of interstate diplomacy, 
criminal justice and human rights advocacy’, it remains powerful in transitional justice.  56
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The Nuremberg Trials  at the end of the Second World War catalysed ‘the first phase of transitional 57
justice’.  At the same time ICL and IHRL were also developing.  ‘The turn to international criminal law 58 59
and the extension of its applicability beyond the state to the individual’ to separate state and personal 
accountability provided new opportunities to deal with past abuse.  After a pause during the Cold War, ICL 60
reclaimed centrality in transitional justice in the 1990s, first through the ad hoc tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), then with the establishment of the ICC. This phase is 
characterised by continuity expressed in the provisions of the Rome Statute and the existence of a permanent 
criminal tribunal of international character leading to the concept of steady-state transitional justice.  
In light of these developments, some have called for a more proactive leadership of the ICC in coordinating 
transitional justice initiatives,  although scepticism surrounding the ICC would commend extreme caution in 61
that regard.  Most notably, Security Council (UNSC) referrals to the ICC through UN Charter Chapter VII 62
resolutions highlight the political risks in establishing links between grave human rights abuses and 
international peace and security issues.  To date, this has occurred only in relation to Darfur (Sudan) and 63
Libya.  Thus, as UNSC referrals to the ICC remain sensitive,  their use in relation to transitional justice 64 65
should be extremely cautious. Likewise, other routes to activate the ICC’s jurisdiction – state referral and 
proprio motu initiatives by the Prosecutor – though based on a state’s formal acceptance of jurisdiction, may 
conceal power dynamics and new patters of socio-political oppression (especially in fragile states) that a 
global criminal court should navigate carefully. It has been argued that the deterrence potential is curtailed 
under this system.  As such, caution is of essence in resorting to the ICC in transitions. 66
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The requirements of TJ have tested the flexibility of ICL. Teitel identifies the ‘rule of law dilemma’ as one of 
the core features of transitional justice, questioning whether in transitions ‘criminal justice [is] compatible 
with the rule of law’.  She notes how ‘in fledgling democracies, where the administration of punishment can 67
pose acute rule-of-law dilemmas, the contradictions to the uses of the law may become too great’, attested by 
frequent decisions to avoid prosecutions.  One attempt to solve this dilemma distinguishes between 68
positivist and natural law approaches described in the jurisprudential debate between Fuller and Hart; in 
essence, while positivists attach special value to procedural regularity (even in radical breaks with the past), 
natural lawyers focus instead on elements of substantive justice.  The second group favours the 69
‘transformative role of law’, discarding previous ‘putative law’ that ‘lacked morality and hence did not 
constitute a valid legal regime’.   70
The presumption of a relationship between internal morality (i.e. procedural rules) of a discipline and moral 
principles understood in a given social context has been deconstructed by Ronald Dworkin.  Before him, 71
Schmitt posited that legitimacy outweighs legality, justifying exceptional violations of rules.  More closely 72
related to transitional justice, Hannah Arendt has also addressed the tension between law and morality in her 
analysis of the Eichmann trial, in which she reaffirmed the supremacy of morality.  She did, however, 73
identify a violation of international law and the territorial principle in the specific circumstances of the case 
(kidnapping and extradition to bring the indictee to justice in Jerusalem); but this act was condoned because 
the ‘unsatisfactory condition of international law’ meant that ‘the realm of legality offered no alternative to 
kidnaping’ , and ultimately justice is the only ‘end of the law’.  Thus, achieving justice by upholding 74
morality over legality intertwines positivist and natural law arguments to serve transitional aims.  
As ‘the principle of legality is a manifestation of the broader notion of the rule of law’,  its implementation 75
is likely to have an impact on a broad range of policy areas regulated by the state. The principle of legality 
(non-retroactivity) and the rule of law are conceptually separate, the latter being broader in political scope 
and less technically specific to criminal justice. It helps inform instrumental and substantive aspects of the 
rule of law in transition and non-transition alike. The instrumental approach focuses on the necessity of the 
legal system to ‘work to structure behaviour’ (i.e. to achieve the government’s aims), whereas the substantive 
approach relies on the desirable objectives of ‘fairness, human dignity, freedom and democracy’ (i.e. the 
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‘goals of the social contract: liberty and justice’).  Margaret Radin argues that ‘rules are not made merely by 76
legislatures or other authoritative entities’, but are instead made ‘public wherever strong social agreement 
exists in practice’ and ‘include an evolving complex of political commitments to the flourishing of the 
community and the individuals in it’.  This reflects Wittgenstein’s social practice conception of rules, ‘in 77
which agreement in responsive action is the primary mark of the existence of a rule’.  This analysis also 78
informs the rule of law dilemma in transitions. 
3.1 The Malleability of the Rule of Law, ICL and Transitional Justice 
The political context of transitional justice may affect the principle of legality. In general, this is expressed 
by the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege banning retroactive applications of criminal law.  Its 79
interpretation in international criminal justice, however, has been ambiguous since the post-Second World 
War International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg.  The principal preoccupation was the 80
identification of an existing rule in international law that outlined the categories of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity; the alternative was to produce a carefully constructed argument to support the moral 
standing and justification of the IMT. Even Kelsen took this latter perspective and revived morality in PIL: 
To punish those who were morally responsible for the international crime of the Second World War may 
certainly be considered more important than to comply with the rather relative rule against ex post facto laws, 
open to so many exceptions.   81
Contemporary scholars have argued that the Hague Conventions provided some precedent for war crimes, 
but not for crimes against humanity, for which the IMT ‘had no real authority, nor did it even try seriously to 
demonstrate that such acts had been punishable under international law in the past’.  Quoting from the 82
Nuremberg judgment, Schabas reports:  
the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. 
(…) [The Nazi leaders] must have known that they were acting in defiance of all international law when in 
complete deliberation they carried out their designs of invasion and aggression.   83
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This argument is based on the presumed morality of international law in rejecting ‘designs of invasion and 
aggression’; thus, the IMT favoured the legitimacy of the intent of seeing justice done rather than upholding 
the strict legality and the formalisms of non-retroactivity. The resulting principles of international law, 
including clearer formulations of the categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity, were 
subsequently endorsed by the UN International Law Commission,  paving the way for subsequent directions 84
of ICL and IHRL. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the ends pursued justified, but did not completely solve, 
the defects in formal legality accepted by the IMT.  
More recent examples in ICL suggest that exceptions to strict applications of the principle of legality did not 
end at Nuremberg. In the Tadić case,  the ICTY severed the link between crimes against humanity and 85
international armed conflict, which was clearly set out in its own Statute.  The Appeals Chamber got round 86
the problem by stating that ‘the requirement of a connection with war was ‘peculiar to the context of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal’, citing a 1948 decision of an American Military Tribunal as evidence that no nexus was 
required by customary international law’.  Today, this position is found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, 87
which does not even mention international armed conflict.  Arguments of peculiarity and exceptionalism 88
have determined derogations from the principle of legality when judges (or political forces behind them) 
have deemed it necessary to revise the limits of applicable law, often paving the way for the formalisation of 
new norms. Although this may improve effectiveness of ICL, blatant derogations from the principle of 
legality forces any deviation to be fully supported by a strong motivation in the overall interest of 
‘justice’ (as was the case in Tadić) – in other words, a legitimacy or morality argument.  
The natural law/positivism dichotomy  still guides the philosophical underpinnings of the principle of 89
legality in international criminal justice and more broadly international law today, and is also relevant for 
transitional justice. According to Teitel, the law in times of transition is uniquely flexible.  Conversely, 90
Posner and Vermeule have argued there is legal continuity in transitional justice;  any partial derogations to 91
strict applications of the principle of legality simply reflect natural evolutions of law even in times of non-
transition. Thus, the concept and applications of law in times of transition stem from the law as a whole – 
and its embedded degree of flexibility – without having to radically erode legality.  
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Posner and Vermeule discuss various ways in which the rule of law can be understood in relation to TJ.  92
They identify four categories of applicable law: (1) new law, applied retroactively; (2) old law, which was 
never enforced; (3) old law, which was not enforced against the perpetrators from the old regime; and (4) 
international law.  The last three types find their sources in pre-existing normative frameworks (domestic or 93
international), thus not raising rule of law concerns, provided the formal procedures for adoption under the 
laws existing at the time were satisfied. In that regard, the potential instrumentalism of blending all law 
together in transitional justice and tailoring legal solutions to the context (and people) of a given situation 
remains problematic. A defence could be provided by the New Haven School adage: ‘jurisprudence is a 
theory about making social choices’.  As such, the rules themselves are informed by the process of making 94
and applying laws, ‘in ways that maintain community order and, simultaneously, achieve the best possible 
approximation of the community's social goals’ (in this case, the aims of transitional justice).   95
Similar considerations apply to the final category of law listed above: new law applied retroactively.  96
Posner and Vermeule argue that the rule of law dilemma can be circumvented through various techniques 
which place retroactive law within an existing legal framework, appealing to higher pre-existing law, such as 
constitutional law, international law, jus cogens, or (unenforced) norms of the previous regime.  97
Interpretative statutes also give new meaning to the previous regime’s positive law, and modified statutes of 
limitations may extend the temporal reach of transitional justice.  These methods used to anchor transitional 98
justice law, including substantially new norms and retroactive applications, to existing, ordinary (non-
transitional) law, reveal positivist appropriations of essentially natural law claims.  
Arguing that transitional justice constitutes an extraordinary form of justice, David Gray sees transitional 
laws as departing from the preceding legal order, which emanated from the ‘abusive public face of the law’: 
this determines the paradox of the rule of law.  He reports that some courts may uphold ‘the principles of 99
predictability’ of non-retroactivity over ‘the revolutionary role of law as an agent of change’, whereas others 
favour the ‘transformative potential of the law over its formal duties of predictability and fair warning’.  100
As such, notions of higher law surface again, giving voice to natural law theories that underpin transitional 
justice and somehow coexist with positivist requirements of law. In effect, strict positivist approaches may 
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require ‘too much legality’, with the detrimental effect of ‘undermin[ing] the legitimacy of law’ and 
‘conflict[ing] with seemingly self-evident natural law aspirations’ in punishing perpetrators or seeking 
redress for victims.  Reflecting the legitimacy-legality tension, Mark Drumbl suggests that ‘law as 101
technique may fall short of law as justice’, suggesting a distinction between ‘mass atrocity crimes’ and 
‘ordinary common crimes’ in light of the ‘sui generis nature’ of the crimes proscribed by ICL.  102
Self-styled ‘third way’ interpretations of the extraordinary/ordinary justice debate suggest that ‘transitional 
justice is neither in itself a distinctive form of justice nor a mere compromise, but rather a principled 
application of justice in distinct circumstances’ as proposed by De Greiff.  This argument still rests on 103
potentially very differing conceptions of what the law of transitional justice could be, how it is derived from 
existing notions of justice, and how it ought to operate in practice. Therefore, when the law of transitional 
justice is conceived as a novelty, it is more likely to conflict with the principle of legality; whereas, when it 
is presented as flowing uninterruptedly from pre-existing norms, alterations to the principle of legality will 
be less likely.  
Ultimately, however, political decisions determine whether the principle of legality can be usurped, as well 
as the extent to which the rule of law may be disregarded when new laws are introduced as part of TJ – as 
demonstrated at Nuremberg. From a theoretical angle, the New Haven School perspectives help defend the 
inherent flexibility required by transitional justice both with regard to processes and functions,  as well as 104
with reference to the pluralism embedded in international lawmaking.  Additionally, critical legal studies 105
approaches shed light on the power imbalances (including gender and socio-economic status) that affect TJ 
processes, which rely heavily on derogations to the principle of legality.  With an eye to the aims of 106
transitional justice, a degree of flexibility motivated by specific circumstances and situated within the scope 
of applicable international law (and specifically ICL) is not necessarily detrimental to the legitimacy of the 
process. Moreover, a uniform global law of transitional justice is unlikely to yield better results than a 
conscientious application of the international legal framework integrated by domestic laws and relevant 
normative principles of informal justice (religious, traditional, etc), as discussed later in this thesis. 
To sum up, the relationship between transitional justice and ICL is both historical and conceptual, as 
demonstrated by the solutions proposed to the rule of law dilemma from Nuremberg to the current steady-
state TJ. At international level, trials at Nuremberg and at the ICTY provide examples of the creative 
solutions to reinterpret the laws of transitional justice to suit the needs of a given context. As to the question 
whether transitional justice is ordinary or extraordinary justice, Posner and Vermeule, Gray and Teitel have 
resuscitated older arguments over positivist and natural law approaches to criminal justice and international 
law, as well as the possible tension between legality and legitimacy in law. Acknowledging that transitional 
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justice is ultimately guided by political factors that affect the interpretation and applications of ICL does not 
quite solve this debate, but it does place it in a broader context. Moreover, the gradual ascent of IHRL in 
relation to transitional justice shifts our attention away from the perpetrators and towards the victims and 
societies at large, overshadowing the role of ICL in transition in favour of a human-rights approach to 
transitional justice.  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4. Transitional Justice and International Human Rights Law 
The intimate link between transitional justice and IHRL is widely recognised. In the seminal 1995 
Transitional Justice trilogy, edited by Neil Kritz, frequent references to human rights cement its importance 
in the discussion.  At UN level, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 107
coordinates transitional justice matters in relation to human rights – albeit presented as special issues.  The 108
Human Rights Council has specifically requested the OHCHR ‘to continue to enhance its leading role, 
including with regard to conceptual and analytical work regarding transitional justice, and to assist States to 
design, establish and implement transitional justice mechanisms from a human rights perspective [emphasis 
added]’.  The High Commissioner for Human Rights  has stated that the UN deals with TJ in close 109 110
connection to IHRL practice.  And Secretary General followed this approach in his 2010 Guidance Note on 111
Transitional Justice.  Human rights now dominate international conceptions of transitional justice.  112
This evolving connection between TJ and IHRL raises the question of whether transitional justice is ‘simply 
part of the human rights movement’.  Paige Arthur discusses the cross-fertilisation between the two 113
disciplines to illustrate how transitional justice is distinct from human rights, concluding that the historical 
origins of the former differentiates it from the latter  A further argument supporting separation emerges 114
from an analysis of objectives: for transitional justice, the key aim is to facilitate a systemic transition to 
democracy (which generally include human rights provisions), and not the enjoyment of human rights 
specifically.  Moreover: 115
Unlike the broader human rights movement, transitional justice relies on two sorts of beliefs, which are 
“normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust”; and casual 
beliefs, which are “beliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus 
of recognised elites”.    116
The relationship between law and politics further illustrates the distinction between transitional justice and 
IHRL.  This becomes visible, according to Sweeney, in the tension between the political purposes of TJ 117
and human rights law.  In the context of the ECHR, that Court has upheld human rights standards set out in 118
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the Convention and case law, instead of allowing derogations motivated by the exceptions of transitions of 
states emerging from authoritarianism or civil war.  As transitional aims do not automatically trump IHRL, 119
this divergence reveals that TJ is distinct from human rights. 
In general, there is some evidence that transitional justice initiatives improve human rights and 
democratisation of a society.  Teitel highlights the role of human rights during the second phase of 120
transitional justice, exemplified in post-authoritarianism in Latin America.  With regards to current steady-121
state transitional justice (discussed above), she laments the conflation between IHL, ICL and IHRL as a 
detriment to human rights, which still remain a benchmark of the process.  Compared to ICL, IHRL 122
encompasses a broader range of situations within the scope of TJ, beyond the four crimes listed in the Rome 
Statute. Moreover, the category of victims in IHRL is wider than its equivalent in ICL: although the ICC has 
leapt forward in terms of victims’ participation and reparations,  the remedies and reparations afforded in 123
IHRL are, at least nominally, greater.  The main reason behind this discrepancy can be found in the 124
subject-matter of the two: since the establishment of the ICC, ICL focuses on four international crimes, 
whereas the variety of human rights protected in a (growing) number of international instruments enjoy a 
capillary reach, which is more likely to respond to TJ needs.  
A dual human rights approach to transitional justice can be identified: on the one hand, human rights 
violations may trigger transitional justice responses, while on the other, transitional justice seeks – more or 
less openly – to rebuild a fragmented society on human rights principles, including political and civil rights 
as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Human rights, at least theoretically, provide a framework for 
inclusivity and non-discrimination in dealing with the past and building a better future on the basis of basic 
freedoms and access to resources. Maintaining a human rights focus in transitional justice may also help 
mitigate the detrimental effects of power structures or exalting certain narratives over others,  as well as 125
limiting the (continued) marginalisation of significant portions of society, like women and girls.  126
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The human rights approach to transitional justice may also draw on cultural relativism debates to ensure TJ 
is responsive to local, informal and customary norms. Indeed, understanding the challenges and 
opportunities of culturally-responsive TJ is key to designing (participatory) processes that suit the needs of a 
beneficiary community.  Awareness of informal normative sources (such as traditional or religious norms) 127
is, arguably, crucial for developing human rights-oriented TJ mechanisms that resonate with the victims’ 
visions of justice, which may in turn increase their involvement in transitional processes. The second half of 
this thesis will explore these themes with particular reference to Muslim-majority settings. 
Finally, it is important to recall that the presumption of the global bounty of human rights is debatable,  as 128
is the usefulness of IHRL instruments.  Some have explained how human rights are bad for resolving 129
conflict.  Others have argued that promoting human rights can be ‘bad politics’ if it legitimises repressive 130
states or facilitates the harm it seeks to prevent.  Cases radically against human rights have been made: for 131
example, the notion of human rights has been described as ‘fraudulent’;  and Posner has recently argued 132
that ‘Human rights treaties were not so much an act of idealism as an act of hubris’, with deep-rooted 
colonial connotations.  133
To reply to these critiques, human rights approaches to transitional justice do not have to be necessarily rigid 
and imperialistic: in principle, transitional justice allows for flexible approaches to human rights that 
respond to the needs of beneficiary societies and the sentiment of political actors. Ultimately, the way 
transitional justice is designed is a policy choice: there are no a priori human rights imperatives in 
transitions, and criticism directed at IHRL in that regard expresses frustration more than anything. The 
choice to uphold strict interpretations of IHRL is an obligation for UN-led transitional justice initiatives, but 
individual countries may freely choose differently within their own jurisdiction, according to their past and 
present status of ratification and practice.   134
4.1 Root Causes, Human Development, Peace and Transitional Justice 
IHRL, encompassing in principle the full range of rights, is better suited than ICL to addressing the root 
causes of conflict preceding transitional justice.  The 2010 UN Guidance Note calls for transitional justice 135
to take into account ‘the root causes of the conflict and the related violations of all rights, including civil, 
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political, economic, social and cultural rights’.  This acknowledges links between TJ and broader questions 136
of sustainable peace  and development  stemming from political and armed violence as well as socio-137 138
economic inequalities. Addressing socio-economic rights as part of transitional justice, argues Ismael 
Muvingi, is necessary to prevent the recurrence of conflict; at the same time, it is important to ensure that TJ 
mechanisms do not reproduce past inequalities through a mix of neoliberalism, colonialism, post-
colonialism and globalisation.  But linking the ultimate aims of transitional justice initiatives to long-term 139
peace and development carries a double warning: firstly, the promise of security and material wellbeing is 
unlikely to be honoured by transitional justice mechanisms alone; secondly, focusing excessively on long-
term social reconciliation may cause additional grievances in the present, further exacerbating social 
tensions.  
During her mandate as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour made a strong case for the 
inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) as an integral part of transitional justice.  The 140
holistic interpretation of transitional justice that Arbour borrows from Alexander Boraine, founder of the 
International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘offers a deeper, richer and broader vision of justice’ that takes 
into account the three key stakeholders of the process: victims, perpetrators and society at large.  In 141
essence, victims need to survive and, probably, their living conditions might need to be bettered; structural 
inequalities that allowed for perpetrators to inflict harm need redress; and societies in general might need 
restructuring so as to limit patterns of prevarication, marginalisation and suffering. But can transitional 
justice help with this? Lars Waldorf has argued that transitional justice in its current form is unable to 
respond to ESCR considerations – and extensions of its reach in that direction may be impractical.  Aoife 142
Nolan and Evelyne Schmid, instead, have responded to these concerns, suggesting that ESCR are, in fact, as 
aspirational in transitional justice as civil and political rights are.   143
ESCR approaches to transitional justice may help respond to violations that affect entire communities, 
including mass famine,  lack of access to healthcare,  settler-colonial harms harms inflicted to indigenous 144 145
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peoples,  and unequal land distribution.  Denial of food, healthcare and structural social marginalisation 146 147
all fall within the scope of ‘subsistence harms’, proposed by Diana Sankey as a novel category of 
‘interrelated mental, physical and social elements’ of the minimal ‘conditions necessary for people to survive 
and live’ which require recognition in transitional justice.  This approach responds to the needs of victims, 148
who are seen as survivors whose lives depend on the implementation of basic ESCR, and not (only) on 
transitional justice instruments that focus on civil and political rights.    
ESCR-sensitive transitional justice also paves the way for an investigation into the economic crimes that 
affect a society facing transition, including corruption.  In establishing links between commercial loans 149
and gross human rights violations, corporate accountability becomes relevant to transitional justice,  and 150
upon further scrutiny, even corporate complicity.  International donors and International Financial 151
Institutions (IFI) may contribute to propping up abusive governments – as was the case with Mubarak’s 
regime in Egypt, as Reem Abou-El-Fadl notes.  Paradoxically, although IFIs are aware of the noxious 152
effects of corruption, their intervention in fragile states may be detrimental.  Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky 153
argues that ‘lenders providing financial assistance to authoritarian regimes should be held responsible for 
complicity if they knew or should have known that they would facilitate human rights abuses’, recalling that 
IFIs are ‘under obligation not to violate or become complicit in the violation of general rules of human rights 
law’ as well as jus cogens.  By way of example, he cites the 1960s controversy between the UN General 154
Assembly and the World Bank over lending policies to South Africa and Portugal due to their human rights 
situation.  A further issue for transitional justice to consider is what to do with massive sovereign debt 155
incurred by former authoritarian regimes to support a system of human rights violations;  a ESCR-156
sensitive approach may offer some solutions. 
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Although in practice minimal evidence of the ESCR-sensitive approach to transitional justice is available,  157
the right to property is the exception to this rule. Considering the ICTY case of Kupreskic, Arbour recalls that 
the ‘comprehensive destruction of homes and property may constitute the crime against humanity of 
persecution when committed with the requisite intent’.  This echoes the Geneva Conventions in which 158
‘intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable 
to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies, is also recognised as an international crime’.  159
The restitution of property, however, is more complex. In the context of decommunisation, the ECHR has 
favoured stability of property relations and the prospective rule of law rather than restitutions to original 
owners.  The Court found that ‘long-extinguished’ property right could not be revived’ and thus property 160
restitution was not due after the fall of communism.  All of this suggests that although a clear and uniform 161
framework for property rights is still absent, unlike other ESCR issues it has been considered as part of TJ.  
In essence, ensuring a dialogue between ESCR and transitional justice is part and parcel of the human rights 
approach to transitional justice, considering also the principle of the indivisibility of rights. However, the 
extent to which international law may yield tangible results in redressing violations of ESCR through TJ 
mechanisms is unclear. While rejecting the supremacy of civil and political rights on the basis of a 
presumption of more successful justiciability, ESCR has the potential of guiding transitional justice 
initiatives in light of the root causes of conflict and with an eye to human development (of which human 
security, broadly interpreted as a shorthand for peace, is an important structural condition). This approach 
also points to radical critiques of the role of IFIs and international donors in exacerbating violence, as well as 
the neoliberal agendas pushed onto fragile transitional states. By becoming more ESCR-sensitive, the human 
rights approach to transitional justice is more likely to respond to overarching collective issues that also 
contribute to the broad aims of accountability, justice and reconciliation – such as accountability for causing 
harm to societies (including subsistence harms), social justice with a view to a better future for all, and 
reconciliation between individuals and groups who must find strategies to live side by side after violence.   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5. Transitional Justice and International Humanitarian Law 
Alongside IHRL and ICL, IHL provides an international ‘normative framework and language for thinking 
about successor justice’ and ‘regime wrongdoing’.  Discussing the influence of IHL on transitional justice, 162
Elizabeth Salmón identifies a connection ‘between the way the parties act during an armed conflict’ and ‘the 
chances of achieving peace and reconciliation while restoring the rule of law once the hostilities have 
ended’.  This relationship emerges at two points in time: before the conflict, IHL carries a preventive role 163
regarding state obligations to implement and give effect to its provisions nationally, to prevent ‘serious 
violations of its provisions during a conflict’; after the conflict, its punitive provisions ‘establish the 
obligation to suppress all violations of IHL and to search for and prosecute those who have committed grave 
breaches of IHL in international armed conflicts’ – extending to non-international armed conflict through 
customary international law.   164
The application of IHL is specific to armed conflict, limiting its usefulness to only transitions from 
recognised international or civil wars. In those cases, the jurisdiction of IHL overlaps with IHRL – which 
provides a normative continuum in war and peace.  Revising the lex specialis principle, both the ICJ and 165
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have stated that they are equally applicable in 
conflict.  This means that even when IHL applies to TJ situations, it does not eclipse IHRL. 166
One of the main advantages of applying IHL in TJ contexts is the imposition of ‘obligations on all parties to 
an armed conflict, including non-governmental armed groups’, making authorities and non-state actors 
equally accountable for violations.  As such, categories protected under IHL – notably civilians and 167
persons hors de combat – are considered to be vulnerable in conflict situations regardless of who commits 
violent acts against them. Extending the responsibility of violations to non-state actors, consequently, 
expands the contours of the victim group.  
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Under IHL, victims of international and non-international armed conflict are protected in Additional 
Protocols I and II.  The 2011 ICRC Report, Strengthening legal protection for victims of armed conflicts, 168
expressly lists persons deprived of liberty (internees), victims of IHL violations, persons affected by the 
degradation and destruction of the natural environment, vulnerable to losing their livelihood, and internally 
displaced persons.  Nevertheless, as there is no ‘general mechanism that would allow victims to assert their 169
rights under IHL’,  it is arguably more useful doctrinally to frame the gravity of certain types of violence 170
than as a practicable tool for victims to seek redress.  
Much of the harm suffered in conflict recognised under IHL may give rise to justiciable rights for victims 
under IHRL. Gross human right violations and breaches of IHL have been considered jointly to include 
within the category of victims those who ‘individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss’ and ‘immediate family, dependents of the direct victim 
and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent 
victimisation’.  Compared to IHL, in principle IHRL provides a more tangible means of redress as part of 171
TJ, given the nominal existence of regional and international mechanisms designed for individual 
applications of victims of this sort of violence.  
Since the establishment of the ICC, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression fall 
expressly within the scope of the Rome Statute.  Cassese has implied that the subject matter of IHL is 172
subsumed under ICL.  Therefore, in the current steady-state transitional justice, grave violations of IHL 173
would, ratione materiae, fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Prior to the establishment of the ICC, the 
ICTY also linked IHL and international criminal justice, in its notable decision to consider the 
quintessentially ‘private’ crime of rape as a war crime, the most serious IHL violation.  The case of 174
Kunarac suggests that ICL can be a vehicle for the implementation and the development if IHL in relation to 
transitional justice; ICL may also be a means to bring to justice perpetrators of harm and provide some legal 
redress for victims of grave IHL breaches committed by authorities and non-state actors, in the absence of a 
designated IHL tribunal.   
In addition to the difficulties of justiciability, drawing on IHL to ‘incorporate a full account of successor 
justice’ is challenging in itself.  Salmón considers whether, ‘in the post-conflict period, the obligation to 175
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comply with the rules of IHL requiring perpetrators of violations to be punished’ constitutes ‘an obstacle to 
the transition process’ – for instance, by limiting amnesties and reconciliation initiatives.  While political 176
crimes and minor common crimes may fall within the scope of amnesties, grave breaches of IHL, including 
war crimes and torture, cannot be amnestied.  Truth commissions have also considered the ‘punitive or 177
sanctioning aspects of IHL’ when a situation of armed conflict is ascertained.  This suggests that strict 178
adherence to IHL may stand in the way of the transitional aim of reconciliation.  
On the whole, the present role of IHL in transitional justice is interstitial to that of IHRL and ICL, largely 
due to the lack of justiciability of IHL. Moreover, compared to IHRL and ICL respectively, IHL is generally 
less responsive to the needs of individual victims, nor does it apportion individual criminal responsibilities 
on perpetrators. Nevertheless, IHL has helped transitional justice develop truth-seeking initiatives 
(especially in the Southern Cone) which has paved the way for the establishment of the right to the truth, 
discussed in chapter 3.     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6. Bottom-up Norms of Transitional Justice 
The international normative framework for transitional justice has been described as a ‘mess’ by Christine 
Bell.  This uncertainty, according to Moses Chrispus Okello, offers the ‘potential for genuine 179
transformation of the international balance of powers’ promulgated by international law.  Relatedly, An-180
Na’im voices concern over neoliberal, ‘North Atlantic’ conceptions of human rights, hierarchies of needs 
and procedural mechanisms to redress past violations rejecting ‘indigenous or ‘traditional’ practices’ as 
‘inconsistent with ‘universal’ human rights norms’.  As such, the assumption that international law is the 181
benchmark for TJ is problematic, unless it engages local norms and practices.  
The UN report The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict situations states that 
international law can be accommodated by all legal systems and traditions.  Bell suggests that international 182
law could offer ‘a notion of best practice’, to ‘encourage people to comply through processes that include 
democratic dialogue on how international standards are best implemented in any one context’.  This 183
approach seems to reconcile with the pluralistic legal framework of transitional justice, in which all relevant 
sources, including unofficial norms, are taken into account. Such flexibility allows us to move away from 
the legalism that comes with considering only formal written norms, which does not provide a complete 
picture of the various rules that guide TJ in a given setting.  Ultimately, the balance between global and 184
local law is a contextual policy decision. 
Discussing transitional justice in cultural contexts, Lieselotte Viaene and Eva Brems argue that ‘cultural 
challenges are part of a critical evaluation’ of the field, attested by a growing interest in ‘bottom-up, 
interdisciplinary, empirical and concrete approaches’.  In effect, TJ initiatives that combine different types 185
of formal as well as unofficial law (including informal, customary or religious normative principles) may 
help contextualise global norms in local language. Grassroots legitimacy may be bolstered by forms of 
‘bespoke’ TJ, which incorporate local perspectives instead of universalist visions of justice.  Thus, if 186
discrepancies between local and global can be reckoned with, international law and local understandings of 
justice may mutually reinforce TJ.  
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The perspective of legal pluralism describes the relationship between coexisting – and sometimes competing 
– different legal orders within the same jurisdiction or (informal) normative space.  Today’s ‘global legal 187
pluralism’  responds to the complexities of an interdependent world – the very context in which transitional 188
justice develops through the initiative of a variety of actors and on the basis of competing norms. According 
to Brian Tamanaha, manifestations of legal pluralism include the inherently pluralistic notion of international 
law,  the challenge posed by human rights norms to state law, customs and cultural practices,  the self-189 190
creating legal orders established by ‘transnational corporations, NGOs (…), trade associations, various 
subject-based international agencies, and lawyers who serve them’, trans-governmental networks, and the 
global movements of people.  Understanding what exactly constitutes law might be complicated,  and 191 192
these uncertainties affect the rule of law, especially in transitional contexts.  Laura Grenfell suggests that 193
while the ‘rule of law is deficient when there is confusion within communities as to the applicable law due to 
inconsistencies between local law and the formal legal system’, legal pluralism is still very important in 
‘weak state legal systems’.  Indeed, the perspective of legal pluralism provides an analytical tool for 194
understanding how competing rules operate in given transitional settings. 
The TJ process in Rwanda offers examples of how the ICTR, domestic trials and local gacaca courts 
coexisted under legal pluralism.  In essence, alleged perpetrators fell within the jurisdiction of different 195
fora according to their role and the gravity of their actions during the genocide. This structure, in principle, 
enabled complementarity of the different mechanisms.  So, masterminds (‘persons responsible for genocide 196
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law’) fell under the jurisdiction of the ICTR, set up 
by a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter, as the situation constituted ‘a threat to 
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international peace and security’.  Mid-ranking persons were tried in national Rwandan courts (though 197
these trials have been strongly criticised for their bias).  The third tier of justice was formally devolved to 198
the gacaca, a (reinterpretation of) community justice, considered by its proponents suitable for lower-level 
perpetrators who still lived in the communities they had harmed. The gacaca are ‘based on indigenous 
models of local justice’, involving, according to some estimates, up to one million individuals.  Though 199
international reception of the gacaca has been mixed,  the Rwandan experience proves that multi-layered 200
TJ drawing on local justice as well as on PIL is feasible – and legal pluralism can help analyse it.    
The possibilities offered by legal pluralist perspectives on TJ and the inclusion of local justice are not 
without risks. A theoretical threat is posed by the relativist/universality debate which polarises competing 
norms on the basis of their presumed local or global foundations and hinders dialogue (discussed in chapter 
4). Moreover, with specific reference to the notion of local justice, two distinctive challenges have been 
identified by Joanna Stevens and Lars Waldorf.  Firstly, by focusing on groups rather than individuals, 201
local justice pursues collective benefits as opposed to individual ones, which is likely to result in the 
dominance of powerful actors’ interests over those of disempowered survivors. For instance, focusing on 
violence between different groups may overshadow violence within a single group – notably gender-based 
violence (GBV) and violence against women and girls used as an internal mechanism of social control in 
addition to external uses of sexual violence as a weapon of war (a war crime).  And as women are often 202
relegated ‘to peripheral roles in traditional mechanisms of justice’, GBV is likely to be trivialised.  203
Secondly, by seeking compromise and community harmony, local justice initiatives may treat certain forms 
of harm as unimportant in the bigger picture, such as minority rights of politically and socially marginalised 
groups.  Third, Stevens and Waldorf consider the emphasis on restitution over other forms of punishment 204
in local justice, which may skew the focus of TJ on material rather than moral responsibility, or even ignore 
root causes of conflict and uneven power distribution.  
The community focus of local and traditional forms of justice may actually reaffirm abusive power 
structures. Importing cultural contexts to TJ calls for a ‘double caution’ to ‘avoid incorrect simplistic notions 
of culture or tradition’ and identify the ‘abuse of cultural arguments (…) by governments attempting to cover 
up their shortcomings in dealing with the past’.  Waldorf warns against a ‘tendency to romanticize local 205
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justice by downplaying its coercive aspects and its function in asserting (or reasserting) social control’.  206
Recalling Hobsbawm and Ranger’s seminal work on The Invention of Tradition, ‘what passes for 
harmonious, indigenous custom are more often than not ‘invented traditions’ designed to promote social 
control and political ideologies’; as such, only demystifying local justice facilitates an honest appraisal of its 
role in TJ.  Thus, the turn to local justice, a catch-all phrase including cultural, traditional and religious 207
normative values of a community, may conceal the political motives and interests of powerful stakeholder of 
the TJ process.  
6.1 Religious Norms, International Law and Transitional Justice  
In light of legal pluralism and the need to engage local norms alongside PIL, religious normative values – the 
principles that underpin formal and informal ‘religious law’ – provide an additional layer to the applicable 
legal framework of TJ. When a society facing transition demonstrates strong religious sentiments – whether 
at individual or institutional level or both – religious law is likely to play a part in TJ alongside international 
law and other formal norms. In some cases, religious norms are formalised into positive official/state law, 
and as such may affect TJ processes through domestic law and the agency of recognised religious actors. 
Apart from their influence on state law, religious norms may express understandings of local justice, able to 
permeate TJ processes as ‘intuitive unofficial law’ (described below and in chapter 4). It also interacts with 
global law, to the extent faith-based normative values cross national boundaries.  
The interface between religion and international law has been described as a ‘double-edged sword’, capable 
of both positive and negative uses.  Some have celebrated a tolerant ‘universalising influence of religion’, 208
which marginalises regressive ‘religious extremism based on an alleged dualism between good and evil’.  209
However, this form of ‘humane internationalism’ inspired by religion has been criticised as echoing the 
project of ‘gentle civilisers’ of the mid-nineteenth century and theories of Christian-driven PIL.  Given that 210
international law is ‘about how people negotiate power, justice, and pragmatic self-interest, at home and 
abroad’,  religious law may serve to justify and contest power structures. Ultimately, religious laws are 211
interpreted and enforced by living individuals and institutions in a political context.  Thus, it is imprudent 212
to believe either that ‘religion can play a positive and important normative role in international law and 
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should therefore [always] be accommodated’, or that it should be kept strictly separated from PIL.  Like all 213
law,  including PIL, religious norms both contribute and are susceptible to power dynamics. To that effect, 
Mashood Baderin has argued that ‘religion has never been completely exiled from international law’, as both 
address ‘fundamental issues about ordering society’, ‘ethical and normative regimes’, and are susceptible to 
being ‘politicised and manipulated by elites’.  214
In transitional justice based on PIL, religion is relevant in two main ways. Firstly, abstract religious 
principles may influence the framework of reference for the design and development of a TJ process; 
secondly, religious actors may have an important function in furthering and negotiating the role of religion in 
society and guiding their congregations in political directions. In certain contexts religious principles 
constitute an important element in the normative framework of TJ, to the extent that a given society affords 
religion a (formal or informal) normative function and on the basis of the majority’s religious sentiment. 
Under a liberal human rights paradigm, including religion in the debate is desirable because its exclusion or 
restriction ‘would not only be illiberal but would stifle a valuable source of healing traumatized societies’.  215
Furthermore, the reality on the ground in Muslim-majority settings – as investigated in this thesis – suggests 
that religion is being invoked in transitional contexts, as demonstrated in the debate around the Arab 
Uprisings.  This example reaffirms the pluralistic nature of TJ, in which international law and unofficial 216
and religious norms coexist.     
Constructive synergies between the aims of TJ and religious principles should be explored. With reference to 
the Abrahamic faiths, Daniel Philpott argues that the concept of ‘justice’ tends to be highly valued by 
religion: for instance, it is reflected in the ‘purposes, character and actions of God’.  Furthermore, the 217
notion of ‘reconciliation’ and the ‘restoration of a broken relationship’ are features of both transitional justice 
and religion; notably, forgiveness, ‘the most distinctive, innovative and controversial practice’ offered by 
religion engages the ‘amnesty v. accountability’ debate in TJ.  But religion and TJ may also interact at a 218
psychological level, which then affects the law. Michael Bohlander remarks that transitional justice is ‘also 
and to a large part about religious psychology and parental as well as peer-group-based behavioural 
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conditioning’.  This proposition resonates with Leon Petrazycki’s psychological and sociological analysis 219
of emotions in relation to ‘legal impulsions’ giving rise to so-called ‘intuitive unofficial law’, that is, people's 
spontaneous behaviour guided by their legal intuitions rather than by statutes or other normative facts.  220
Intuitive unofficial law complements positive official law (i.e. domestic law enforced in state courts), 
positive unofficial law (described by Adam Podgorecki as ‘a mediator or unofficial agency resolving a 
conflict with reference to positive law or normative facts’) and intuitive official law (for example, the ratio 
decidendi of a court judgment based on equity).  Consequently, even in formally secular contexts, religious 221
principles may still emerge in the form of ‘legal impulsions’ that affect the TJ process.  
Religious actors influence TJ according to the degree of their ‘institutional autonomy from the state’ before 
and after the transition.  Aaron Boesenecker and Leslie Vinjamuri agree that ‘local faith-based actors’ have 222
‘played a pivotal role in adapting international accountability norms and embedding them in local 
practice’.  These civil society actors have the advantage of being generally separate from the formal state 223
apparatus.  Past examples of religious actors detached from the authorities who have been able to promote 224
truth commissions include Archibishop Tutu in South Africa and Bishop Gerardi in Guatemala.  But when 225
religious leaders ‘acquiesced to tyranny, civil war and genocide and were impotent in the aftermath’ or were 
‘integrated with the state’, the possibility of taking on a constructive role in TJ was compromised (e.g. the 
Catholic Church in Argentina and the former Yugoslavia’s three religious communities aligned to nationalist 
politicians).  More recently, al-Azhar, a leading centre for (Sunni) Islamic jurisprudence has taken part in 226
the in the TJ debate of the Arab Uprisings (discussed in more detail in chapter 5), displaying its contentious 
political role in Egyptian society and across Muslim-majority societies.  In practice, therefore, the role of 227
religious leaders in TJ is comparable to that of secular civil society actors.    
Civil society actors, including religious leaders fall in four broad categories identified by Boesenecker and 
Vinjamuri: norm makers, norm adaptors, norm facilitators and norm reflectors in ‘bridg[ing] the gap between 
international norms and local practice’.  Faith-based organisations are primarily norm-makers, governed by 228
values embedded in organisational ‘beliefs and practices’ and ‘faith doctrines’; as such, when facing a 
tension between theological principles and IHRL, they tend to sacrifice the latter.  Norm adaptors are 229
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‘highly pragmatic actors’ and negotiators operating at ‘the interface of the local and the international, seeking 
to adapt the international accountability norm to fit with local political constraints and culture’.  Norm 230
facilitators ‘embrace, embody and disseminate international expectations for accountability’, acting as 
‘agents of the international human rights community’ seeking to ‘ensure that local practices governing peace, 
justice and accountability are consistent with international standards’.  Finally, norm reflectors are highly 231
localised and closely reflect the culture of their environment; as such, they may resist engagement with 
international law or any other norms perceived as foreign.   232
Norm adaptors and norm facilitators are most likely to develop conceptions of TJ that meet international law 
standards and are also inclusive of local justice and religious principles. In light of the inherent pluralism of 
TJ, which relies on a variety of sources including ‘intuitive unofficial law’, these actors may play an 
important part in synthesising and balancing competing norms applicable to transition. A critical awareness 
of the dynamic legal framework of TJ may overcome standoffs between different actors as agents of different 
norms. This approach also carries the potential to enable a greater range of perspectives as well as more 
inclusivity in the TJ process. By basing TJ on a wider set of relevant norms, PIL and religious values coexist 
and the aims of justice, accountability and reconciliation may enjoy a deeper societal meaning and thus 
contribute to bottom-up ownership of the process. 
In brief, this section discussed a paradox: transitional justice based on international law cannot only rely on 
international law. By acknowledging the bottom-up normative influences that impact on the design and 
implementation of transitional justice (in addition to domestic law, which this thesis does not address 
directly), this section has shown how local justice and practices, including religious normative values as an 
example of intuitive unofficial law, make up an important part of the framework of reference that overlaps 
with international law. Thus, the rules of TJ can be understood from the perspective of legal pluralism, where 
different sets of norms coexist depending on the context. In general, and in TJ settings, the relationship 
between religion and international law plays out at two levels: the first is abstract and relates to principles, 
and the second is concrete, based on the actors that determine the dialogue between the two sets of rules. The 
latter also brings to the fore the profane character of religious law when it meets political interests in the 
context of transitional justice. Therefore, a pluralistic understanding of the legal framework of TJ reveals a 
greater spectrum of applicable rules beyond international law – as well as the power struggles and 
compromises of transitional stakeholders.  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7. Conclusions 
Transitional justice is a range of mechanisms and policies associated with a society’s attempt to face a legacy 
of past abuse at times of radical political change, as well as the distinctive notion of justice in transitional 
contexts. The transitional aims of accountability, justice and reconciliation are pursued by a variety of 
judicial and extrajudicial means, whose backward-looking intentions also reflect forward-looking goals. 
Transitional justice based on international law relies heavily on ICL, IHRL and (to a much lesser extent) 
IHL. These sources are complemented by bottom-up normative influences such as local justice and practices, 
including religious normative values, that coexist with international law within the framework of legal 
pluralism.  
Given the deeply contextual nature of each TJ process, it is impossible to sketch a blueprint normative 
framework of reference. The combination of international law and local norms helps understand the 
complexities of the field. Regardless of whether TJ constitutes an ordinary or an extraordinary form of 
justice, its present-day steady-state is determined by the existence of permanent global mechanisms, which 
pose new political challenges. The role of international criminal justice in transitions has been gradually 
eclipsed by the ascent of IHRL, shifting away from perpetrators of harm and towards victims, survivors and 
societies at large. The human rights approach to TJ may be better-suited to addressing the range of root-
causes of conflict in view of social justice, human development and sustainable peace. In the context of legal 
pluralism, TJ can also draw on local informal norms – including religious law – which foster local ownership 
of the process.  
Ultimately, the normative framework of each transitional setting will differ from one scenario to the next. 
The balance between global and local norms in TJ is a policy decision specific to each setting – though it 
may reflect political manipulations or exacerbate structural inequalities or establish new forms of social 
violence. With regards to reconstructing narratives of the past, the tensions between different norms may 
conceal competition between different actors and interest groups that shape the process. For this reason, to 
avoid the entrenchment of marginalisation of certain individuals and communities not only in TJ processes 
but also in the post-transitional society, diverse participation under a framework of legal pluralism is likelier 
to capture the complexities of ensuring accountability, serving justice and achieving reconciliation. The 
following chapter will analyse the uncovering of historical accounts of past abuse, and consider the complex 
relationship between TJ, truths and collective memories.  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Chapter 2 
1. Introduction  
The discovery of the truth and the role of narratives about the past are a key feature of transitional justice.  1
Ruti Teitel has argued that truth and historical accountability alter the political landscape, and that the 
reconstruction and public recognition of truths may set in motion ‘other legal responses, such as sanctions 
against perpetrators, reparations for victims, and institutional change’.  Beyond its collective political effects, 2
recognising the truth contributes to the psychological healing of victims of gross human rights abuses.  Thus, 3
how the reconstruction of the truth is formed affects the TJ process for individual survivors of past abuse as 
well as their communities. As truth-seeking links to each of the aims of accountability, justice and 
reconciliation, this thesis will consider the truth as a distinguishing crosscutting theme of TJ. This chapter 
investigates the formation, effects and limitations of uncovering the truth through formal proceedings in 
which competing narratives are decided, exerting an effect both between parties and on society more broadly.  
The understanding of the truth adopted in this thesis is based on Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s 
Allegory of the cave: the truth is that which is unhidden, as in not concealed (by actors interested in keeping 
the truth hidden) and the related ability (possibility) to comprehend that which is uncovered.  This twofold 4
appreciation of the truth is particularly suited to the context of TJ, in which efforts to obscure the past and its 
consequences shield perpetrators from being accountable for their violations thus compromising justice and 
reconciliation. While both moments are inherently political, uncovering the truth is a backward-facing 
endeavour, whereas its interpretation is more forward-looking.  
This chapter analyses how the truth can be discovered and interpreted in TJ by distinguishing between the 
notions of legal truths and factual historical truth. The first part considers the complex relationship between 
truth and TJ. The second part explores the notion of legal truth, its formation and limitations. It considers 
how the legal truth shapes historical accounts, and looks into how stakeholders in truth-seeking processes 
influence its course. The final part examines the ritual and performative characteristics of formal truth-
seeking such as trials and truth commissions – as well as any potentially comparable mechanism recognised 
by a community – in forming collective memories. In the broader context of the research question, this 
chapter analyses the notions of legal truth and collective memory as resulting from a clearly-defined process 
or framework. While constituting a distinctive feature of TJ, upon further scrutiny, formal truth-seeking 
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mechanisms display a ritual character situated within the culture and expectations of the beneficiary 
communities (and stakeholders) – this includes international law as well as local understandings of justice.  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2. Truth and Transitional Justice 
Truth and transitional justice are linked in two separate but related ways: through the notion of 
accountability, and as a precondition of pursuing justice and reconciliation. In the first instance, truth can be 
discovered through a variety of transitional justice means either directly, such as in the case of truth 
commissions and inquiries whose specific purpose is to investigate the past, or obliquely, through trials, 
reparations programmes, vettings and institutional reform, in which truth-finding is not an aim but a result. In 
the second instance, the facts and narratives emerging from TJ mechanisms formalise accounts, 
responsibilities and victimhood, establishing official versions of the past and thus contribute to long-term 
goals, such as reforming state institutions, rewriting basic laws, redistributing resources more fairly and 
removing key agents of abuse to rebuild a society’s future.  
Grasping the definitive philosophical concept of the truth cannot be fully investigated in this thesis for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the breadth of scope and effects of ‘the truth’ would not be captured in full and 
with a sufficient degree of nuance without an ambitious interdisciplinary study beyond the scope of law. 
Secondly, the possibility of relying on the narrower, more formal notion and functions of ‘legal truth’ allows 
lawyers to focus on some of the salient features of the truth for the purposes of transitional justice. However, 
going beyond the law helps inform our understanding of the truth for the purposes of TJ, a discipline which 
cannot afford to be a sterile legal endeavour.  
One of the main tensions within transitional justice is the balance between truth and justice, often presented 
in an adversarial model.  Priscilla Hayner describes it as a ‘careful but critical relationship’, noting the ‘false 5
duality’ of assumed trade-offs between truth and justice, typified in the fear that truth commissions set out to 
avoid formal prosecutions and exonerate from criminal responsibility.  This is not necessarily the case, as 6
demonstrated by the frequent recommendations in the final reports of truth commissions to open criminal 
proceedings on the basis of the discoveries.  Even Ruti Teitel rejects the ‘truth v justice’ tension, opposing 7
the zero-sum trade-offs between the two and the choice of either a criminal or a historical inquiry.  Instead, 8
she presents the truth as ‘a virtue of justice’, which is neither synonymous nor independent of it.  The 9
question rests on the sort of truth which is being pursued; this encompasses the extent to which societies and 
new political leaders accept ‘multiple representations of the “truth”’, given the tendency of successor 
governments to focus on one narrative in order to facilitate a smoother political transition.  Thus, the links 10
between historical justice and other forms of justice include ‘establishing past wrongdoings’ which ‘gives 
victims a form of reparation’, ‘delineating a line between regimes’, using the findings to make 
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recommendations for structural changes and ‘attempts to transform public opinion regarding state tyranny’.  11
Thus, truth-seeking is able to catalyse justice as a process which includes accountability for past abuse as 
well as future justice as reconciliation.    
The relationship between truth and justice is complemented by the links between truth and reconciliation. In 
this regard Colm Campbell and Catherine Turner note how truth may be subjected to the interests of 
reconciliation, which include ‘selection and championing of only those truths useful in a reconciliation-
focused teleology’.  This involves the political decision to favour some accounts over others, giving a voice 12
to certain survivors while marginalising others, thus constructing a narrative of truth which reflects the 
ultimate goals of the transitional process instead of accounting for the factual harm suffered by victims. The 
relationship between truth and justice is also problematized by the possibility of amnesty. With reference to 
both the Latin American and the Eastern European transitions, Naomi Roht-Arriaza notes how the use of 
amnesties traded ‘justice for the past in exchange for justice for the future’.  This highlights how the need 13
for societies to reconcile after mass abuse and move on has at times sacrificed the need to account for that 
abuse and apportion responsibilities. Recently, this antagonistic model of ‘truth v justice’ seems to be 
resolving in favour of a complementary approach.  Recognising the interdependence between the three 14
transitional aims of accountability, justice and reconciliation helps acknowledge that the truth does not only 
relate to accountability, but is in effect a crosscutting theme of justice and reconciliation.   
Reaffirming the crosscutting effects of the truth in transitions, UN Special Rapporteur Pablo de Greiff lists 
three ends of TJ closely connected to historical justice: (1) recognition of victim status; (2) promotion of 
civic trust (both horizontal, between citizens, and vertical, between citizens and state institutions); and (3) the 
strengthening of the democratic rule of law.  The acknowledgment of victim status and recognition of the 15
abuse suffered provides a forum for sharing survivors’ accounts, minimising the marginalisation of their 
voices in the public sphere. Seeing victims also as rights bearers and citizens is equally important: trials, 
truth-seeking mechanisms, reparations and institutional reforms all contribute to this end.  Therefore, the 16
discovery of the truth as a component of transitional justice is beneficial to individual victims, as well as 
useful for fostering a collective process of civic trust and the strengthening of the rule of law, which are 
essential in forward-looking transitional justice. Focusing just on criminal retribution misrepresents the 
broader aims of transitional justice, which encompass a collective forward-looking effect as much as a 
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backward-looking premise, as well as responding to the specific needs of each given scenario.  As such, a 17
truth relevant to specific victims and perpetrators carries a collective effect in reconstructing the past for a 
better future.   
The dual backward and forward-looking nature of TJ described by Teitel  suggests that truth cannot be 18
divorced from time and context, and may take on differing meanings accordingly. Drawing on Benedetto 
Croce, Yasmin Naqvi recalls that ‘truth is relative to present interest’: 
The relativism of truth is a concept that becomes important in the legal formulation of the right to the truth, 
because we can work out what information needs to be provided according to the needs of the rights-holder.  19
Similarly, Patrick O’Callaghan proposes an ontological vision of the past that ‘forms a foundation of our 
actual consciousness’, which in turn ‘has implications for both policy-making and our understanding of 
law’.  Drawing on Gadamer, he identifies the option of employing a ‘presentist’ perspective of the past, 20
instead of respecting the ‘pastness of the past’.  This may be a distinctive feature of law’s interpretation of 21
the past; Walter Otto Weyrauch has suggested that, although ‘both law and history are concerned with the 
meaning of the past’, ‘law is more concerned with the subjection of past pronouncements to present social 
needs’.  In the context of transitional justice, this reveals that truth-seeking and the truth itself are 22
approached from a present (and future) perspective in order to accommodate transitional aims. This does not 
imply that the validity of the truth should be compromised or its factual relevance modified to obey the 
political imperatives (or forces) of transition. Instead, more subtly, it suggests that the past which is 
uncovered may not be approached systematically or holistically, due to that ‘presentist’ perspective that 
determines the focus, scope and depth of inquiry into the past.  
Philosophy, and in particular epistemology, has addressed questions of truth in relation to knowledge, 
highlighting the descriptive and normative functions of knowledge (and truth) at individual and collective 
levels.  The processes of truth making through legal processes may be understood in light of the rich 23
theoretical debates that have puzzled philosophers for centuries.  The interest of some in keeping the truth 24
about past abuse hidden illustrates Michel Foucault’s claim that ‘truth isn’t outside of power, or lacking in 
power: … Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint’.  25
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Moreover, ‘truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to 
effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A ‘regime’ of truth’.  The revelation of truth, 26
therefore, is affected by power dynamics; at the same time, it can be used as a tool of power in a political 
context – including in transitional justice processes.  
Frederick Schmitt outlines four types of truth: correspondent, pragmatist, coherent and deflationary.  The 27
latter is different from the first three as it posits that ‘truth talk is expressive (enhances the expressive power 
of language) rather than descriptive’.  This suggests that talking about the truth may actually contribute to 28
constructing the truth, reflecting Austin’s theory of ‘performative utterances’.  Schmitt himself critiques the 29
very need to define the truth at all;  nevertheless, the expressiveness of truth is an important concept to 30
consider in relation to transitional justice inasmuch as it highlights the constructive force of official accounts 
about the past in establishing certain narratives over others. As a social matter, truth ‘may be generated by 
social procedures and structures’ and it is possible for it to be ‘agreed upon’ .  In other words, truth can be 31
presented as a construction of knowledge, or ‘manufactured’.   32
Just as it is constructed, truth is contested within the political space of transitions. Teitel considers how 
transitional justice implies a ‘displacement of one interpretative account or truth regime by another, even as 
the political regimes change, while preserving the narrative thread of the state’.  The conservation of the 33
new historical account can be achieved through the law, which may also be used to control other accounts 
which reinterpret political events and may be detrimental to the establishment of the new order.  However, 34
she cautions against the ‘attempt to entrench an identity based on a particular historical view’, as this would 
be in itself an illiberal vision,  competing with the right of freedom of expression central to liberal states.  35 36
Consequently, Teitel stresses the importance of a ‘plurality of narratives, instability and political dialectic’.  37
In that sense, she seems to acknowledge that it is precisely the dialogue between differing voices and 
competing accounts of the truth which must be reckoned with during and after the transition in order to avoid 
Page    of  52 216
 Ibid, citing Foucault supra, fn 2426
 Frederick F Schmitt, Theories of Truth (Blackwell 2004)27
 Ibid, 2828
 John Langshaw Austin, How to do things with words: The William James Lectures delivered in Harvard University in 29
1955 (OUP 1962)
 Schmitt, Theories of Truth, 2830
 Naqvi, ‘The right to truth in international law’, 25331
 Moses Chrispus Okello, ‘Afterward: Elevating Transitional Local Justice od Crystallizing Global Governance?’ in 32
Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf (eds), Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass 
Violence (Stanford University Press 2010), 276
 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 11533
 Ibid, 105 et seq. Examples of legal limitations of certain accounts and the barring of certain individuals from 34
influencing public debates can be found in post-war constitutions and later court decisions. In Italy, Article XII of the 
‘Transitory and Final Provisions’ of the 1948 Constitution introduced a temporary political lustration of the Fascist 
cadres, limiting their voice in the political debate of the newly founded republic. In Germany, in the recent Wunsiedel 
case [Case No. 1 BvR 2150/08, paras. 1–110, 4 Nov. 2009] the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) held that the prohibition of neo-Nazi gatherings on symbolic days for the movement did not 
violate the constitutional right to freedom of expression. See Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘The Limits of Freedom of Expression 
in the Wunsiedel Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court’ (2010) 11(8) German Law Journal 929, Teitel, 
Transitional Justice, 103 et seq, and Roht-Arriaza, ‘The New Landscape of Transitional Justice’, 13




a shift to another illiberal regime. Support for historical transitional justice that reckons with internal 
contradictions is offered in the ethical perspective of deconstruction provided by Drucilla Cornell: 
Deconstruction necessarily presupposes an ethical relationship to others; deconstruction requires us not only to 
recognise others as others but also to be open to them and their perspectives. Thus, deconstruction contains an 
ethical imperative both to question our own beliefs and to understand the situation and views of others.  38
Against this background of commitment to the truth in the context of multiple narratives, including those put 
forward by members and supporters of the previous illiberal regime, historical transitional justice sketches a 
sufficiently nuanced image of past facts for a torn society to continue discussing. As such, scholars and 
practitioners of transitional justice in various settings may benefit from adopting a critical, interdisciplinary 
approach to interpreting the legal framework to deliver historical transitional justice, of which the truth – and 
the developing right thereof (as discussed in chapter 3) – is a key component.  
Taking stock of these theoretical premises, historical transitional justice has relied heavily on the distinctive 
notion of legal truth. But ‘legal and historical truth are far from identical’, as Martti Koskenniemi 
admonishes.  Borrowing Jacques Derrida’s point that ‘there is nothing outside the text; all is textual play 39
with no connection with original truth’, Yasmin Naqvi suggests that ‘the truth starts to look more like a right 
to an official statement about what happened’, bringing about an ‘obligation on the part of the state to 
disclose something’ and a ‘matter of the use of language by the state’.  Indeed, the formal recognition of 40
facts about past abuse through a prescribed procedure authorised by a set of norms (existing or new) helps 
elevate a narrative (or set of narratives about the past) to the status of an official account. Once a portrayal of 
the past enjoys formal endorsement by a competent (but not necessarily legitimate) authority, that account of 
the truth becomes both an end in itself as well as a means to other transitional aims linked to reforming 
society towards reconciliation. For this reason, both trials and truth commissions  – and potentially any 41
other formal transitional mechanism that investigates the past directly or indirectly – can deliver legal truths. 
Trials and truth commissions constitute the core legal tools of transitions.  In the context of historical 42
transitional justice, the assumption that criminal trials deliver justice and truth commissions uncover the truth 
has been convincingly rejected.  Instead, they both contribute to establishing the ‘legal truth’ about past 43
abuse, which impacts on individuals as well as on societies at large. Trials are often necessary to discover 
and act upon the truth in ways that truth commissions may not; likewise, truth commissions, in many 
transitional settings, may discover a broader set of truths than those of formal criminal trials. 
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Jon Elster notes that ‘generally, any measures undertaken to punish wrongdoers will ipso facto be capable of 
serving the needs of the victims’.  This indicates that the punitive intent of criminal trials carries with it an 44
important corollary for victims (as well as society at large) in giving formal recognition to responsibilities 
regarding past abuse, thus uncovering the truth. The legal truths emerging from criminal trials, in fact, have 
two main effects: firstly, as the res judicata of trial proceedings seeks to resolve a dispute between parties, its 
results have an inter partes relevance. Secondly, the acknowledgment and establishment of a set of facts that 
describe the dispute and the context in which it has arisen may carry an important collective function in 
stating an official version of the truth. The political relevance of courts’ establishing facts about the past has 
been recognised in non-transitional settings,  and this dynamic, constructive approach to official truths 45
becomes more significant in TJ contexts. Moreover, trial-based truth-seeking is actionable through IHRL, as 
human rights principles and laws can ‘trigger (…) the application of criminal law’.  This facilitates the 46
access to the right to the truth, which is one way victims of harm can demand to know the truth about past 
violence, as discussed in detail in the following chapter. The legal truth can thus be understood as ‘the legal 
conception of a right owed by the state to the individual’.  47
On the other hand, truth commissions specifically seek to uncover the truth through formalised, yet non-
judicial, proceedings characterised by a non-punitive intent (or at least, not directly).  This mechanism is 48
likely to include a broader range of participants, not limited to direct victims, in the quest for a better 
articulated account of the past; consequently, the truths uncovered through the work of truth commissions 
may be better-suited to including more voices and thus more narratives of the facts in order to reach a more 
complete picture of past abuses. These unofficial ‘truth projects’ have been famously described as ‘narrowing 
the range of permissible lies’,  ‘limit(ing) the possibility of denial or trivialization of victims’ experiences’.  49 50
A built-in feature of truth commissions is the public nature of their findings. Louis Bickford notes that: ‘they 
transform what is often widely-known about violent past events – common knowledge – into official 
acknowledgment’, which is ‘important both for its symbolic value and for its practical effects’.  In other 51
words, they elevate truth to legal truth. Moreover, truth commissions include the ability to connect with other 
transitional justice mechanisms, including criminal trials, ‘such as prosecuting past violators of human rights 
or war criminals, or initiating meaningful institutional reform’.  Thus, the truths uncovered in truth 52
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commissions may play an important role within the broader transitional justice process, beyond the mere 
establishment of legal truths. 
The discussion around the truth in relation to historical transitional justice and the notion of legal truth as 
something separate from facts and history brings to light the inherent flaw of truth-seeking as part of 
transitional initiatives: any truth found is unlikely to be the mere description of historical fact. If we combine 
Derrida’s view that textual play dominates accounts of the truth with Foucault’s critique of the truth as a by-
product and tool of power structures, the quest to uncover the truth about the past may seem pointless. 
However, by acknowledging that truth-seeking in the context of transitional justice is inherently ‘presentist’, 
the contradictions within the truth can be understood in their critical context: truth (including legal truths) 
offers and synthesises a plurality of competing narratives that pave the way for political dialectics, as 
indicated by Teitel, that may shape other aspects of transitional justice, such as institutional reforms. In this 
context, a deconstructive analysis of the truth can engage a given conviction about the truth, as well as 
opposing views, a facet which, according to Cornell (discussed above), captures the ethical imperative to 
question beliefs held. As such, we have the possibility (or the imperative) of critically contesting the truths 
constructed by trials and truth commissions, and challenging the rules of procedure as well as substantive 
norms that may elevate truth to the sacredness of legal truth; regardless of their factual validity, the political 
uses of truths determine transitional justice.   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3. Legal Truths in Transition 
An example of the effects of the legal truth on TJ can be found in the context of the Milošević trial, halted 
after the death of the defendant,  in relation to which ICTY prosecutor Carla Del Ponte indicated that:  53
The lack of a judgment has not deprived the four-year trial from achieving some of its objectives, in particular 
that of satisfying to some extent the right to the truth or settling down a historical record.  54
This statement indicates that the trial documents published by the ICTY have had a political effect in 
establishing and providing a formal record of the truth, regardless of the fact that the defendant died before a 
judgment was possible. Some have indicated that the legal truth is ‘merely a by-product of a dispute 
settlement mechanism’.  The notion of legal truth, however, is more complex.  Constitutive theories of law 55 56
suggest that ‘law is not simply an instrument for enforcing a system of morality or justice but is also “part of 
a distinctive manner of imagining the real”’.  Robert Summers defines ‘formal legal truths’ as ‘whatever is 57
found by the legal fact-finder (judge or lay jurors or both), whether it accords with substantive truth or not’, 
drawing on Hans Kelsen’s identification of a created legal fact, which may exist in the sphere of law, 
although it has not occurred in the sphere of nature.  This perspective fits the analysis presented in the 58
previous section, which suggested that truth does not necessarily follow historical reality and thus should be 
understood in its political context and in light of power structures within society.  
The political power of the law extends to the creation of narratives. Implicitly expanding the notion of legal 
truth beyond the res judicata and corollary documents, Jack Balkin argues that ‘law creates truth – it makes 
things true as a matter of law’ and ‘in the eyes of the law’.  He contends that ‘law is continuously 59
proliferating truth into the world’; by ‘making things real’, it has power in two ways: ‘it can make things true 
or false in a way that matters to us’ but also ‘because it has power over us’.  Law ‘creates legal knowledge’, 60
it is ‘a form of cultural software that shapes the way we think about and apprehend the world’, in a way 
‘compromis[ing] one’s ability to understand what is true, because what is true from the standpoint of law is 
not really true’.  Judges, therefore, play a crucial role in constructing the legal truth about past abuse; 61
consequently, their vision of society and politics is likely to trickle down into the official narratives of truth 
they construe.  Moreover, law ‘is intertwined with, supports and is supported by the power and authority of 62
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the state’, or of equivalent political forces that dominate transitional justice policies.  These presumptions 63
are controversial, as they presuppose (perhaps mistakenly) and support (perhaps unjustifiably) the idea that 
the power and authority of the state are in place and will operate the legal system according to the rule of 
law, and thus would be able to deliver legal truth legitimately and effectively in the course of transition. For 
this reason, a variety of means to find the legal truth – such as truth commissions, but also non-criminal 
judicial proceedings  may help overcome institutional limitations that affect criminal trials.  
It is important, however, not to underestimate the force of truths derived from unofficial truth-seeking 
processes – that is, mechanisms other than formal trials or official truth commissions. Unofficial Truth 
Projects (UTPs), rooted in civil society organisations such as NGOs or universities, rather than in state-based 
efforts, also contribute to uncovering the truth about past abuse.  It has been noted that one of the primary 64
advantages of UTPs is the ‘community level truth-telling’ they entail.  Comparable considerations could be 65
drawn from traditional forms of truth telling, as was the case in the Rwandan gacaca.  Indeed, as long as the 66
truth-seeking processes are recognised in the society they seek to serve, a degree of formalism is met, 
regardless of the specific shape they take. Thus, artistic expressions that describe past sufferings through 
literature, drama, visual arts and music may all contribute to truth-seeking ends at community level.  
Legal truths can be recycled elsewhere. For example, in Milošević the ICTY decided to lift the 
confidentiality of certain information after the death of the accused in order to facilitate other related 
proceedings.  This possibility was discussed where there was ‘a sufficient nexus’ based on ‘substantial 67
geographical and temporal overlap’ between cases,  or when individuals had been jointly accused.  68 69
Moreover, other truth-seeking projects in the Balkans (notably in Kosovo) have been able to use some of the 
legal truths of the Milošević trial.  This reaffirms the potential political uses of legal truth for entire regions 70
that share a history of past abuse, highlighting the potential overlap between individual cases and society as a 
whole.  
Trials and truth commissions are able to share information and feed into each other’s work if there is the 
political will to do so. For instance, criminal proceedings and truth commissions can be set up as 
complementary, leading to legal truths which embody characteristics of both mechanisms. In Mexico, the 
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Special Prosecutors Office  is supported by the Citizens’ Support Committee made up of lawyers, historians 71
and social scientists with the function of giving a voice to victims and to society at large,  and it has full 72
power to name and gather evidence against the perpetrators of human rights violations.  The decision to join 73
the truth-seeking efforts of criminal investigations and a cross-sector truth commission leads to legal truth 
which is grounded in both mechanisms, blurring the lines between two primary aims: individual criminal 
accountability on the one hand, and a collective interest in knowing the truth about past abuse on the other. A 
second example is the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación), which was able to pass on recorded evidence of crimes and alleged perpetrators to 
prosecutors.  Indeed, one of the aims of the Peruvian TRC was to help advance criminal prosecutions, and it 74
did so by handing over case dossiers to the Office of the Prosecutor General (Ministerio Público).  This also 75
resulted in expressions of legal truth that combined the perspectives of both criminal proceedings and truth 
commissions, whose relationship was strengthened by the sharing of information about pass abuse. Both 
examples suggest that legal truths can synthesise the perspectives of trials and truth commissions, while 
maintaining the dual inter partes and collective effects of accounts of past abuse.  
A further example of the pursuit and formation of the legal truth from the bottom-up – involving both 
individual and collective effects – can be found in Argentina, in relation to the responses to the amnesty that 
temporarily blocked further inquiries into the past.  With the publication in 1984 of the Nunca Más report 76
by the Argentine National Commission of the Disappeared (the CONADEP truth commission),  the 77
construction of the ‘public truth’ of past events became a central feature of transitional justice initiatives. 
Thanks to the CONADEP inquiries, families of victims held in secret detention centres were able to discover 
the fate of their loved ones, and those accounts acquired the status of legal truth and due publicity through 
that mechanism.  The problems arose when the amnesty laws of Argentina were passed – the Full Stop Law 78
(Ley de Punto Final) and the Due Obedience Law (Ley de Obediencia Debida) – after which victims and the 
general public could no longer know the truth through formal means.  
As a reaction to the policy decision of banning trials through amnesty, the joint efforts of a creative judiciary 
and a proactive civil society found an alternative means to the legal truth: truth-finding trials/truth-trials 
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(juicios por la verdad).  These proceedings, while neither establishing criminal responsibility nor 79
sanctioning perpetrators, set out to investigate the truth about crimes carried out under the dictatorship and 
ascertain the fate of the victims.  Elena Maculan describes these truth-finding trials as ‘‘bottom-up’ 80
procedures in the sense that they originated as a consequence of the pleas presented by human rights 
associations and the families of the victims of forced disappearance’.  Invoking the right to the truth, 81
families of victims of enforced disappearances petitioned various criminal courts in an attempt to access 
records of their loved ones, but the military who were in possession of the files refused to cooperate.  82
Consequently, some petitioned the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, whose recommendation to 
the state paved the way for further investigations by the Federal Appeals Chambers in criminal matters 
(Cámaras Federales en lo Criminal y Correccional Federal).  Thus, the bottom-up requests of the families 83
of the victims and the regional top-down recommendations of the Inter-American Commission put pressure 
on the state to continue its official truth-seeking activities through further investigations and thus not put a 
stop to the formation and adjustments of the legal truth. The pursuit of the legal truth, consequently, became 
a kind of state obligation, which could not easily be subject to politically-motivated limitations.  
Although these truth-finding trials were judge-made and non-homogenous,  which posed challenges to fair 84
trial guarantees,  the Argentine experience illustrates how the formation of legal truths in relation to 85
transitions can be elevated to a state obligation and a related right for those persons affected. This example 
also demonstrates how the scope of legal truths (temporally and with regards to subject-matter) as well as its 
legal framework of reference responds to political decisions, which may nonetheless be affected by bottom-
up demands and the application of regional international law (in this case human rights law). On this topic, 
drawing from H.L.A. Hart’s positivist approach, Jack Balkin argues that the legal truth can be constructed in 
positivist terms; as such, ‘a healthy degree of scepticism about the justice and morality of the existing legal 
systems’ is appropriate.  Indeed, by acknowledging that ‘law and morality are not separated’ and that ‘moral 86
imagination becomes ensnared by and held in servitude to the legal’,  the norms applicable to a given 87
transitional justice situation will respond to prevailing moral priorities and then be imposed through positive 
law. As such, the legal truth is an expression of political evaluations pursuing certain objectives, giving effect 
to those evaluations creatively through the possibilities set out in applicable law. Therefore, the legal truth is 
a result of power struggles and in turn an instrument of power in presenting narratives of the past – both 
within the parties of a dispute and more broadly for societies as a whole facing a legacy of violence. 
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Consequently, legal truths may carry a future normative force – e.g. with regards to institutional reforms and 
constitutionalisation processes  – but should be understood critically in light of the political context and 88
actors that determined their creation. 
3.1 The Construction and Limits of Legal Truths 
The legal truth as the outcome of a truth-seeking process is also subject to the procedural limitations of 
specific mechanisms, which may restrict the revelation of factual evidence. In this regard, the rules of 
evidence  and other formal procedures contribute to the gap between legal truth and substantive truth.  This 89 90
is because: 
Formal ‘findings of fact’ that diverge from substantive truth not by design, but merely because this is the way 
the process happens to work, under the peculiar circumstances of the case.  91
Furthermore, with reference to trials, ‘court procedures and the rules of evidence, though generally directed 
at substantive truth, are also designed to serve other ends that actually come into play in a particular case’, 
resulting in the court failing to find the true facts.  This divergence, however, is not necessarily a bad thing: 92
for example, Summers suggests it is:  
Merely the price we pay for having such a complex multi-purpose system in which actual truth, and what 
legally follows from it, comprise but one value among a variety of important values competing for legal 
realization.  93
As competing narratives about the past coexist in the context of truth-seeking, the legal truths resulting from 
formal proceedings represent a temporary, context-specific compromise capable of repeated adjustments 
(refer back to the Latin American examples provided above). Critiques of the notion of legal truth highlight 
other inherent deficiencies. From a postmodernist perspective, coupled with the recognition that a 
multiplicity of truths may coexist, any type of legal truth may be devoid of objectivity and in essence depart 
significantly from the factual truth about past abuse.  Additionally, the limitation of what the law captures 94
and sees – to the detriment of what it does not – indicates further ways in which legal truths discovered 
through formal proceedings can be distorted.   95
Among the possible misrepresentations of fact embedded in the legal truth in transition, Colm Campbell and 
Catherine Turner list the public/private divide, the marginalisation (or exclusion) of certain voices (including 
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those of certain groups of victims) from the process, the rigidity of legal categories (thus whether or not 
certain facts can be considered under the law), the exclusion from certain legal responsibilities under human 
rights law for non-state actors, and the hegemonic qualities of law.  An example of the public/private law 96
divide that distorts the legal truth in transitional justice is highlighted by feminist critiques.  Notably, 97
‘women’s testimony, sexual violence, (…) [and] victim identity’ are absent or marginalised in accounts of 
past harm outlined in transitional justice mechanisms.  Indeed, public violence tends to overshadow private 98
violence in accounting for past abuse, ignoring the peculiarities of patterns of violence suffered by women 
and their long-term impact on societies.  As such, ‘the institutional conditions and productive effects of the 99
commissioning of truth’ in transitional justice may conceal gendered private sphere violence,  which may 100
partly obscure the factual truths about past abuse.  
The legal truths uncovered in transitional justice may also impose a hegemonic vision of the past. Drawing 
on Antonio Gramsci’s work on hegemony, Douglas Litowitz argues that a legal system ‘induces people to 
comply with a dominant set of practices and institutions’ in an overarching manner, ‘through its function as 
constitutive of social ontology’.  In general (non-transitional contexts), the ‘law is at the same time both 101
repressive and constitutive’, and its repressive features ‘clear enough from the presence of police, prisons, 
courtrooms with armed bailiffs, and the ever-ready national guard, which is called out to restore the status 
quo when a social disturbance arises’.  The normative effects of official accounts of past abuse may also 102
carry hegemonic features. For example, the legal truth as a result of formal procedures of trials or truth 
commissions may impose an interpretation over all others of the truth on past violence and defend it through 
the state apparatus, limiting  (or even suppressing) the destabilising effects of alternative views. Moreover, 
power structures and fixed identity categories affect the performative process and restrict the validity of the 
truth derived from them.  Thus, formal words uttered in law courts may perpetuate violence through the 103
infliction of further punishments, as argued by Judith Butler.  As such, the violent and hegemonic 104
properties of law are revealed, which may undermine the validity of the resulting legal truth.  
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In transitional justice, narratives about the past and the renegotiation of the legal framework as a whole 
impact the development of ‘constitutional justice’.  Indeed, the opportunity to define and challenge existing 105
or contradicting versions of legal truth may provide the momentum for revising the constitutive principles of 
a society even when they contradict each other. Acknowledging that law may ‘come into conflict with other 
forms of knowledge’, including historical truth, Balkin notes that legal truths may also ‘distort and deform 
social relations’.  Likewise, legal truths tend to proliferate in a context of disagreement, even after 106
historical changes in the law; indeed, ‘legal indeterminacy can actually proliferate law’s power by spurring 
people to think, talk, contest, and argue using legal frameworks, legal concepts and legal terms’.  Questions 107
on the formation of the legal truth feed into transitional constitutionalism. Highlighting the constructivist 
features of transitional constitution making, Teitel describes two modalities of operation, one ‘codifying’ and 
expressing existing consensus, whereas the other, which prevails, is transformative, seeking to reconstruct 
the previous ‘political order associated with injustice’.  As such, ‘the construction of constitutional 108
constraints’ responds to ‘a state’s political, historical and constitutional legacies’.  In this context, the legal 109
truth captures those legacies and provides a basis to renegotiate historical accounts and their normative 
effects at the constitutional level and beyond.  
3.2 Stakeholders of the Legal Truth 
The stakeholders of any given truth-seeking legal procedure have an effect on the formation of the legal 
truth. Victims and survivors have a special, individual interest in uncovering the truth about past abuse (as 
discussed in the following chapter). Political forces, including military and paramilitary groups, as well as 
powerful elites outside the political establishments (for instance, the judiciary or key economic leaders) may 
also influence the formation of the legal truth. As part of the power adjustments between ‘the forces of the 
past and the successor elites’,  international organisations, NGOs and bilateral donors who fund, promote 110
or support truth-seeking mechanisms, and endorse specific narratives may also affect the formation of legal 
truths.  But above all others, the operational stakeholders of the legal truth are the legal professionals 111
involved in both judicial and extra-judicial TJ processes.  
In truth-seeking initiatives, ’lawyers’ arguments and judicial opinions are attempts to share truths of practical 
wisdom publicly, allowing that truth be experienced, seen and felt’ in the guise of ‘political or legal truth’.  112
On the other hand, lawyers can also be ‘enemies of the truth’ if they pursue ‘truth-obscuring’ and 
‘uncertainty’ as a source of business – revealing ‘a fundamental tension between lawyers and the public’, 
who instead ‘benefits from truth-eliciting rules’.  Nevertheless, strategic legal activism in TJ can help 113
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uncover legal truths, as discussed earlier in relation to the creative circumvention of amnesty laws in 
Argentina. Conversely, the ‘culture of quietism’ and the lack of engagement by lawyers may hinder 
transitional aims, as noted by Kieran McEvoy; likewise, an overly-technical, legalistic approach divorced 
from political circumstances may also devalue those aims.  Thus, lawyers do not simply provide neutral 114
technical input to truth-seeking in work in TJ. 
As a special category of lawyers, the judiciary interprets and applies the law in ways that determine the 
formation of legal truths.  The relationship between judges and the previous and new establishment is 115
likely to affect how the legal truth is constructed; likewise, as human beings, judges will exercise their 
discretion informed by their beliefs and opinions. To the extent she sees herself as a  ‘loyal member of this 
society’, a judge may ‘import[…] politics into legal processes and threaten[…] society as [she] perceives 
it’.  This ambivalence is summarised by Robert Cover: on the one hand, we ‘hear the judge as a voice of 116
reason [and] see her as the embodiment of principle’, but on the other, there is a ‘danger in forgetting the 
limits which are intrinsic to this activity of legal interpretation’ and ‘in exaggerating the extent to which any 
interpretation rendered as part of the act of state violence can ever constitute a common and coherent 
meaning’.  This ‘institutional structure’ allows for the transformation of a judge’s understanding of a fact to 117
be transformed into law, conferring ‘meaning on the deeds which effect this transformation, thereby 
legitimating them as “lawful”’.  Judges, however, may be reluctant to play a transformative role in TJ for a 118
variety of reasons. In that sense, Hakeem Yusuf expresses regret when the judiciary makes no effort to ensure 
‘justice for victims of gross human rights violations through an affirmation of the right to truth’ for victims 
in transitional justice.  Others have defended the importance of a greater judicial proactivity in ICL in 119
‘finding the material truth’ about a certain chain of events’.   120
In addition to practising legal counsel and judges, scholars may also contribute to the formation of the legal 
truth. For instance, as noted by Alan Freeman, critiques may ‘reveal truth’ and critical lawyers ‘eventually 
reveal(s) a world which is characterised more by conflict than by harmony, and by patterns of illegitimate 
hierarchy’.  By the same token, scholars may instead be mouthpieces of ruling elites before and after the 121
transition, coerced into adhering to its illiberal values to retain an income, or even choosing to pay lip service 
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to authoritarian regimes in order to continue public intellectual activities in universities.  Their role, 122
therefore, may be advantageous to or destructive of the legal truth, and its proximity to history, depending on 
factors such as political and ideological alliances as well as agency in practical transitional mechanisms.  
In sum, the notion of legal truth is separate from factual truth, but it plays an important role in setting down a 
historical record about past abuse and in legitimising it in official/legal language. This truth is capable of 
being ‘recycled’ across a system as well as constituting the foundation for radical institutional reforms based 
on an accepted set of sometimes competing narratives in the context of shifting politics and adjustments to 
power structures, potentially providing rules for contestation of different accounts. In that regard, the legal 
truth is both an instrument of power as well as a constitutive force in itself, as it both codifies and transforms 
existing consensus and shapes narratives about past violence. The legal truth may misrepresent facts and 
conceal structural forms of violence that permeate transitional societies; distortions are determined by 
politics as well as by procedures of specific mechanisms. Moreover, the actors that shape the formation of 
the legal truth, including national elites (both pre and post-transition), international organisations involved in 
setting up truth-finding mechanisms and the lawyers that operate the process, all contribute to the contours of 
the resulting accounts of the past. Against this backdrop, some survivors may be marginalised from truth-
seeking initiatives. However, as exemplified in Argentina, creative uses of law and regional IHRL 
instruments have enabled a bottom-up push for the legal truth, resulting in an emergent state’s obligation to 
investigate the past and victims’ right to the truth.  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4. Truth-Seeking, Collective Memory and Transitional Justice 
The importance given to trials, criminal proceedings and other formal legal mechanisms is striking. Even 
when local, seemingly informal, transitional justice mechanisms are adopted, the authoritativeness of the 
outcomes may be comparable to that of an official trial or truth commission. This can be understood in 
relation to the two processes of decision-making identified by Duncan Kennedy as ‘rule application and 
decision according to purposes, or substantive rationality’.  As such, in addition to the normative principles 123
contained in a given legal system, the route through which they are applied by an adjudicatory body is 
equally relevant. Thus, any given purpose of substantive rationality may be pursued (and even achieved) by 
multiple rule applications (mechanisms), provided they are recognisable and acceptable in a given 
community. It follows that in any particular setting there will be a spectrum on which different adjudicatory 
bodies enjoy differing degrees of acceptance in the community on the basis of both rule applications and 
substantive rationality.  
In transitional justice settings, the need to ‘construct collective memory’  constitutes one of the main 124
substantive rationality aims. According to Kennedy’s theory of legal formality, this could be achieved 
through a variety of rule applications, which, in the application of transitional justice, would include trials 
and truth commissions, as well as traditional justice mechanisms. The validity of that collective memory, in 
essence, will depend not only on the content of the narratives captured, but also on the processes of enquiry, 
evaluation and decision-making that culminate in the formation of said collective memory. In relation to 
transitional historical justice, Teitel highlights the ‘visible turn to the law, its processes, and framework (…) 
at a time when the social consensus is otherwise frayed’, because the ‘law offers a canonical language and 
established symbols and rituals of passage’.  125
The rituals associated with the formality of law (rule application/procedure) and the validity of its aims 
(substantive rationality) contribute to discovering and sketching a collective memory about past abuses.  126
The specific relationship between law and collective memory has also been explored.  Mark Osiel has 127
argued that prosecutions influence public discussion, as well as serving traditional punitive aims: ‘trials, 
when effective as public spectacle, stimulate public discussion’ and ‘indelibly influence collective memory 
of the events they judge’.  Legal storytelling and the ‘public presentation of the truth’ are ‘much more 128
dramatic when done through a trial’.  This means that shared accounts of the past emerging from trial 129
proceedings carry a more profound meaning. Osiel suggests that the outcome of such processes are similar to 
founding myths, upon which societies are built or rebuilt; but these myths may be deeply divisive for society 
and actually cause further fragmentation in communities.  130
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The links between social cohesion and criminal proceedings reflect two main approaches, one founded on 
value-based arguments and the other on political negotiations. The former assumes that trials express an 
existing collective moral consensus on a given matter; the prosecution of wrongdoers, therefore, reaffirms 
belonging to a community and sharing a set of common values.  The latter, instead, takes stock of different 131
perspectives within fragmented communities, where formalised trials allow for deliberation between ‘social 
antagonists’ who ‘occupy the same society’.  Trials – and other forms of adjudication – provide a 132
framework for different narratives and claims to compete in uncovering and apportioning responsibilities 
about past abuse, but their outcomes remain open to further scrutiny from both a moral and political angle.  
4.1 Ritual Performances, Legal Masks and Truth-Seeking 
The political and social stage upon which truth-seeking initiatives operate and contrasting voices enter into 
dialogue brings to light the ritual and performative character of transitional justice, where actors 
(stakeholders) compete for central roles. For instance, trials have been described as a (theatrical) staging of 
punishments, a form of a ritual of power.  A trial can be understood as ‘an arena of speakers and listeners’ 133
in which the ‘search for truth always proceeds by way of competing attempts to shape and present narratives 
for particular audiences’.  As proposed by Paul Gewirtz, ‘thinking about the trial as narrative or story-134
telling can bring fresh attention to the communicative exchanges central to the trial, directing us to the fact 
that (…) the form of telling and the setting of listening affect everything, and that telling and listening are 
complex transactions that jointly create meaning and significance’.  In addition to trials, examples of the 135
relationship between performance, theatricality, law and transitional justice have been found in truth 
commissions, such as the South African TRC.  This perspective highlights the performative role of truth-136
seeking activities beyond the production of the legal truth, where ritual performances of certain actions may 
help moderate a complex situation of political and social upheaval.  
A gradual increase in attention towards transitional justice processes as performances has been identified, 
taking over from questions of ‘truth or falsity of the history produced’ through those means.  Anne Orford 137
indicates that the ‘language of truth’ ‘can be understood in terms of speech act theory – the idea that 
particular words or utterances accomplish an act’.  Historians working on historical transitional justice 138
have reached similar conclusions; for instance, Berber Bevernage discusses how truth commissions in 
particular contribute to the ‘politics of time’, producing important socio-political effects in a performative, 
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and not merely descriptive, fashion.  As such, the effect of establishing formal truth-seeking mechanisms – 139
regardless of their ability to ultimately achieve their proposed aims within a reasonable timeframe – is in 
itself noteworthy. For example, it has been argued that the lengthy process of arresting and prosecuting an 
alleged perpetrator of an international crime by the ICTY may in effect contribute to the accuracy of 
justice.  Moreover, the very fact that an individual is indicted before an international court for some of the 140
most serious abuses contemplated on the international legal stage may send a powerful message in the 
interim to communities affected. More generally, the rituals associated with formal processes employed as 
part of transitional justice carry a distinctive force in attempting to agree on past truths.  
The performative role of judicial and semi-judicial processes – including trials and truth commissions – 
contributes to the understanding of formal justice mechanisms as rituals and of their outcomes (i.e. the legal 
truths) as products of that ritual. As such, the ritual force of processes may be found in formal as well as in 
traditional mechanisms to uncover the truth. Recognising that ‘many norms and political/legal practices are 
produced by and grounded in ritualized activity’  explains why formal procedures (not necessarily trials) 141
are chosen for official truth-seeking purposes. Indeed, it has been acknowledged that ‘secular rituals’ impact 
our society.  Andrew Cappel defines ritual as ‘the performance of a more or less invariant sequence of 142
formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performer’, and identifies eight typifying 
characteristics: formal, invariant, governed by rules, symbolic, sacred, traditional, performed and not 
encoded by the performer.  He notes how:  143
Ritualization thus tends to insulate a normative order from the ordinary give and take of everyday life, by 
locating it instead in the realm of implicit, timeless reality. By doing so, ritual promotes the stability of these 
orders against too rapid change, and also against gradual deterioration as more and more people choose to 
violate a norm.    144
He continues by linking formal (i.e. positive) law to the notion of secular rituals, which ‘will become more 
stable and hence more unquestionable the closer they can be associated through ritualization with such an 
aura of sacredness’, gaining ‘a transcendent legitimacy coming from outside human society itself’.  145
Similarly, Weyrauch also points out that ‘participants and observers of a legal system are less likely to 
criticize or even question decisions that appear to be based on an objective application of neutral laws’, 
satisfying a ‘quasi-religious faith’ in the ‘objectivity, neutrality and fairness’ of the legal process.  In 146
relation to finding the truth through formal procedures in the context of transitional justice, it may be argued 
that a truth originating from a recognised (and accepted) secular ritual – such as a judicial procedure – is of 
higher procedural ‘pedigree’ than an informal or unstructured attempt to discover and agree upon the truth. 
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The ‘Law’ as an abstract concept carries the intrinsic potential of embodying the desirable substance and 
procedure of justice, regardless of its misuse by previous regimes. Thus, ritualisation preserves certain norms 
‘in a relatively immutable manner’.  Consequently, certain normative principles may acquire primacy 147
through the rituals of transitional mechanisms like trials and truth commissions, and become founding 
concepts of the post-transitional order. This echoes Weyrauch’s idea that law involves ‘rendering peace and 
to some extent ordering social interactions’, a function which ‘necessitates the development of legal rules, 
which inevitably become legal masks’.  148
Secular rituals, however, are to be broadly understood beyond ordinary state-administered processes. 
Anthropologist Kimberly Theidon provides an interesting example of how ‘communities also mobilize the 
ritual and symbolic elements of these transitional processes to deal with the deep cleavages left – or 
accentuated – by civil conflicts’.  In relation to the Peruvian transition, she notes that: 149
A central tenet of transitional justice is that it includes important performative aspects; via the secular rituals 
embodied in transitional legal practices, collectives engage in “ritual purification” and the reestablishment of 
group unity. From this perspective, law is not just a set of procedures but also a set of secular rituals that make 
a break with the past and mark the beginning of a new moral community.  150
Local informal mechanisms presenting ritual characteristics must be handled with care, as argued by Lars 
Waldorf with reference to the gacaca in Rwanda.  There may even be a risk that appropriation of local 151
mechanisms by state authorities may create ‘state imposed ‘informalism’ designed to expand the state's reach 
into local communities’, which may consequently result in ‘increased formalism, decreased popular 
participation, and increased state coercion’.  Indeed, the ownership of the justice process – be it a formal 152
trial or a local justice mechanism – may itself mask patterns of political domination of one group over 
another, sometimes confirming or reversing the power dynamics at the time of abuse. With reference to truth-
seeking, as noted in the previous section, power structures can distort the effects of rituals, reinforcing 
unfairness and violence. Ritualised legal procedures, in fact, may conceal other interests.  
The analogy of law as a mask furthers our understanding of judicial rituals as social functions of the law.  153
Weyrauch draws convincing parallels between ‘the modern social functions of law and those of masks in 
earlier societies’: official procedures carry the ‘potential to dehumanize persons through the use of 
conceptual legal masks’, camouflaging the ‘human significance’ and gravity of certain acts through the 
illusion that ‘legal reasoning will remain on a level of neutral abstraction’.  In the theatrics of ritual 154
performance, masks ensure that the show goes on as planned, but may hide the true human emotions behind 
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the act. This difficulty is exemplified in the formal actions carried out in courtroom proceedings by the legal 
counsel of dictators, when abuse and violence has been widely recognised extrajudicially but not by a 
tribunal, rendering the defendant (rightly) innocent until proven otherwise. Legal procedures and necessary 
fair trial guarantees, therefore, sometimes mask the true feelings of horror when faced with unfathomable 
human evil.   155
In addition to concealing human emotion, the stakeholders of a formal process will select and highlight 
certain elements or facts over others, reflecting ‘the prevailing value judgments of the society in which they 
live[d]’, giving relevance to certain issues over others.  These considerations take on a deeper meaning in 156
times of political flux (such as in the context of transitional justice) when ‘any attempt to introduce 
“irrelevant” matters into legal proceedings involves a challenge, sometimes subtly so, to the established 
values as protected by rules of law’.  Thus, the choice of facts to be included in judicial proceedings in the 157
context of transitional justice highlights the power of discretion that stakeholders of the process have in 
determining ritualised truth-seeking activities.  
For example the BICI report on Bahrain, a non-transitional country which faced an intense period of internal 
violence in 2011 set out a truth inquiry, independent and yet sanctioned by the authorities, set out to discover 
factual evidence and evaluate it under international law.  However, the failure at government level to 158
implement the BICI recommendations  indicates the ritualistic, theatrical character of the whole procedure 159
based on international law, which was not met by substantive responses by the authorities. Thus, by placing 
excessively high expectations on the law (in the Bahraini case, on the findings and existence of the BICI 
report, collated and analysed by eminent international jurists) a critical approach to the legal process is lost, 
and with that comes the realisation that law masks politics.  
In essence, truth-seeking initiatives of transitional justice contribute to the formation of collective memory of 
past abuse through the formalities of recognisable substantive and procedural rules. Indeed, in transitional 
settings, law provides a set of established rituals that communities recognise as authoritative in guiding 
historical transitional justice processes, laying the foundations for reconstructing the future social order. In 
the transitional phase as well as the new system, opposing narratives must coexist and shared rules help 
regulate these contradictions. The political and social context in which truth-seeking initiatives operate 
brings to light the ritual and performative character of transitional justice mechanisms such as trials and truth 
commissions. Against that backdrop, formal (i.e. positive) law assumes a sacred aura that strengthens its 
legitimacy in guiding truth-seeking rituals. The force of these secular rituals may also extend beyond 
ordinary state-administered processes, encompassing local informal mechanisms which display a comparable 
ritual character within a given community. However, it is important to note that law – and by extension, local 
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norms – may mask the substance of truth-seeking and distort the interpretation of past abuse. This 
shortcoming may be further exacerbated by the structural inequalities directly or indirectly promoted by 
powerful stakeholders of the process. To counter the risk of marginalising victims from truth-seeking ritual 
performances and to oppose the pitfalls of using the law as a mask, the developing right to the truth 
(discussed in chapter 3) can empower survivors to instigate investigations into past harm suffered.  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5. Conclusions 
This chapter presented the notion of truth as the cornerstone of transitional justice, understood broadly as an 
objective in itself and as a facilitator for other aims of transition. In its backward-looking guise, truth-
seeking aims at discovering facts, though it is unlikely to faithfully represent a historical account of 
violence. In its forward-looking intent, the truth is inherently presentist, interpreting the past from the 
current standpoint and in view of long-term societal reform based on normative principles that (partly) break 
with the past. Given how competing narratives clash in historical TJ, the truths resulting from transitional 
mechanisms do not reflect the full range of standpoints, and consequently established versions of the past 
remain open to challenges.  
Cognisant of the effects for societies at large of the legal truth produced in trials and truth commissions, this 
discussion highlights how the legal truth both codifies and transforms the dominant consensus on histories of 
past abuse and how it may provide some scope to counter prevailing narratives. But substantive and 
procedural rules may mask the substance of truth-seeking and distort the interpretation of past abuse; 
likewise, powerful stakeholders of these processes may deliberately perpetuate structural inequalities 
through the law. As legal truth is the production of legal rituals, comparable to religious rituals, law assumes 
a sacred aura in guiding truth-seeking mechanisms – and the norms of local unofficial systems of justice 
may play a similar role. For these reasons, it is important for all types of truth-seeking initiatives in TJ to be 
understood in their local context yet still from a critical angle.  
Structural social, economic and political inequalities before, during and after the political shifts tend to 
deform TJ processes and the resulting historical accounts by marginalising the agency of victims whose 
voices have little chance of shaping policy. The exclusion of survivors – whoever they may be – produces 
two risks: firstly, the truths uncovered about past abuses will be incomplete and inadequate, resulting in 
severely deficient historical accounts and thus severely affect further transitional aims (such as institutional 
and legal reforms); secondly, direct and indirect victims may suffer additional dispossession and violence 
due to their exclusion from public debate about previous harm with a view to social reconstruction. For these 
reasons, the involvement of survivors in transitional justice processes is crucial: but how can essentially top-
down practices of TJ dominated by elites at local, national and international level make room and hear 
victims’ voices as well as giving their accounts some form of legal effect?  
In order to counter the risk of marginalising victims from truth-seeking initiatives, a bottom-up push for the 
legal truth may redress this unequal access to shaping the accounts of past abuse and facilitate reconciliation. 
In the context of TJ, creative uses of IHRL instruments in Latin America and Europe point to an emerging 
right to the truth, which carries the radical potential to empower survivors in instigating inquiries into past 
harm suffered at individual and collective level as well as the related state obligation to investigate abuse. By 
the same token, survivors may choose to rely on local justice as well as (or instead of) on international law to 
guide truth-seeking initiatives and other TJ mechanisms. The relocation of TJ from international law to local 
settings reflects the substantive and procedural rules that guide truth-seeking mechanisms. As both global 
and local norms help uncover truths, this would indicate an overlap in their objectives. The next chapter 
considers the development of new truth-seeking tools under international law, and subsequent chapters 
investigate how local justice – and in particular Islamic law – can contribute to transitional aims.  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1. Introduction  
The labyrinth of rules applicable to transitional justice is likely to disorient survivors who are not leading 
stakeholders of the process. Hindering their participation affects the process of uncovering legal truths as 
well as the formation of collective memories. As argued in the first chapter, the paradigm of IHRL may offer 
a palliative for this problem in the transformative context of TJ, paving the way for a longer-lasting post-
transitional idea of inclusive citizenship to contrast new expressions of authoritarianism and conflict. Taking 
advantage of the possibilities of human rights, survivors of past abuse may be able to access justice and 
shape historical narratives through IHRL instruments, thus reaffirming a sense of active citizenship and 
renegotiating the relationship between individuals and state authorities.  
The right to the truth appears to be on an upward trajectory in international law and today this concept is 
widely discussed in relation to TJ.  At a broader level, the right to the truth carries the potential of becoming 1
a powerful tool for enabling not only individual victims of serious violations but also societies at large to 
uncover facts and responsibilities surrounding past abuse, especially when authorities fail to investigate 
appropriately. The gradual recognition of the right to the truth is evidenced in the Inter-American Human 
Rights system (IACHR) and the acknowledgment by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights (the Court) in the recent El-Masri v FYRM (El-Masri ) judgment. This comparative appraisal calls for 2
a reassessment of this right in global IHRL.  3
 This chapter explores the extent to which recent developments contribute to the establishment of the right to 
the truth in international law. The first part will introduce this emerging right through the analysis of global 
and regional sources, after briefly considering its normative value and desirability. The following part will 
discuss the right to the truth as presented in the El-Masri judgment and concurring opinions; in particular, it 
will take into account the Grand Chamber division on the existence and content of a separate right, as well as 
the breadth of the category of victims. The final part will then contextualise the significance of citing the 
right to the truth in El-Masri with regards to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), global 
IHRL and general public international law (PIL). Specifically, the final section considers whether the Court’s 
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jurisprudence in light of El-Masri contributes to the formation of a global right to the truth as customary 
international law (CIL) or as a general principle of law. Building on the findings of chapter 2, it provides an 
example of how courts and judges contribute to the formation of legal truths by establishing a procedural and 
substantive right to the truth in the context of TJ. In the broader context of the research questions, this 
chapter explores the right to the truth as it gains traction in the international paradigm of TJ through PIL, 
setting the scene for understanding how this idea may operate in Muslim-majority legal settings.  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2. The Development of a Human Right to the Truth 
Acknowledging and tracing the development of the right to the truth requires a preliminary reflection on the 
proliferation of human rights in general and in transitions. The list of human rights is essentially open-ended 
and incremental.  Human rights seek to protect individuals and groups, reflecting ‘the broader goal of states 4
to establish orderly and enlightened international and national legal orders’.  5
 Notwithstanding the presumably laudable intent of human rights developments, critical scholars have 
explored some underlying problems.  Rights discourse may bear unintended consequences, such as further 6
suffering,  or conceal a systemic ‘planned misery’, in which ‘human rights emerged as a set of ‘blinders’ that 7
narrow our field of vision and prevent us from seeing (and hence from challenging) the wider scene’.  8
Referring to the previous chapter, the normative function of human rights reveals how law may operate as a 
mask. Some critical legal scholars have even warned against human rights ‘romance’ (suggesting instead a 
‘register of tragedy’);  political theorists have expressed similar worries.  9 10
The dangers of over-proliferation of human rights have been widely discussed. Often presented as a 
contemporary ideology,  human rights face inflation and as a consequence may gradually lose their 11
‘distinctive moral force’.  Upendra Baxi questions whether the ‘talismanic properties of human rights 12
enunciations’ impact on their quality and efficiency.  His main concerns are: (1) the ‘question of 13
management of proliferation, vital to the credibility of the enterprise of rights creation entrepreneurship, 
especially in the conversion of human needs into human rights’; and (2) the ‘constant conversion of needs 
into rights [which] assumes that the rights regime is the principal mechanism for arranging human well-
being’.  He also questions whether this ‘endless normativity’ performs ‘any useful function in the “real” 14
world’.  The analysis of the ‘criteria to determine when the concept of “human rights” is being correctly 15
used and when it is being overextended’ ultimately raises philosophical questions, argues Susan Marks.  16
Moreover, in order to translate human rights into social realities they must be acknowledged as inherently 
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political.  Thus, the creation of new rights essentially reflects a policy decision to recognise, protect and 17
promote an additional value or principle in the complex socio-legal relationship between individuals and the 
state.  
However, the unquestioned acceptance of the state as guardian of human rights may conceal justificatory 
arguments for abuse by state authorities.  In state-centric systems, established human rights categories 18
qualify victims of certain violations as rights-holders and exclude others, reinforcing social hierarchies and 
generally allowing non-state actors to escape responsibility.  Baxi contends that the ‘bureaucratisation of 19
human rights’ and the language adopted ‘enhances the power of the State against violations of human rights 
in civil society’, which hinders their application.  He is echoed by Marks who sees the combination of ‘so 20
many tests, institutions and procedures’ with vagueness and weak enforcement mechanisms as a hindrance to 
the ‘efficacy and coherence of the system as a whole’, which in turn widens ‘the scope for confusion, 
inefficiency and empire-building’.  21
In relation to the right to the truth, existing laws may (deliberately or not) include and privilege some victim 
groups over others; this further disempowers the marginalised and reasserts state power.  In light of Baxi’s 22
analysis, the desirability of the right to the truth as a new human right can be tested according to whether it 
performs a ‘useful function in the real world’, and, relatedly, whether it empowers citizens as rights-bearers 
against state authority. Shifting the focus to TJ, the right to the truth may partly rectify the exclusion of 
certain voices from the dominant narratives of the past, providing actionable means to instigate inquiries. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, legal truths are inherently permeable to uneven power structures that 
impact the course of truth-seeking initiatives such as trials and truth commissions. But by introducing the 
right to the truth, victims and survivors may acquire the ability to challenge the establishment’s version of 
history and compel the authorities to investigate and make public a more contested account of the past. Thus, 
the relationship between the ‘right’ and the ‘truth’ describes the actionability of a process of cause and effect, 
in which the ‘right’ exercised by individuals specifically pursues the ‘truth’ (in the form of legal truth). The 
key novelty introduced by giving victims a justiciable right is their greater empowerment in the legal system, 
which in turn facilitates the inclusion of their perspectives in truth-seeking initiatives, as well as providing 
the option of instigating proceedings. Moreover, far from being restricted to inter partes effects, the legal 
truths derived through the right to the truth also contribute to building the collective memory of the past as 
part of historical transitional justice processes.  
 The right to the truth is a means for survivors to confront authorities about past abuses through trials, truth 
commissions and fact-finding missions at domestic, regional and international level. Drawing on J.L. 
Austin’s theory of ‘performative utterances’, the right to the truth may fulfil the requirements of self-
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performativity.  As discussed in the previous chapter, talking about the truth may actually contribute to 23
constructing the truth; likewise, talking about the right to the truth may in essence create a new right in TJ 
settings (and beyond). 
2.1 The Foundations of the Right to the Truth 
In 2010 the General Assembly established the international day for the right to the truth, confirming 
acceptance of this right in the UN system.  Its slow recognition and uneven applications across the world, 24
however, call for an inquiry into how it developed in order to evaluate its current and future value for TJ. 
Although it falls short of a general treaty source, if the right to the truth can be framed as CIL or as a general 
principle of law, its theoretical benefits are likelier to find practical applications in transitional contexts.   
The origins of the right to the truth can be traced to IHL. For instance, article 32 of the Additional Protocol I 
to the Geneva Conventions refers expressly to the ‘right of families to know the fate of their relatives’, both 
with respect to the remains of the deceased (Article 34) and for missing persons (Article 33).   But as noted 25
in the first chapter of this thesis, relying on IHL does not encompass the full range of TJ situations nor 
provides easily justiciable rights for individuals.  
With regards to ICL, the Rome Statute of the ICC provides only a ‘limited realisation’ of the right to the 
truth, restricted to the ‘context of enforced disappearances (see Article 7(1)(i))’.  Although, in principle, the 26
Rome Statute could accommodate the right to the truth, the costly and largely ineffective victim participation 
schemes  suggest that international criminal justice is not yet ripe for operationalising the victims’ right to 27
the truth.  
Today, the right to the truth is most closely related to IHRL. It is framed as a right ‘in relation to other 
fundamental human rights by human rights bodies and courts’ and referred to as such in truth-seeking 
mechanisms.  Yasmin Naqvi argues that the right to the truth is emerging as ‘something approaching a 28
customary right’ under CIL;  similarly, it could be understood as a general principle of law (both discussed 29
in the final section of this chapter). At UN level the emergence of this right is being channelled and 
developed through the work of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-recurrence, whose 2013 report  clearly states that the right to the truth is ‘enshrined in a 30
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number of international instruments’.  The report affirms that states are required to ‘establish institutions, 31
mechanisms and procedures that are enabled to lead to the revelation of the truth’, described as ‘a process to 
seek information and facts about what has actually taken place, to contribute to the fight against impunity, to 
the reinstatement of the rule of law, and ultimately to reconciliation’.  32
Among the sources listed in that report, the only treaty provision enshrining the right to the truth is Article 
24(2) of the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(CED):   
Each victim has the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the 
progress and results of the investigation and the fate of the disappeared person. 
The right to the truth, however, extends beyond the specific instance of disappearance, and both the UN 
Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council have addressed the topic.  Significantly, the 33
2005 UN Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to 
Combat Impunity (Orentlicher Principles) affirmed that: 
Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of 
heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through massive or systematic violations, to 
the perpetration of those crimes.  34
Moreover, the 2006 Study on the Right to Truth of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights confirmed the ‘inalienable right to know the truth vis-à-vis gross human rights violations and serious 
crimes under the international law’.  This demonstrates that the right to the truth is not just relevant to 35
enforced disappearances, but also applies to a broader range of IHRL violations and international crimes.  
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The link between the victims’ right to know and the state’s ‘general obligations of states to take effective 
action to combat impunity’ was outlined in the 2005 Orentlicher Principles.  More recently, the right to the 36
truth has been extended to other, non-transitional situations – such as counterterrorism activities – based on 
the protection afforded by international law to ‘the legal right of the victim and of the public to know the 
truth’ and the ‘corresponding obligations on States which can be conveniently gathered together under the 
rubric of the international law principle of accountability’ (applicable to ‘all three branches of 
government’).  Outlining a corresponding state obligation helps give the right to the truth a degree of 37
justiciability. 
Increasingly, the right to the truth is presented as a cross-cutting right, not restricted to a specific context or 
type of harm. It has been linked to treaty provisions on a variety of substantive violations, including enforced 
disappearances, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom of opinion 
and expression and basic guarantees in the age of counterterrorism. By tracing this right to a correlated state 
obligation, survivors of past abuse may, at least in principle, instigate inquiries into past violations and thus 
contribute to shaping historical accounts. 
2.2 The Right to the Truth as an Inter-American Human Right 
De Greiff states that ‘the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights were at the forefront of developing jurisprudence on the right to truth of the victim, his or her 
next of kin, and the whole of society’.  This claim is echoed by former President of the Inter-American 38
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, in relation to enforced 
disappearances.  Undoubtedly, the Inter-American system of human rights appears to offer the most 39
advanced recognition of the right to the truth.  Indeed, it deals with the truth as a fully justiciable right.   40 41
The IACHR has used the right to the truth in transitional contexts to develop new ways of holding states 
accountable for past institutional abuse and for refusing to investigate political violence. This tool is 
actionable by direct victims, but its effects are relevant to society as a whole. Manuel Bolaños was the first 
Inter-American Commission (the Commission) case involving the right to the truth about enforced 
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disappearance and the location of remains.  The state’s failure to ‘use all means at its disposal to carry out a 42
serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction to identify those responsible’ was among 
the violations found.  In this case, the right to the truth was anchored to article 25 (the Right to Judicial 43
Protection), namely the right of the victim’s family to know the fate of their relative. But as stated by the 
OAS ‘the right to the truth has a basis not only in Article 25, but also in Articles 1(1) (Obligation to Respect 
Rights), 8 (Right to a Fair Trial), and 13 (Freedom of Thought and Expression) of the Convention’.   44
The Commission has underlined that article 13  is crucial to ‘delivering’ the right to the truth to family 45
members and society as a whole, as opposed to amnesties.  Indeed, amnesty laws constitute an obstacle to 46
the right to the truth,  understood as a: 47
 Collective right which allows a society to gain access to information essential to the development of 
democratic systems, and also an individual right for the relatives of the victims, allowing for a form of 
reparation, especially in cases where the Amnesty Law is enforced.  48
The right to the truth of individual victims, their families and society at large are closely connected, as 
demonstrated in the case of Monsignor Oscar Romero, Archbishop of El Salvador. Here, the Commission 
found that the state failure to investigate the circumstances of extra-judicial killing constituted a violation of 
its duty to reveal the truth to both the victim’s family and society at large.  An investigation:  49
Must be undertaken in good faith and must be diligent, exhaustive and impartial and geared to exploring all 
possible lines of investigation that make it possible to identify the perpetrators of the crime, so that they can be 
tried and punished.      50
The Inter-American Court has also given indications as to how investigations ought to be conducted. For 
example, as stated in Velásquez Rodríguez: 
[the investigation] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be 
ineffective.  An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a 
step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of 
proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.   51
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Velásquez Rodríguez establishes the state duty to investigate human rights violations alongside its duty to 
prevent them.  Likewise, in the more recent case of Contreras, the IACHR linked the ‘violation of the right 52
to the truth, understood as a violation of the rights contained in Articles 8, 13 and 25 of the Convention’ to 
the state obligation to ‘demonstrat[e] that they have taken all the measures at their disposal to prove that the 
requested information does not exist’.  53
Contreras also makes clear that ‘the right to know the truth has the necessary effect that, in a democratic 
society, the truth is known about the facts of grave human rights violations’, to the extent that: 
Every individual, including the next of kin of the victims of grave human rights violations, has, in accordance 
with Articles 1(1), 8(1), 25 and, under certain circumstances, Article 13 of the Convention, the right to know 
the truth, so that they and society as a whole must be informed on what happened.  54
Therefore, in the inter-American human rights system, while the primary relationship remains that between 
the individual and the state – expressed through the individual right to the truth held by the victim and their 
family members and the duty of the state to ensure that the right to the truth is delivered through trials – the 
state acquires an additional duty to provide the general public and society at large with the truth. A similar 
issue is raised in late 2012 by the European Court of Human Rights in El-Masri v FYRM, discussed in the 
next section.   55
 Combining the earlier analysis of the foundations of the right to the truth in the UN system with its regional 
applications in the IACHR, a central emerging theme links victims’ right to the truth and the creation of a 
broader legal truth relevant to society at large. In light of this, state obligations to investigate the past are 
significant beyond individual cases. In sum, regardless of the scepticism that surrounds the development of a 
new human right, the recognition of the right to the truth in the UN system and IACHR points to its 
existence. This reality may further the status of the right to the truth as CIL or as a general principle of law, 
as discussed subsequently in this chapter. The following sections discuss the extent to which the right to the 
truth has developed in relation to the ECHR and what this means more generally.  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3. The Right to the Truth and the ECHR 
In contrast to the Inter-American jurisdiction, ‘the right to truth has been comparatively slow to develop’ in 
the Council of Europe system.  An initial acknowledgement came in 2005 when a series of resolutions of 56
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) culminated in the recognition of the families 
of disappeared persons as ‘independent victims’, to be granted a ‘right to be informed of the fate of their 
disappeared relatives’.  However, it was only in the El-Masri judgment of December 2012 that the European 57
Court of Human Rights (the Court) acknowledged the right to the truth, when the Grand Chamber made its 
first explicit reference to this right.  This case has brought to light the question of the right to the truth in 58
relation to the ECHR, and linked it to the procedural limb of article 3 (prohibition of torture). Most notably, 
in the concurring opinions, six judges out of seventeen debated the doctrinal point of the right to the truth in 
relation to the Convention as well as in international law more generally.  
Taken together, the El-Masri judgment and concurring opinions ‘cautiously expand the function of the state 
duty to undertake a credible investigation’, setting ‘a novel standard to secure accountability of human rights 
violations committed in other national security cases and beyond’ (e.g. TJ).  In assessing the procedural 59
limb of Article 3, and specifically the lack of an effective investigation, the Court noted ‘another aspect of 
the inadequate character of the investigation in the present case, namely its impact on the right to the truth 
regarding the relevant circumstances of the case’.  Relating the discussion back to the previous chapter of 60
this thesis, the twin principles of substantive rationality and (procedural) rule application identified by 
Duncan Kennedy must be sufficiently satisfied in order to achieve justice.  With reference to the right to the 61
truth in the context of the ECHR, this means that the recognition of its substantive element would be 
incomplete unless the procedural formalities that render it justiciable (and thus real) are defined and 
articulated in a manner that enables individuals to access justice and put it into practice.  
For the Court, the existence of the right to the truth was linked to the ‘right to know what happened’.  62
Consequently, if state authorities carry out an inadequate investigation, the right to the truth may be violated 
and the state may be in breach of its obligation to protect human rights (and specifically article 3) within its 
jurisdiction. The state’s obligation to protect includes a procedural question (an obligation of means) to 
demonstrate steps taken to prevent a violation (regardless of whether state action actually results in averting 
the violation), and a substantive question, to ascertain whether the state’s action amounts to ‘reasonable 
measures’.  Indeed, an effective (adequate) investigation, according to the Court in El-Masri, is ‘capable of 63
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leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the alleged events and of establishing 
the truth’.  64
 Having acknowledged that, in El-Masri the Court went on to ‘underline the great importance of the present 
case not only for the applicant and his family, but also for other victims of similar crimes and the general 
public, who had the right to know what had happened’.  Moreover, even when ‘obstacles or difficulties (…) 65
prevent progress in an investigation’, an ‘adequate response by the authorities in investigating allegations of 
serious human rights violations’ is ‘essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule 
of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts’.  This move calls for 66
a reflection on how the Court approaches new challenges and new rights.  
The Court’s prerogative to go beyond – or behind – the text of the Convention to identify implied 
‘unenumerated rights’, gives credence to rights ‘which are not expressly mentioned in the text but (…) 
should be “read into” it’.  This reflects the Court’s view that the ECHR operates as a ‘living instrument 67
which (…) must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’,  setting out to guarantee rights that 68
are ‘practical and effective’, and not ‘merely theoretical or illusory’.  New developments in IHRL – like the 69
recognition of the right to the truth – fall within the scope of ‘present-day conditions’ that inform the 
interpretation of the ECHR as a human rights treaty. As such, the object and purpose of the Convention (i.e. 
the protection and promotion of human rights) guides its application.  The limit to the expansion of the 70
ECHR is imposed when the Court reads ‘a significant new obligation into the Convention’ which is not an 
integral part of it.  Evolutive interpretation  allows the Court to integrate its understanding of the ECHR 71 72
through practice.  This poses similar challenges as any constitutional interpretative approach that departs 73
from black-letter law; judicial proactivity may promote novel interpretations of founding texts bypassing the 
ordinary (expected) democratic process – or, in the case of PIL treaties, formal accession by states.  
The Court has, notably, found implied procedural rights in the Convention. In Golder, Article 6 implied a 
right of access to the courts ‘in its context and having regard to the object and purpose of the Convention’, 
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although the text of the article does not expressly state as much.  This is because ‘one can scarcely conceive 74
of the rule of law without there being the possibility of having access to courts’.  Similarly, in El-Masri the 75
Court links the right to the truth to the rule of law, through the procedural limb of article 3. Yet a valid 
objection to admitting implied rights is raised by Merrills: ‘if the Court is prepared to imply a right, then it 
must define it’.  By not providing a clear definition of the right to the truth in El-Masri the Court proactivity 76
remains vulnerable to criticism; however, this accusation may be dismissed by considering the definitions 
provided in the global IHRL instruments cited in the judgment as evidence of this right.  
 The extent to which the Court pushes the boundaries of the text of the Convention to ‘read in’ new rights 
may also depend on the judicial ideologies of restraint and activism and whether judges favour ‘tough 
conservativism’ or ‘benevolent liberalism’.  Merrills describes the judicial activist as a judge who ‘sees his 77
job as both to apply the law and, where necessary, to make it’, considering the judiciary to be ‘part of the 
political process and adjudication [as] always a political act’.  But in doing so, the Court’s creativity must 78
strike ‘a fair balance between judicial innovation and respect for the ultimate policy-making role of member 
States’.  Even in TJ, as discussed in chapter 2, the judiciary may find itself performing a constitutive role to 79
construct the legal truth and provide an official account of past abuse, going beyond its merely adjudicatory 
function. In recognising the right to the truth, the Court would provide an important tool for TJ as well as 
more generally.  
Where an unenumerated right, or a novel (expansive) interpretation of a listed right, is based on global IHRL 
instruments applicable to the member states in other forums (and especially if supported by ratification, 
signature, or participation in the travaux) the Court would be arguably justified in adopting a strong 
progressive approach to protection beyond the black letter of the ECHR. With reference to the right to the 
truth, if the Court finds that a sufficient number of its member states have joined the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, contributed or endorsed the 
drafting of global instruments that recognise this right or funded truth commissions overseas, it may have 
reason to refer to them. In El-Masri it took a step in that direction.  
The Court raised two key issues in El-Masri: (1) the very existence of the right to the truth, and its 
relationship to the Convention via article 3; and (2) who are the bearers of the right to the truth, and whether 
they extend beyond the direct victim of a violation. These questions, however, are brought to light more 
clearly in the doctrinal disagreements in the Grand Chamber, as evidenced in the concurring opinions, the 
content of which is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 The joint concurring opinion of judges Tulkens, Spielmann, Sicilianos and Keller criticised the judgment’s 
‘certain over-cautiousness’ in making a ‘somewhat timid allusion to the right to the truth in the context of 
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Article 3 and the lack of an explicit acknowledgment of this right in relation to Article 13’.  These judges 80
linked the right to the truth to Article 13, especially – but not only – when related to procedural obligations 
under Articles 3, 5 and 8.  
 For Tulkens et al, the reasoning in the judgment should have acknowledged that ‘in the absence of any 
effective remedies (…) the applicant was denied the “right to the truth” that is, the right to an accurate 
account of the suffering endured and the role of those responsible for that ordeal’ (citing Association 21 
December v Romania ). If the right to the truth is understood as encompassing the ‘right to ascertain and 81
establish the true facts’, it is more appropriately situated within the scope of Article 13, especially in the 
context of ‘scale and seriousness’ of the violations at stake and widespread impunity. In that regard, ‘the 
search for the truth is the objective purpose of the obligation to carry out an investigation and the raison 
d’être of the related quality requirements (transparency, diligence, independence, access, disclosure of results 
and scrutiny)’. 
 In this concurring opinion, the right to the truth is a ‘well-established reality’ which is ‘far from being either 
innovative or superfluous’; it is neither ‘a novel concept’ in the Court’s jurisprudence, ‘nor is it a new right’. 
To support their claim, they relied on the Court’s own case law, global IHRL instruments,  the jurisprudence 82
of the Inter-American human rights system,  EU  and Council of Europe  statements as well as evidence 83 84 85
provided by third-party interveners.  By remarking on the well-established reality of the right to the truth, 86
Tulkens et al acknowledged the scepticism that often greets the introduction of novel concepts through case 
law. Nonetheless, by stressing that the right to the truth is not a new concept in international law or in the 
Court’s own jurisprudence, they consciously pre-empt possible accusations of introducing additional rights; 
this suggests that recognition of the right to the truth is not an inflation or over-proliferation of rights, a 
concern outlined by Baxi and others as discussed earlier.  87
 Conversely, in the other separate concurring opinion in El-Masri, Judges Casadevall and Lopez Guerra 
assert that judges have no place in introducing a right ‘different from, or additional to’ the provisions set out 
in the Convention and the Court’s case law,  dismissing the idea that the right to the truth merits attention 88
either as an extension to provisions within the Convention or as a novel human right. Contrary to Tulkens et 
al, Casadevall et al argued that it was not necessary to address the right to the truth ‘as something different 
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from, or additional to, the requisites already established in such matters’ in previous case law.  For them, the 89
right to the truth is equivalent to the right to a serious investigation, a ‘serious attempt’ to ‘finding out the 
truth of the matter’ for which three elements must be established: the facts of the case, the cause of the 
injuries suffered, and the identity of those responsible.  
For Casadevall et al, the right to a serious investigation is specifically linked to the deprivation of life 
(Article 2) and torture, inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3). Therefore, they suggest that the right to 
the truth is merely an extension of the procedural obligations under these articles, actionable only by the 
direct victim. As such, ‘a separate analysis of the right to the truth becomes redundant, as do references 
concerning accountability to the general public.   90
 Avoiding repetition in articulating and extending convention rights echoes another of Baxi’s preoccupations: 
whether a provision performs ‘any useful function in the “real” world’.  The restrained approach adopted by 91
Casadevall et al is consistent with previous case law limiting the Court to considering only concrete issues 
and not theoretical points; this is because ‘the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are 
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective’.  In that regard, if the content of the right to 92
the truth can be subsumed within the scope of articles 2 and 3, a move to afford separate recognition, is 
unnecessary according to their argument. 
Despite the more conservative argument, it could still be argued that the right to the truth as an articulation of 
the procedural obligations of article 3 satisfy Baxi’s criteria of usefulness. Firstly, it consolidates an existing 
and established right in the ECHR (in El-Masri, article 3); as such, it would contribute to the enjoyment of a 
clear substantive right through a stronger procedural norm. Secondly, it enables the Court not only to align its 
approach to trends in international law, but also to contribute constructively to the development of IHRL, as 
will be discussed subsequently in this chapter. Ultimately, however, the real test for the usefulness of the 
right to the truth must turn on the extent to which victims and survivors may use it to further their rights and 
interests. In other words, this right must be actionable concretely by applicants who survived or were 
affected by past abuse.   
3.1 Victims’ Rights to the Truth in a Democratic Society  !
 Persons affected by harm hold an immediate interest in knowing the truth as victims of the violation. From a 
criminological perspective, the emotional repair of truth-finding contributes to the justification of the right to 
the truth in TJ.  Likewise, ‘the restorative nature of truth is as much remedial as it is reparative, as much 93
procedural as substantive, and as much immediate as enduring’.  In their concurring opinion in El-Masri, 94
Tulkens et al also recognised how the right to the truth is connected to the emotional repair of victims: 
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Establishing the true facts and securing an acknowledgment of serious breaches of human rights and 
humanitarian law constitute forms of redress that are just as important as compensation, and sometimes even 
more so.  95
According to the Grand Chamber in El-Masri, the ‘right to know what happened’, which is expressly linked 
to the right to the truth, is relevant to (a) the victim (applicant), whose Convention rights are allegedly 
violated and who has standing before the Court; (b) the family of the victim; (c) ‘other victims of similar 
crimes’; and (d) the ‘general public’.  This broader understanding of the category of victims echoes the 96
jurisprudence of the IACHR discussed previously.  
The Court’s jurisprudence has confirmed that victim status is relevant at all stages of the proceedings.  97
Victims are presented as a special category in Article 34 of the ECHR  and in the Practical Guide on 98
Admissibility Criteria.  An applicant may be a direct victim if ‘directly affected by the act or omission’, 99
‘even in the absence of prejudice’.  However, ‘this criterion cannot be applied in a rigid, mechanical and 100
inflexible way’: even if the victim is deceased the case may continue, because ‘human rights cases before the 
Court generally also have a moral dimension’, especially ‘if the main issue raised by the case transcends the 
person and the interests of the applicant’.  This aspect in particular is highly relevant to the construction of 101
the legal truth discussed in the previous chapter, inasmuch as it presents a public account of the past. It also 
justifies the inclusion of potential and indirect victims in the category.  
 In specific circumstances, the Court may also accept applications from potential or indirect victims, i.e. 
‘persons who could not complain of a direct violation’.  These include: individuals affected by the 102
existence of secret measures (such as telephone tapping) ‘without having to allege that such measures were 
in fact applied to [them]’;  applicants claiming ‘that a decision to extradite [them] would, if implemented, 103
be contrary to Article 3’ given the ‘foreseeable consequences in the requesting country’;  certain classes of 104
people who ‘run a risk of being directly prejudiced by the measure complained of’,  and those who are 105
‘directly affected by the legislation’ if it is ‘established that there is a real risk (…), in the not too distant 
future’ requiring a modification of conduct or risk of prosecution.   106
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The Court can accept applications from family members as indirect victims, ‘where there is a personal and 
specific link between the direct victim and the applicant’.  So far, this category has included spouses,  107 108
parents,  and even a nephew with close ties to the direct victim and the violation  (but has excluded an 109 110
adult sibling living in a different city ). Nevertheless, it has stated that there is no automatic ‘general 111
principle that a family member of a “disappeared person” is thereby a victim of treatment contrary to Article 
3’; affording victim status to relatives depends on ‘special factors’ which give ‘the suffering of the applicant 
a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress’, based on the proximity of familial ties, the 
circumstances of the relationship and whether the harm was directly witnessed.   112
Significantly, the ‘victimhood’ of relatives does not derive vicariously from the status of the direct victim 
(generally under Articles 2 and 3). Instead, they acquire independent victim status vis-à-vis the state in 
connection to the violations suffered by the direct victim, when the ‘authorities’ reaction and attitudes to the 
situation’ are inadequate, such as the responses to family members attempting to obtain information.  This 113
was confirmed in Association 21 December 1989 v Romania,  where the Court found that the failure of the 114
state to provide families of the victims with adequate and prompt access to an independent judicial enquiry 
on brutal political repression contributed to the violation of Article 2.  This also reaffirms the state’s 115
obligation to provide access to the truth about past abuse through judicial means.  
In Aslakhanova and Others v Russia (enforced disappearances in Chechnya and Ingushetia) the Court 
distinguished the state’s duty to carry out an effective investigation and conduct a trial (which is not an 
obligation of result) from the right to the truth granted to victims.  It lists the regional and international 116
instruments applicable to enforced disappearance, calling the right to the truth by that name.  By linking 117
alleged violations of articles 3 and 5 expressly to the violation of article 2, the Court noted that the ‘essence 
of such a violation does not lie mainly in the fact of the “disappearance” of the family member but rather 
concerns the authorities’ reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention’.  This 118
stresses the state’s obligations to deliver the right to the truth through its actions, more than the rights of the 
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victim/relative to know. This approach is consistent with previous judgments in which the state’s persistent 
failure to account for missing persons constituted a continuing violation of article 3 for relatives.  119
 In El-Masri the Grand Chamber partly reconsidered the Court’s tendency to talk of the state’s breach of the 
procedural limb of substantive articles (generally 2 and 3) rather than granting an explicit right to the truth to 
individual victims and their relatives in relation to substantive provisions. Instead, it highlighted that 
inadequate state investigations impact the right to the truth, opening up the possibility of considering it a 
stand-alone right.  However, the meaning of ‘impact’ falls short of a ‘violation’, leaving the matter 120
unresolved. The difficulty in clearly outlining the right to the truth is interconnected with the identification of 
specific victims who hold that right. Given that harm affects communities widely, the general public may 
also have an interest in the ‘right of access to relevant information about alleged violations’ in addition to 
those directly concerned, extending the right to the truth beyond the parties to a case.  121
By acknowledging that ‘other victims of similar crimes and the general public’ may also be affected by 
inadequate state investigations which have an impact on the right to the truth, the Grand Chamber links this 
right to the rule of law.  When authorities openly violate human rights or guarantee impunity for the 122
abusive behaviour, investigations into serious violations contribute to ‘maintaining public confidence’ in the 
rule of law. Previous jurisprudence already found the right to know the truth especially important in 
situations marred by an unambiguous disregard for the rule of law and ‘conditions of guaranteed impunity’ 
for state agents and authorities.  Likewise, the Court has stated that authorities cannot remain inactive and 123
allow perpetrators of violent repression against civilians to be shielded from criminal responsibility through 
statutes of limitations, stressing the importance to know the truth for both direct victims as well as society as 
a whole.  Nevertheless, in El-Masri the Grand Chamber did not analyse the broader implications of the 124
right to the truth for the general public and in relation to maintaining public confidence in the rule of law, 
leaving this task to the separate opinions.  
The concurring opinion by Tulkens et al stressed that ‘the desire to ascertain the truth plays a part in 
strengthening confidence in public institutions and hence the rule of law’.  Thus, the political significance 125
and implications for society at large of these cases goes beyond the dispute between individual applicant and 
respondent state. On the other hand, for Casadevall et al it is ‘the victim, and not the general public, who is 
entitled to this right resulting from Article 3 of the Convention’, regardless of the general public’s interest 
(and curiosity) in the case.  While not dismissing the fact that certain cases carry public significance 126
beyond the parties to the dispute, these judges argued that the interest of society at large should be irrelevant 
to the Court.  
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The more conservative approach, however, seems to miss a distinctive feature of the right to the truth 
revealed by the IACHR. In support of this, Tulkens et al cite Contreras (alongside Velásquez Rodríguez) 
where the victim and their relatives had ‘the right to know the truth, so that they and society as a whole must 
be informed on what happened’, as there must be knowledge ‘about the facts of grave human rights 
violations’ in a democratic society.  This echoes the Court’s own application of the ECHR as ‘an instrument 127
designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’.  Tasked with the political 128
responsibility of defending human rights across Europe, the Court – like all judges in ‘modern democracies’ 
–  has ‘a major role to play in protecting democracy’.  This approach consolidates the arguments presented 129
in chapter 2 suggesting that judges have an important function in uncovering legal truths and contributing to 
the collective memories of past abuse. Therefore, a Court which fails to uphold the victims’ right to the truth 
may be criticised as complicit in protecting perpetrators, which radically undermines the democratic intent of 
the ECHR. Moreover, the enjoyment of right to the truth contributes to maintaining public confidence in the 
rule of law and is the basis for public order and democracy, especially in times of transition. 
The ECHR is cautiously receptive of the right to the truth. In El-Masri, the Grand Chamber expressly 
acknowledged this right in relation to the procedural limb of Article 3, although judges disagreed on the 
usefulness of such a right, whether it introduces new rights, and whether society at large has an interest in the 
truth alongside victims. The discussion at the ECHR on the right to the truth feeds into the broader 
discussion of the formation of legal truths outlined in previously. In particular, the recognition of the right to 
the truth points to the related state duty to investigate past abuses, not only in relation to the specific case of 
one party, but with a view to present an official account of history that society as a whole can access. 
Moreover, as noted by Tulkens, the uncovering of the truth plays an important part in strengthening the rule 
of law, indicating a notion of legal truth which is inherently transformative. Thus, the case law of the ECHR 
suggests a willingness of the Court to acknowledge the function of the right to the truth in societies in 
transitional settings (Association 21 December; Aslakhanova) or in situations of exception (El-Masri) where 
the effects of political and legal uncertainties prevail over the enjoyment of human rights. As such, the 
victims’ right to the truth counters the authorities’ unwillingness to account for abuse, providing individual 
redress as well as informing collective memories, and compels states to investigate human rights violations. 
In the context of transitional justice, this recognition gives the broad category of victims a (regional) human 
rights tool to demand a formal state inquiry into the circumstances and responsibilities for past abuse – and 
not just wait in hope for their suffering to be recognised.  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4. The Right to the Truth under PIL: ECHR Contributions 
The foregoing discussion reveals the Court’s receptiveness to global trends in IHRL and suggests it can 
influence those trends. By acknowledging the right to the truth, the Court joins the IACHR and various UN 
bodies that had previously done so: the increased consensus around this right acquires significance under 
CIL, evidenced through opinio juris and state practice.  Arguably, ECHR jurisprudence carries a significant 130
normative value regionally within its jurisdiction and potentially beyond it.  The Court contributes to 131
‘international legal culture’ by providing important ‘elucidation and development of international law’ as 
well as developing ‘principles of general applicability’, such as those addressing procedure, jurisdiction and 
admissibility.  Jointly with the IACHR, the ECHR is able to give regional legal effect to many IHRL 132
principles which may otherwise be un-justiciable: for this reason, its importance as a discrete regional 
mechanism acquires global significance as well. Mindful of the specificities of the European context, this 
section will focus on the dialogue between the Court, as an example of a regional human rights tribunal, and 
PIL in shaping the right to the truth as well as (potentially) human rights in general.  
To shield itself from criticism, the right to the truth must be grounded in the sources of PIL. To that end, 
when the Grand Chamber and individual judges considered the right to the truth in El-Masri, they 
contextualised the ECHR among a broader range of IHRL instruments, including UN documents and the 
IACHR jurisprudence. The difference between the two courts’ use of the right to the truth can be explained 
by the IACHR having to face a regional wave of authoritarianism and amnesties that forced judicial 
creativity to uncover accounts of past violence. Conversely, the Court has had fewer opportunities to explore 
this right ECHR, which has surfaced in relation to decommunisation and, more recently, to counter-terror 
practices. In El-Masri, the Court considered the UN Human Rights Council Resolutions 9/11 and 12/12 on 
Right to the Truth among the relevant sources to get round the lack of an explicit mention of the right to the 
truth in the ECHR. This move has, arguably, contributed to the creation of CIL. 
References to IHRL and PIL in the Court’s jurisprudence denote an interactive, reciprocal correlation. The 
former President of the Court Luzius Wildhaber has remarked that the ECHR and PIL enjoy a ‘dynamic and 
evolutive’ relationship, ‘checking and building on each other.  As ‘part of the legal background’ of the 133
ECHR (a treaty under PIL ), international law is a ‘vital reference point’ for the Court.  The ECHR 134 135
expressly mentions international law in Article 7, Article 15, Article 35 and Article 1 Protocol I, and the 
Court’s case law has clarified that ‘the Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with 
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other rules of international law of which it forms part’.  It routinely considers PIL within the applicable 136
legal framework to decide cases,  and even references ICJ jurisprudence.  By drawing on other 137 138
international law instruments, the Court develops a reading of the Convention consistent with other areas of 
IHRL (as was the case in El-Masri).  And as such, the ECHR plays a ‘key role’ in IHRL and PIL, which is 139
desirable, argues Wildhaber, ‘if it contributes to the evolution of international law at large’ as well as of 
IHRL.  140
Indeed, the Court has relied on international law to determine ‘the effect of some substantive provisions of 
the Convention’ and has been responsive to developments in international law as a means for interpreting and 
applying it.  But the ECHR does not always follow classic state-centric PIL;  early case law clarified that: 141 142
Unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal 
engagements between contracting States. It creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral 
undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of the Preamble, benefit from a “collective 
enforcement”.  143
In addition to the different type of obligations created by the ECHR, the Court has noted its ‘special 
character (…) as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.  The 144
Court has questioned ‘the fact that at the heart of any treaty-based agreement there could only be an 
agreement’,  as ‘the integrity and unity of the Convention system’ go ‘beyond the consent- and 145
sovereignty-oriented rules of general international law’.  Interpretations must thus be consistent with ‘the 146
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general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a 
democratic society’.  As such, given its human rights subject matter and its democratic intent, the ECHR is 147
a special type of treaty under PIL and, consequently, the Court may go arbitrarily beyond the letter of the 
Convention in order to reflect or give effect to IHRL trends within its jurisdiction. Thus, the Court may 
autonomously recognise right to the truth within the scope of the ECHR, because its special nature as a 
human rights treaty makes it permeable to global IHRL developments as well as to agreements between 
states parties to the Convention.  
The other side of the relationship between the ECHR and PIL focuses on how the former can be constitutive 
of the latter. The emergence of the right to the truth in the Court’s case law exemplifies this process. ECHR 
jurisprudence, especially in Grand Chamber formation (like in the El-Masri case), carries the potential to 
contribute to the consolidation of the right to the truth under IHRL as evidence of CIL or general principles 
of law. The fact that the Court considers itself as a special regime under PIL does not affect the reality of its 
judgments, which feed into IHRL and human rights debates.  
Based on the combined ‘repeated inferences of this right in relation to other fundamental human rights by 
human rights bodies and courts’, as well as the proliferation of truth-seeking mechanisms, Naqvi argues that 
the right to the truth is emerging as ‘something approaching a customary right’.  Given the ‘dynamic 148
relationship between custom and treaty’, in which the latter may generate ‘new rules of customary law and 
may eventually acquire probative value for establishing the customary character of the new rules’,  the 149
scope of human rights could be broadened through Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, authoritatively 
interpreted in UN work. 
Bruno Simma and Philip Alston discuss the ‘authoritative interpretation’ approach to human rights as such:   150
States Parties to the [UN] Charter, having in good faith undertaken treaty obligations to respect “human 
rights”, are subsequently bound to accept, for the purposes of interpreting their treaty obligations, the 
definition of “human rights” which has evolved over time on the basis of the virtually unanimous practice of 
the relevant organs of the United Nations.   151
Nonetheless, this incremental authoritative interpretation approach based on the UN Charter is risky.  152
Meron is sceptical of the ‘attempt to endow customary law status instantly upon norms approved by 
consensus or near-consensus at international law conferences’ (such as UN human rights conferences).  153
Similarly, Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner warn against ‘a vague and easily manipulable consensus 
criterion’ replacing state consent in a context where there power of international law over states is limited by 
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their self-interests.  In addition to the difficulties of ascertaining state practice through consensus, 154
identifying opinio juris is also problematic, as ‘lex lata [may be] cloaked as lex ferenda’.   155
 A more reliable indicator for establishing CIL is proposed by Meron as the ‘degree to which a statement of a 
particular right in one human rights instrument, especially a human rights treaty, has been repeated in other 
human rights instruments’, countered by ‘the degree to which a particular right is subject to limitations 
(clawback clauses)’.  References to a right in national law can provide further proof of its consolidation.   156 157
 The state obligation to investigate serious violations, closely related to the right to the truth, has already been 
addressed in the context of CIL.  Naomi Roht Arriaza acknowledges that ‘although state-sponsored grave 158
violations of human rights persist’ and states often fail to investigate them, ‘other aspects of state practice 
show that states do recognise these failures as breaches of international norms’.  This finds an application 159
in state prosecutions. However, Roht Arriaza cautions against using domestic law as an indicator of state 
practice, pointing instead to verbal statements of governmental representatives to international organisations 
as ‘recognition of an international obligation to investigate and prosecute’.  The recent International Law 160
Commission (ILC) ‘Report on identification of customary international law’ clarifies some of the 
uncertainties around what constitutes relevant state practice, confirming that acts of the executive branch in 
international contexts are included.   161
Alongside the actions of state representatives which consolidate the customary right to the truth, regional 
human rights courts enter into dialogue with customary IHRL.  For instance, the European Court accepts 162
the binding nature of customary law provisions as part of applicable PIL.  Regional human rights courts (as 163
international courts) may contribute to the interpretation and formulation of CIL.  Meron identifies this 164
two-way relationship as follows:  
Although regional human rights courts and commissions apply and interpret their constitutive instruments 
rather than general international law, the cumulative weight of their case-law influences and consolidates the 
development of customary human rights law.   165
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Meron also highlights that ‘the decisions of such organs are frequently and increasingly invoked outside the 
context of their constitutive instruments and cited as authoritative statements of human rights law’; as such, 
the jurisprudence of the regional courts, taken cumulatively, ‘has a significant role in generating customary 
rules’.  Consequently, the jurisprudence of the Court, including judgments addressing the right to the truth 166
like El-Masri, contribute to the customary consolidation of this right in IHRL. 
Implicit references to the potential customary nature of the right to the truth can be found in El-Masri. With 
regards to state practice, the findings of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 
(WGEID) cited in the concurring opinion of Judge Tulkens et al recall that various countries have worked 
and cooperated with the WGEID.  Similarly, the Human Rights Council’s Report on the WGEID states that 167
‘the existence of the right to the truth in international law is accepted by State practice consisting in both 
jurisprudential precedent and by the establishment of various truth seeking mechanisms in the period 
following serious human rights crises, dictatorships or armed conflicts’.  With regards to opinio juris, 168
evidence may be found in the Human Rights Council resolutions listed among the sources of the right to the 
truth in general IHRL.  This suggests, therefore, that in El-Masri the Court did not dismiss the potential 169
customary consolidation of the right to the truth.  
Alternatively to (but even in conjunction with) CIL it could be argued that the right to the truth is an 
emerging ‘general principle of law as recognised by civilised nations’ under Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute.  A comparative analysis of this concept in El-Masri, read alongside Inter-American case law and 170
other international law sources (especially at UN level), points in this direction. Yasmin Naqvi has suggested 
that the jurisprudence of (regional) human rights courts indicates a nascent general principle; more 
specifically, procedural obligations that address violations of fundamental rights are emerging as ‘an 
expected response by a state to a violation’.  This is exactly what happened in El-Masri, where the right to 171
the truth was linked to the procedural limb of article 3, as discussed earlier. Whether the recognition of the 
procedural limb of a Convention right is acceptable and sufficient in order to establish a right (in this case the 
right to the truth) is more a practical question than a doctrinal one, and will ultimately be tested by the 
Court’s subsequent applications of the new right.  
 Interpreting the right to the truth through the lens of general principles of law instead of CIL carries the 
advantage of avoiding the challenging test of state practice. This is because, if Simma and Alston are correct, 
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human rights obligations do not ‘run between’ states, like other areas of PIL.  Instead, in the absence of 172
treaty provisions, but in light of the ILA Report on the Formation of Customary Law, there is a link between 
human rights and general principles of law.  For Simma and Alston, the notion of general principles admits 173
a situation in which ‘a norm invested with strong inherent authority is widely accepted even though widely 
violated’.  This, they suggest, ‘provides a more plausible explanation of how substantive human rights 174
obligations may be established in general international law, than that offered by a strained, or even denatured 
“new” theory of custom’.  Following this logic, the right to the truth may be understood as an emerging 175
general principle of law. The right to the truth can be ‘widely accepted’ while being ‘widely violated’. A 
growing acceptance of this right can be drawn from a comparative analysis of the cross-references between 
the ECHR, the IACHR and other international law sources.  Though a welcome development, this right is 176
yet to be accepted and applied as such outside of Latin America, Europe, and UN bodies, which suggests that 
its standing in all other jurisdictions is still lacking.  
 The ECHR mentions ‘general principles’ in Article 7(2) and in Article 1, Protocol I. Merrills argues that the 
drafters ‘saw the use of general principles as inevitable’  and as ‘part of the fundamental legal fabric’; this 177
potentially open list reflects ‘a process in which the resources of legal culture are constantly being scanned 
by the judicial mind in a search for new solutions’.  The comparative method – intrinsic in the workings of 178
a regional court – provides a useful tool in searching for and testing ‘new solutions’.  In El-Masri, the 179
Court considered IACHR jurisprudence and UN sources as well as its own case law relevant to the right to 
the truth. As such, it examined solutions piloted elsewhere in tentatively suggesting that the right to the truth 
is somehow connected to the ECHR. Arguably, (at least some of) the judges looked for a general principle 
that could be applicable in Europe, even if it was generated elsewhere within the constellation of IHRL.  
As ECHR jurisprudence is significant internationally, the El-Masri case is likely to influence the global 
understanding of the right to the truth. The 2013 annual report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of 
truth listed the case of El-Masri among the regional sources that consolidate the right to the truth, alongside 
the rich Inter-American jurisprudence and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
recognition of the right to the truth.  The UN Human Rights Committee and the IACHR have both referred 180
to European case law in the past to elucidate principles of general international law applicable in their 
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jurisdictions.  Likewise, domestic jurisdictions outside the Council of Europe have been responsive to 181
ECHR case law,  as have states parties.   182 183
 Though politically contested, the far-reaching effects of ECHR jurisprudence have been described by its 
advocates as justified by the Court’s ‘responsible decision-making in accordance with the highest traditions 
of judicial craftsmanship’ and grounded firmly in the ‘law behind the cases’.  As illustrated in El-Masri, the 184
provision of separate opinions contributes to the intellectual transparency and nuance in judgments.  The 185
Court’s legal technique, finesse and reasoning, according to some, places its jurisprudence on a par with the 
ICJ and other international courts.  As such, in addressing the right to the truth, the Court is well placed to 186
contribute to the elucidation of this right not only in its own jurisdiction but also for global international 
human rights. Given that its jurisprudence carries implications above and beyond the inter partes nature of a 
case, there is reason to believe that the legal and political effects of the right to the truth as introduced in El-
Masri will echo both throughout Europe and beyond. Nevertheless, while exalting Strasbourg’s merits in 
contributing to the consolidation of the right to the truth, one must investigate whether other jurisdictions and 
legal traditions can also contribute to the global formation of this right, to avoid a Eurocentric (as well as 
Latin American, in the case of the right to the truth) focus in establishing and imposing general principles of 
international law. If the right to the truth is to serve the interests of victims of past violations in the context of 
TJ, its normative significance should be acceptable across various communities. Failing that, the right to the 
truth will be at best considered irrelevant in certain transitional settings, and at worst convey neocolonial 
impositions through externally-introduced truth-seeking initiatives.  
In essence, the recent jurisprudence acknowledging the right to the truth contributes to the consolidation of 
this right under general PIL. The European Court now joins the IACHR and various UN bodies in 
recognising the right to the truth; the broadened consensus across jurisdictions (two regional IHRL systems 
and the UN human rights bodies) gives new meaning to this right. In particular, as the ECHR is situated 
within the scope of IHRL and thus of PIL, the Convention is receptive to global human rights trends as well 
as constitutive of those trends. Therefore, the Grand Chamber discussion of the right to the truth in El-Masri 
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consolidates this emerging right under PIL as CIL or as a general principle of law, carrying implications both 
within the jurisdiction of the ECHR as well as for global IHRL.  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5. Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates that recent European jurisprudence acknowledging the right to the truth joins 
previous IACHR case law and the UN’s authoritative recognition, contributing to the consolidation of this 
right globally. As the ECHR is a human rights treaty within the scope of PIL, it is capable of being receptive 
to IHRL trends as well as constitutive of new developments, by virtue of the special nature of the principles 
it seeks to protect and promote. For this reason, the reference to the right to the truth in the El-Masri case is 
situated in the broader international context in which this right has developed. The discussion around the 
right to the truth in El-Masri has been subsequently cited by the Court  as well as by the UN Special 187
Rapporteur on truth,  which strengthens the argument that the ECHR helps shape IHRL through PIL. As 188
such, in conjunction with other regional and global manifestations of acceptance, the Court may contribute to 
the establishment of the right to the truth as CIL or a general principle of international law.  
 Regardless of the scepticism that surrounds the development of a new right, and notwithstanding the fact 
that the right to the truth still falls short of having a clear definition and scope, its acknowledgement in 
different fora points unequivocally to its existence and relevance for TJ. The victims’ right to the truth 
counters the authorities’ unwillingness to account for abuse, offering opportunities for individual redress as 
well as collective knowledge of the past, compelling states to investigate human rights violations. This right 
helps answer the need to provide victims with an incisive tool to hold authorities accountable for serious 
abuses and negligence, and demand state investigations that carry a deeply transformative role in 
strengthening the rule of law and promoting confidence in public institutions. Understood in the context of 
the creation of the legal truth, the right to the truth feeds into the wider discussion around the formation of 
collective memories outlined in the previous chapter.  
In the broader context of relocating TJ to specific settings, the right to the truth enables (in principle) 
survivors of past abuse – local stakeholders – to instigate truth-seeking endeavours and participate more 
actively in shaping the process of uncovering legal truths. In that regard, a substantive right to the truth under 
PIL is remarkably useful for individuals and groups at grassroots level seeking redress for past harm as well 
as public recognition of the responsibilities of perpetrators. The challenge, however, is making this right 
justiciable beyond the IACHR and ECHR jurisdictions both substantively and procedurally. Indeed, the 
future consolidation of the right to the truth as global – i.e. not limited to the IACHR, ECHR and UN – relies 
on the identification of comparable references in other legal systems, to ensure inclusivity of different 
perspectives and avoid neocolonial or irrelevant uses of PIL. Applications of the right to the truth in TJ 
provide opportunities to analyse whether other normative systems can give effect and strengthen this right. 
The following chapter will analyse the comparative tools for broadening our inquiry into the right to the truth 
across jurisdictions, and in particular in Muslim-majority legal systems (discussed in chapters 5 and 6).  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1. Introduction  
Transitional justice processes do not rely only on formal laws, but also take into account the complexity of 
overlapping normative sources in a given context; therefore, although international law conceptions of TJ 
constitute ‘universal standards’, they ‘can and should accommodate diversity and be responsive to local 
realities’.  The flexibility required for ‘cultural diversity and localization’, however, need not undermine the 1
development of an ‘international law of transitional justice’,  embracing IHRL (and PIL more generally) 2
alongside other forms of culturally-specific norms that characterise a given society experiencing transition. 
By highlighting the potential cross-fertilisation between international law and local visions of justice, 
comparative law may provide conceptual tools to strengthen global principles of TJ through specific 
applications.  
In the wake of the Arab Uprisings there is a pressing need to reassess how TJ applies in Muslim-majority 
settings. This echoes William Twining’s preoccupation with ‘concepts and legal discourses’ that ‘travel well’ 
in an increasingly cosmopolitan world, and the ‘dangers of ethnocentric projections’ in ‘discussing legal 
phenomena across jurisdictions, traditions and cultures’.  International lawyers face the theoretical and 3
practical challenges of localising and adapting international norms TJ elsewhere.  Given the impossibility of 4
neatly applying a universal normative framework for TJ based on PIL to complex local realities, this process 
must be embedded in local conceptions of justice – as set out in the 2004 UN Secretary General Report on 
‘The rule of law and transitional justice’.  The challenge is resisting, on the one hand, apologetic, relativist 5
and deferential approaches to local norms inspired by tradition, religion and custom, and, on the other, blind 
impositions of the international paradigm of TJ.  
This chapter contributes to understanding the relocation of TJ from international law to specific settings 
through the lens of comparative law. The first part critically discusses why local norms and cultural contexts 
are relevant to TJ, and considers how the tools of comparative law help international lawyers reckon with 
foreign legal systems. The second part analyses comparative law as a method for translating international 
understandings of TJ into local settings, drawing from the theory of formants of legal systems introduced by 
Sacco. The third part examines international law in light of comparative law as a cultural bridge for 
localising TJ within an emerging jus commune/jus gentium framework contributing to a common core across 
legal systems – and even draw on the Islamic tradition. In the broader context of the research questions, this 
chapter provides the methodological tools to understand and appreciate the complexities of Muslim-majority 
legal systems in which TJ is relocated and developed.  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2. Localising Transitional Justice: A Challenging Necessity 
The 2004 UN Secretary General Report on ‘The rule of law and transitional justice’ highlights the need to 
duly take into account ‘indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice or settling disputes’, 
To help them to continue their often vital role and to do so in conformity with both international standards and 
local tradition.   6
Warning against pre-packaged solutions imposed from the outside, the Report stresses how TJ must be 
localised at all stages to empower the national actors and facilitate local ownership:  
Local consultation enables a better understanding of the dynamics of past conflict, patterns of discrimination 
and types of victims. (…) A more open and consultative trend is emerging (…). Although the lessons of past 
transitional justice efforts help inform the design of future ones, the past can only serve as a guideline. Pre-
packaged solutions are ill-advised. Instead, experiences from other places should simply be used as a starting 
point for local debates and decisions.  7
International law and standards set out by the UN ‘accommodated by the full range of legal systems of 
Member States, whether based in common law, civil law, Islamic law, or other legal traditions’ are presented 
as a safety net for localising TJ.  Without clearly stating it, this approach recognises that every TJ process 8
faces a context of legal pluralism in which different rules coexist in a given legal system.  9
Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf argue that ‘the paradigm of transitional justice’, as set out in universalist 
terms, ‘is increasingly destabilized by its local applications’.  On the one hand, TJ is pulled towards the 10
international legal framework, and on the other, towards localisation.  Reckoning with the perceived 11
antagonisms between universal and indigenous norms, therefore, is a necessity when relocating international 
understandings of transitional justice to local settings. For this reason, one-size-fits-all toolkits do not 
provide appropriate methods for designing and implementing TJ. 
At least in theory, a ‘grassroots approach to transitional justice’ is better suited to fostering a fully 
participatory process at all stages of design, development and implementation, following findings in 
development studies.  Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern identify the democratic deficit at the heart of 12
‘hegemonic international approaches to democracy promoted in post-conflict situations’, raising important 
questions about agency, power relations and dominant interests – such as donors’ agendas – that determine 
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transitional justice processes.  Accepting that TJ occurs in a ‘contested space’, Kieran McEvoy and Lorna 13
McGregor call for a bottom-up perspective, focusing on the communities that have experienced the violence, 
which operate below formal institutions and distinctly from the elites.  But just as the hegemony of 14
international and national elites may perpetuate structural unfairness, even bottom-up transitional initiatives 
are capable of replicating partners of dominance and violence. Therefore, alongside PIL, both local and 
external stakeholders in the design and implementation of TJ processes must search for a normative 
contribution from below and be critically aware of local customs and rules in order to localise TJ through the 
participation of those affected and their versions of justice.  
Evaluating the centrality of customary forms of justice in post-conflict (transitional) settings, Deborah Isser 
sets out three main arguments.  Firstly, customary justice systems ‘are and will likely remain far more 15
accessible and effective than the broken and mostly distrusted formal systems’; secondly, ‘they offer a 
paradigm of justice preferred by much of the population and can often resolve problems that the formal 
justice system cannot’, such as ‘root causes of conflict, ending cycles of blood vengeance, resolving 
sociospiritual problems, and promoting social reconciliation’; thirdly, ‘constructively engaging customary 
justice systems can improve the legitimacy of the state and its formal institutions’. Isser presents legal 
pluralism as an opportunity for the justice sectors of post-conflict settings, highlighting three further aspects 
to consider: the ‘sociocultural basis of customary justice systems’, their limitations, and the relationship 
between customary and formal justice systems.  16
Mindful of the continual supremacy of international law in TJ, Catherine Turner stresses that ‘international 
standards should provide guidelines, not provide a strait-jacket upon independent thought’, and calls for a 
‘process of local, social and cultural engagement and of attempts to produce context-specific consensus’ 
facilitated by the international community.  But, naturally, tensions may arise between customary forms of 17
justice and the standards set out in international law in the localisation of TJ. For instance, Isser describes 
customary justice systems as ‘guardians of the dominant social and cultural beliefs of their societies’, which 
preserve a ‘conservative social order often characterised by a patriarchal hierarchy and social inequalities’.  18
She suggests that instead of accepting principles so wholly at odds with basic IHRL standards, their purpose 
and broader social significance ought to be taken into account in understanding a given local setting. This 
would mean embedding IHRL standards in the language of local customary forms of justice for the purpose 
of transition. However, the transformative features of TJ may also foster new interpretations of customary 
justice that could be purposefully oriented towards IHRL by relevant stakeholders. Indeed, if successor 
authorities are serious about the transitional aims of accountability, justice and reconciliation, with all its 
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faults the rights paradigm provides language, concepts and opportunities for critique to rebuild broken 
societies.  
These tensions are reminiscent of the universality v relativism debate in human rights;  the fact that TJ relies 19
heavily on IHRL, suggests that it may have unwittingly inherited some of its problems. Mindful of this 
challenge, Lieselotte Viaene and Eva Brems have argued that TJ is better-placed in facing this deadlock for 
four main reasons: TJ is emerging in developing contexts and not in the West; the unacceptability of past 
harm is uncontested; cultural specificity claims are mostly external and academic; and, finally, the 
international law of TJ is at an early stage and thus can still integrate cultural diversity.  Their calls for a 20
revisitation of ‘traditional and local culture’ to consider ‘traditional and informal justice systems’ as part of 
TJ are essential,  but the practical difficulties of doing so are immense, largely due to the inability of 21
international lawyers that dominate the discipline to think more critically about its inherently pluralistic 
sources. 
The complex relationship between law, culture and society is key to understanding how TJ is localised.  22
Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon have argued for legal scholarship to ‘embrace cultural analysis and cultural 
studies’,  as a ‘kind of epistemological corrective to the plethora of problems posed for postrealist legal 23
studies by the crisis of the social liberal state’.  But this approach unearths other issues: much like the notion 24
of tradition analysed by Hobsbawm and Ranger,  the very ‘idea of cultural authenticity’ is questionable,  25 26
and risks essentialising foreign legal cultures instead of recognising that societies and states are not culturally 
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homogeneous.  It should also identify dynamics of power and subjectivity,  challenge traditional ideas of 27 28
culture and advance new (better) conceptions of law,  instead of returning to romanticised golden era of a 29
distant past and impose its rules on contemporary societies. Moreover, as (all) law proposes a ‘distinctive 
manner of imagining the real’, it is itself constitutive of culture.  This final point echoes the earlier 30
discussion on the formation of legal truths, which in turn feed into historical narratives and cultural 
dynamics.  
Rejecting the artificial separation between law and culture, Naomi Mezey sees ‘law as culture and culture as 
law’, borrowing from the ethnographic method that studies how ‘specific cultural practices or identities 
coincide or collide with specific legal rules or conventions’ thus ‘altering the meanings of both’.  She sees 31
ethnography as providing both explanation and and ‘cultural interpretation’ of the law in three main ways:  
1. Interpretation of law at a site of production (the courtroom, the committee room, etc.), which would make use 
of both traditional and non-traditional modes of legal interpretation; 
2. Interpretation of the cultural practices that might be said to inspire the law and those that the law confronts 
when applied; 
3. Interpretation of the interventions of culture in law and law in culture, of the dissolution of production and 
reception into a circulation of the interdependencies, contradictions, and conspiracies in meaning.   32
By setting aside the (positivist) need for discreteness and determinacy,  a complex, varied and improvised 33
relationship between law and culture emerges. This offers a more accurate explanation of the contexts in 
which TJ is localised, taking stock of the fact that law and culture cannot be disentangled. As such, the rules 
of any system are likely to express dominant beliefs grounded in the cultural values of powerful community 
stakeholders. This links TJ localisation to both formal and informal norms informed by cultural practices.  
The relationship between law and culture reaches its peak in relation to human rights, which in turn guide TJ. 
Culture connects to human rights in ways that both enhance and restrict the realisation of those rights;  34
intersections include the right to cultural participation and the right to enjoy one’s own culture, but culture 
may also be an obstacle or barrier to the enjoyment of human rights and promote harmful practices.  As 35
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such, this relationship is inherently ambivalent and but not per se undesirable. A deeper engagement with the 
perspectives of cultural studies and ethnography would help international lawyers navigate the universality v 
relativism debates in IHRL which overshadow potential synergies between culture and law in delivering 
human rights aims in TJ. Therefore, although the localisation of TJ destabilises its emerging international 
paradigm, grassroots participation is necessary, as argued by the authors reviewed. This will inherently 
reflect the dominant cultural traits of a society, which is neither good nor bad, but should be reckoned with 
openly.  
Rejecting the tendency to ‘demonise culture’ in human rights circles, Sally Engle Merry argues that culture is 
not necessarily ‘a barrier to progress’ as opposed to ‘modernity and the laws of human rights’ purportedly 
‘culture-free’.  Drawing instead on anthropology, she suggests that the ‘human rights legal system produces 36
culture’ by identifying problems and articulating ‘normative visions of a just society’ (and the related 
procedural rules to make complaints) and imposing them at national and international levels.  Both Merry 37
and Jessica Almqvist link culture to power dynamics and political appropriation – just like law. 
Consequently, culture may be used to shield violations, but also to further human rights enjoyment.  To 38
understand the relationship between culture and human rights, Almqvist cautions against excessive reliance 
on controversial propositions, idealism, simplicity, and particularism.  For these reasons, it is essential to 39
understand the interaction of law and culture for localising TJ in a given setting.  
Going back to the overarching research question of this thesis, the relocation of TJ from international law 
cannot refuse the cultural context altogether or embrace it without further scrutiny. In other words, neither 
pure relativism nor pure universality are fit for the task of localising TJ in Muslim-majority legal settings, as 
explored in subsequent chapters. Instead, TJ should be made palatable to both traditional and progressive 
actors, depending on the balance appropriate to each setting and negotiated politically and democratically. 
Therefore, IHRL and other international standards will inevitably coexist alongside other forms of culturally-
specific norms that characterise a given society experiencing transition. Giving due consideration to both is 
imperative for TJ to be relevant and of use.  
2.1 Reckoning with a Foreign Legal System 
Since the end of the Cold War, international relations has increasingly turned to cultural identities to explain 
violence and conflict.  Most notably, after 9/11, this resulted in the tendency to present international law and 40
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Islam as opposed to each other.  In light of the previous discussion, these approaches seem academically 41
misguided and incapable of being of practical use in understanding the culture and laws of Muslim-majority 
communities. Instead, viewing Islamic law simply as a legal system different to PIL may be more useful for 
the relocation of TJ. As such, the methods of comparative law are better suited to analysing links between 
law and culture,  in order for lawyers to become ‘culturally fluent’ in another legal language’.  The 42 43
problem is that not all lawyers are well-equipped to do so.  
Some scholars have remarked that ‘in the society of jurists, the duties of the explorer’ fall on the comparative 
lawyers, who ‘travel through the frontier of law’.  Indeed, ‘comparative law is somewhat like traveling’.  44 45
But observing ‘a foreign legal system from the outside’ is complicated.  Lasser calls for an awareness of 46
limitations and responsible engagement with the object of study,  as one’s cultural starting point is likely to 47
determine how norms are understood.  This could take the form of ‘the ‘inner’ perspective’,  bring an 48 49
outside view, or focus on ‘trans-cultural unity’.  In order to understand and interpret the distinctive cultural 50
features that influence a legal system, anthropology can help.  This interdisciplinary angle is more likely to 51
provide the basis for constructively engaging local norms in designing relevant TJ processes. As such, 
international lawyers attempting to localise TJ in Islamic settings (or any setting, for that matter) benefit 
from comparative methods. 
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Comparative law is not limited to analysing official state law or other types of formal law. It also looks at 
broad patterns of social order and rules which have yet to be formalised, even in the absence of centralised 
state power,  considering ‘whatever gives individuals incentives strong enough to affect their social 52
behaviour’.  Rodolfo Sacco terms these abstract normative principles ‘genotypes’ (theoretical norms), 53
whereas he calls their contextual tangible expressions ‘phenotypes’.  These dual concepts identify the 54
prescriptive force of culture and customary forms of justice alongside other rules that make up a legal 
system, and as such inform the process of relocating TJ in a culturally-responsive manner.  
Introducing a romantic/hermeneutic approach, James Whitman also suggests that comparative law should 
engage ‘the unspoken, taken-for-granted body of assumptions and beliefs that inform and motivate the law in 
different societies’.  Nevertheless, he cautions against basing one’s understanding of a legal system solely 55
on internal actors and adopting a distinctively apologetic angle.  Thus, the indispensable internal perspective 56
of a given legal system should remain open to scrutiny, especially when local understandings of justice and 
IHRL collide in practice. Clearly, human suffering determined by political, economic, social or other factors 
cannot hide behind cultural peculiarities.  
The analysis of the relationship between law and culture required of the international lawyer localising TJ 
raises another issue. As stated by Paul Kahn, ‘bringing cultural study into the heartland of the legal academy 
is a way of putting the self at risk’, inasmuch as the ‘subject of that inquiry is always the self’.  Indeed, as 57
non-Muslims investigating TJ for Islamic settings, openly acknowledging the inescapable role of one’s own 
identities – cultural and disciplinary – in the process of analysis is a small but necessary gesture of 
intellectual honesty.  
Can a researcher be excluded by virtue of her identities and perspectives from investigating transitional 
justice for Islamic settings? Based on the contributions of Edward Said, who rejects a priori exclusions from 
scholarly endeavours, one is mindful of the risks of: 
A double kind of possessive exclusivism (…) being an excluding insider by virtue of experience (only women 
can write for and about women, and only literature that treats women and Orientals well is good literature), and 
(…) by virtue of method (only Marxists, anti-Orientalists, feminists can write about economics, Orientalism, 
women’s literature).  58
The dangers of ‘othering’  and excluding a researcher on the basis of a perceived personal or scholarly 59
identity can be tempered by the framework provided by comparative analysis, including comparative law, in 
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which being ‘other’ to something is a prerequisite for study and evaluation. To that effect, some have aptly 
pointed out that ‘the cultural Other is in principle not different from the intra-cultural or historical Other’,  60
and, one may add to this, disciplinary other. Nevertheless, these distinctions may be more artificial than 
authentic.  
The ‘assumption of a fundamental distinction between self and other’ has been critiqued by cultural 
anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughad in her seminal ‘Writing Against Culture’;  she argues that culture enforces 61
‘separations that inevitably carry a sense of hierarchy’. One could also posit that comparative lawyers are 
better placed to investigate TJ for Islamic settings than international lawyers, or that an Islamic law scholar is 
more likely to succeed than a legal theorist in analysing doctrinal perspectives. 
In dismantling the perceived hiatus between self and other, Abu-Lughad discusses the human category of 
‘halfies’, which inherently ‘unsettle the boundaries between self and other’, and consequently radically 
renegotiate that sense of cultural hierarchy.  Many international lawyers engaged in questions of Islamic law 62
and comparative law become ‘halfies’. Moreover, the developing framework of reference and past 
experiences of TJ is in itself hybrid, which forces scholars to cross into domains which do not necessarily 
constitute their starting point. International organisations and prominent scholars alike have displayed 
‘halfie’ characteristics. Notably, the 2004 UN Secretary General document on Transitional Justice traces a 
clear connection between TJ, human rights and multiple legal traditions, expressly including Islamic law, 
rejecting PIL purism in the discipline.  Similarly, academics such as Cherif Bassiouni and Abdullahi Ahmed 63
An-Na’im operate comfortably across PIL and Islamic law.  In TJ discussions around the Arab Uprisings, 64
cultural dualisms break down assumed antagonisms of Self and Other lawyers.  Comparative law can help 65
navigate these dualisms for the purpose of translating TJ in Muslim-majority contexts. 
A non-comparative approach to the localisation of TJ risks underestimating the importance of a culturally-
responsive normative framework. Thus, purist approaches based on one discrete set of norms may provide a 
framework of reference based on a solid and coherent internal logic, but are unsuitable for the complex 
reality of transitional settings where different normative principles coexist in a system of legal pluralism. 
Summing up, transitional justice is guided by international law as well as by bottom-up customs and 
cultures. As such, IHRL standards, customary forms of justice and cultural practices coexist in TJ, which is 
more likely to reflect the aspirations of a border range of stakeholders and beneficiaries if different normative 
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principles are included in the process. Therefore, in light of the universality v relativism debate, TJ is well 
placed to test new solutions which are responsive to a wider range of sources. A constructive way to embed 
TJ in various norms is offered by comparative lawyers, whose methods are suited to capturing and critically 
interpreting cultural meanings of law and engage in interdisciplinary dialogues which investigate the unseen 
normative patterns of societies.  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3. Comparative Law Methods 
In translating TJ to Muslim-majority settings, international lawyers are likely to face cognate disciplines that 
comparative lawyers reckon with ordinarily, such as philosophy, history, anthropology and sociology. 
Comparativists, therefore, are well placed in capturing the ‘diversity, change, or history’ in which transitional 
justice occurs, searching for ‘all the factors that, by nature, influence the creative process of law and shape 
the rule and the life of law’.  As such, to serve the purposes of TJ, comparative law ought to ‘become part of 66
interdisciplinary research and serve the scholar concerned with problems of sociology and politics’.  This 67
raises further questions as to the relationship between comparative law and power structures in the 
international arena.  
In a provocative contribution, Günter Frankenberg expresses surprise at how comparative law has left the 
ivory tower ‘to become an ally of power, an integral element of the new regime of consultants’ and a tool of 
political intervention.  He notes the ‘Janus-faced persona’ of mainstream comparative law: 68
The self-proclaimed humanist and idealist in search of the ideal law uneasily coexisting with the pragmatic 
politician who is partial to unity and standardization under the auspices of the very rule of law he likes best. 
Together these two projects constitute the hegemonic self, a representative of legal paternalism.  69
Frankenberg accuses mainstream comparativists of ‘suppress[ing] their subjectivity and hid[ing] their 
peculiar perspective behind the rhetoric of objectivity and neutrality’, ‘camouflaging their politics’ and 
avoiding ‘immersion into the other’ until they recognise their own prevailing culture.  In light of this, the 70
conscientious international lawyer localising TJ in Islamic settings is likely to reflect the traits of the tragic 
comparative lawyer he describes. As such, a strategic use of comparative law can help recognise 
ethnocentrisms when applying TJ concepts to local contexts. Becoming culturally and professionally self-
aware is a necessary step for international lawyers whose cross-cultural work – necessarily guided by their 
own beliefs and attitudes about the law – contributes to TJ processes. The mindfulness stimulated by 
comparative methods is the first step towards more conscientious and self-critical approaches to intercultural 
applications of international law, including the localisation of the international paradigm of TJ.  
In a broader sense, conscientiousness and self-restraint seem to be core features of comparative law. 
Zweigert and Kötz suggest that comparative law shows up the ‘hollowness of traditional attitudes – 
unreflecting, self-assured, and doctrinaire’, and contextually enables deeper insights into the law.  The 71
origins of comparative law, however, are not as enlightened and progressive, revealing entrenched colonial 
attitudes towards foreign (i.e. ‘native’ or ‘primitive’) legal systems. As such, caution must be exercised in 
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adopting comparative methods in the localisation of transitional justice to Islamic settings, in order to avoid 
the pitfalls of ethnocentrism or ethnic apology.  
The colonial heritage of comparative law encompasses a number of features, which Upendra Baxi describes 
as ‘an ethical enterprise, an affair of history and an ensemble of practices of violence’.  Narratives of 72
progress, modernity and legal development contribute this vision. Baxi identifies three legacies of colonial 
legality: mercantilist governmentality, high-colonial legality and the lower degree of civil freedom.  The 73
first conceals economic and commercial profit behind the moral end of colonial legality; the second concerns 
the construction of judicial spheres (such as common-law and civil-law ones) connected to imperialism, and 
the related forms of legal pluralism; the third seeks to introduce the notion of legality in the colonies, albeit 
at the service of colonial intentions.  In this sense, the law carries within it a project of domination and, as 74
such, comparative law may both serve and restate that power and agency divide between individuals. 
The First International Congress for Comparative Law in 1900 in Paris and initial proponents such as E. 
Lambert and R. Saleilles explicitly sought to develop a common law of mankind, as a consequence of human 
progress aided by the comparative method.  Around the same time, PIL was developing as a result of 75
nineteenth century imperialism, in which uniform rules set out by colonial powers governed the rest.  76
Contemporary scholars of comparative law have traced its origins back to natural law vision of Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas (thus preceding positivism).  Gordley outlines a parallel teleological relationship between 77
principle and rule, and higher and lower order principles, which are accompanied by a form of 
(discretionary) ‘prudence’ to evaluate the appropriateness or worth of a certain principle.  Consequently, 78
according to this analysis, human fallibility explains variations across legal systems given that ‘different laws 
may be consistent with the same principles’.  As such, different expressions of the same principle may be 79
evaluated according to their fidelity to the presumed original principle to be upheld, leading to a type of 
analysis which is ill-fitted to the requirements of legal systems that are human-oriented and not higher-
principle oriented.  
More recently, comparative law scholars have dismissed the unification project of the discipline’s earlier 
days.  For instance, Sacco celebrates the achievements of comparative law by highlighting the value placed 80
on legal diversity and pluralism, and the decline of legal nationalism.  In that regard, comparative law seems 81
receptive to the central tenets of legal pluralism. The centrifugal and centripetal effects of comparative law – 
i.e. identifying the convergence or highlighting the differences between norms – can be reckoned with 
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according to the stated aim of each comparison (this will be discussed with reference to PIL in the following 
section).  
But must the discipline of comparative law have a specific intention other than comparison? Zweigert and 
Kötz argue that the ‘basic methodological principle of all comparative law is functionality’, focusing on 
identifying solutions for concrete problems.  In selecting which legal systems to compare, based on their 82
degree of similarity, Zweigert and Kötz simply suggest a rule of thumb, flexible enough to compare virtually 
any legal system, if appropriate to the research question. Indeed,  
If law is seen functionally as a regulator of social facts, the legal problems of all countries are similar. Every 
legal system in the world is open to the same questions and subject to the same standards, even in countries of 
different social structures or different stages of development.   83
A vocal critic of this functionalist position, Frankenberg is sceptical of oversimplifications that negate or 
marginalise ‘the effects of legal forms and ideas in the realm of consciousness as ideologies and rituals’ for 
the sake of problem solving.  Nevertheless, the imitation of foreign models – legal borrowing and 84
‘transplants’  – brings to light how elites choose to draw on foreign law.  But regardless of its practical 85 86
potential and applications, argues Sacco, ‘comparative law remains a science as long as it acquires 
knowledge’.    87
An additional question to ask regards the object of study of comparative law. Today, it is established that 
comparativists do not just analyse the ‘law’ of statutes and cases, nor can they assume that a legal system is a 
monolithic, monocultural and coherent normative apparatus. Indeed, it has long been acknowledged that the 
use of comparative law ‘requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also of its social, and above all 
its political, context’, and that legalism without an appreciation of the context can be detrimental to the aims 
of comparative law.  Some have identified invisible features of legal systems which are often hidden to the 88
lawyers operating within that system.  As such, the context and the underpinnings of a system inform the 89
analysis of comparative lawyers, who cannot limit their inquiry to black letter law. Although positive norms 
have long been juxtaposed to other elements of law, especially among theorists, comparative lawyers whose 
discipline is both deeply theoretical and very practical look beyond black-letter law as a matter of routine.   
Legal systemology, as described by René David, is based on the notion that ‘despite the diversity of laws 
encountered in the world today, it is possible to concentrate on certain “models”, certain laws which can be 
considered typical and representative of a family which groups a number of laws’.  The law of each country 90
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‘in fact constitutes a system: it has a vocabulary used to express concepts, its rules are arranged into 
categories, it has techniques for expressing rules and interpreting them, it is linked to a view of the social 
order itself which determines the way in which the law is applied and shapes the very function of law in that 
society’.  David cautions against focusing on given rules of a particular legal system (seen as a political 91
entity, a state), and instead directs towards seeking out those characteristics which constitute fundamental 
and constant elements underlying specific rules.  As such, black letter law is but a part of the overall 92
structure of a legal system.  
This approach identifies two main criteria upon which to base the classification of laws into families; firstly, 
the ‘law’s conceptual structure’ (i.e. ‘the theory of the sources of the law’); secondly, ‘social objectives to be 
achieved with the help of the legal system or the place of law itself within the social order’ (for this aspect, 
refer to the previous discussion on functionalism).  The distinction of legal families proposed by David is 93
heavily reliant on a Eurocentric notion of what constitutes a legal system, revealing a tendency to consider as 
legal ‘other’ any system that does not follow the conventional western face of the law. Since the classic texts 
of David, more recent studies supporting the framework of legal families as expressions of relatively linear 
legal traditions have been received with much scepticism.  Nevertheless, the usefulness of David’s ‘legal 94
families’ approach rests in the fact that all norms can be somehow compared. Moreover, as comparative law 
originated in relation to legal history, its relevance extends to historical developments of law as well.   95
Many approaches to understanding legal families have been presented by comparative lawyers, and modes of 
classification are presumably as numerous as the issues and details that scholars may choose to analyse. 
Accepting the notion of ‘law as a tool of social organisation’,  Mattei lists law, politics, religious and 96
philosophical traditions as the elements that make up the three patterns of rule of law: professional, political 
or traditional.  In the first system, ‘the legal arena is clearly distinguishable from the political arena (…) and 97
the legal process is largely secularized’; moreover, ‘high level (political) decision-making is itself subject to 
the restraints of the law’, setting up a ‘biunivocal’ relationship between law and politics.  This process of 98
full autonomy between law and politics has not been fully reached in the second type of legal system listed, 
which allows the authorities to escape the ordinary rule of law.  In the third type of system, the traditional 99
rule of law prevails over the other two and ‘the hegemonic pattern of law is either religion or a 
transcendental philosophy in which the individual’s internal dimension and the societal dimension are not 
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separated’.  Mattei concedes that legal analysis alone is unable to capture the subtle complexities of the 100
links between religion/morality/ethics in that context, and stresses that traditional rule of law systems do not 
coincide with the spheres of informal law.   101
The political rule of law model prevails in transitional contexts, to the extent that Mattei explicitly talks of a 
‘law of development and transition’ model.  This is characterised by: 102
Limited control of state institutions on the society; weak courts; uncontrolled rate of inflation; high level of 
instability of existing democratic structures, if any; high level of political involvement in the activity of the 
judiciary; high levels of police coercion; drastic governmental economic regulatory and deregulatory 
intervention; continuous attempts at major legal reform; legal culture heavily influenced by foreign models and 
usually marginalized by the political power; scarcity of legal literature; limited distribution of judicial 
opinions; scarcity of legally trained personnel; and a highly bureaucratized public decision making process. 
The transitional/political rule of law system described presents a temporary nature, and seeks to eventually 
shift towards the rule of professional law model once the transition has been completed.  In that regard, 103
Mattei remarks that this type of legal system is also characterised by the competition between the rule of 
professional law and the rule of traditional law in appropriating the lion’s share of the transitional legal 
setting. In light of the transitional justice/development nexus introduced in the first chapter of this thesis, the 
balance between competing pulls is likely to play a role in the longer-term restructuring of society.  
The tripartite patterns of legal systems set out by Mattei and the explicit mention of transitions suggest that 
while the rule of politics temporarily prevails, the rule of professional law and the rule of traditional law 
struggle to project their respective norms in the process. With reference to the localisation of TJ in Muslim-
majority settings, a prima facie analysis of the Arab Spring contexts suggests that although political forces 
dominate the entire process, both the traditional (Islamic) rule of law camp and the professional rule of law 
camp (inclusive of international law and human rights guarantees) struggle to put themselves in the picture.  
3.1 The Contents of Legal Systems: Formants, Cryptotypes and 
Transplants 
As discussed previously, legal systems are not based on a single set of rules upon which a cohesive model is 
structured.  Instead, a variety of legal material, numerous interpretations and conflicting elements suggest 104
that there are multiple ‘legal formants’ within a given legal system, and ‘there is no guarantee that they will 
be in harmony rather than in conflict’.  Legal formants are defined as: 105
All those formative elements that make any given rule of law amidst statutes, general propositions, particular 
definitions, reasons, holdings, etc. All of these formative elements are not necessarily coherent with each other 
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within each system. (…) To the contrary, legal formants are usually conflicting and can better be pictured in a 
competitive relationship with one another.   106
According to Sacco’s theory, a multitude of facts influence how a scholar or a judge may interpret a legal 
provision; these include factors extraneous to the law, as well as those norms borrowed and transplanted 
from elsewhere. The value of the comparative legal method rests in its explicit aim of dismantling the claims 
of logic and deduction upon which a legal system is based.  The competing interpretations and models 107
available, in fact, can all be valid by virtue of their very existence; this is because the ‘the comparative 
method is founded upon the actual observation of the elements at work in a given legal system’.   108
Sacco argues that there is not a closed set of legal formants in any system (limited to statute/judicial 
decisions/scholarly writings) and focuses on the varying comparative importance of legal formants in each 
system.  A distinction he does make, however, is between ‘those legal formants that are themselves rules of 109
conduct and others that are developed in order to provide abstract formulations or justifications of rules and 
conduct’.  He also distinguishes between ‘enacted legal formants’ (e.g. in constitutions) and ‘those which 110
have grown up without formal enactment’.  The dynamic ability to influence other formants will inevitably 111
vary between legal systems, as will the dissonance among formants of a same system.  It is in this context 112
that comparative law brings its important contribution to understanding a legal system.  
Interpretation of the law is key to its application; Sacco argues that ‘whatever affects the convictions of the 
interpreter [and thus interpretation] is thus a source of law’.  This is a fairly radical notion, which distances 113
itself from both positivism and natural law. Legislation must ‘somehow be placed on a pedestal’ and 
‘sacralised’, understood by those who apply it as ‘the product of a great social breakthrough’ to gain 
respect.  This is especially important in times of transition, when rules ‘break radically with the past after a 114
period of acute social conflict’.  This process of sacralisation may also take place when society elevates 115
lawmakers and their entourage to a higher level than the law itself.   
Likewise, scholarly writings as a legal formant have ‘been regarded as the supreme source of law’ in various 
contexts because the scholar ‘guides interpretation’ of rules ‘in his double role as writer or authoritative 
works’ and teacher.  By way of example, Sacco discusses Islamic law, positing that although the shari’ah 116
comes from a divine revelation ‘that gives legal propositions the air of infallibility’, scholarly interpretation 
fills the gaps when ‘the revealed sources do not deal explicitly with all problems’ and their meaning is 
Page    of  116 216
 Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei, ‘The Common Core Approach to the European Private Law’ (1997/1998) 3 106
Columbia Journal of European Law 339, 344 
 Sacco, ‘Legal Formants’ (Instalment I of II), 24107
 Ibid, 25108
 Ibid, 32 et seq109
 Ibid, 34110
 Sacco, ‘Legal Formants’ (Instalment II of II), 344111
 Sacco, ‘Legal Formants’ (Instalment I of II), 33 112
 Sacco, ‘Legal Formants’ (Instalment II of II)’, 345113
 Ibid, 345114
 Ibid, 346115
 Ibid, 346 et seq. For an general discussion on the effects of legal scholarship in the UK, Richard Taylor ‘Complicity, 116
legal scholarship and the law of unintended consequences’ (2009) 29(1) Legal Studies 1
Chapter 4 
uncertain.  In this context, scholars (and especially those operating before the 10th century) are recognised 117
as the ‘architect[s] of this immense framework of rules’, given there is little space accorded to judicial 
precedent and reasoning; moreover, in Sunni Islamic law and theology, there is no supreme interpretative 
authority.  The scholar’s legitimacy in Islamic law, thus, is linked to the fact that the source form which he 118
performs exegesis is assumed to be of divine nature.  Even when the nationalisation of law limits the 119
scholar’s capacity to create law, scholarly authority may play an important role in the legal system. For 
example, in Egypt, the Grand Sheykh of Al-Azhar, the leading scholarly institution in sunni Islam, is held in 
high esteem among the secular institutions of the state (also for political motivations), and has played an 
important role in the public debate around the law.  The role of Al-Azhar in the Egyptian transition will be 120
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.  
In a legal system not all legal formants are explicitly formulated.  There are numerous implicit, non-121
verbalised rules and patterns, which may diverge from ‘the explicit formulations of a system’, and have 
outward effects, which are termed ‘cryptotypes’ by Sacco.  According to this theory, the more general a 122
cryptotype, the harder it is to identify; Sacco notes that, at times, ‘they may form the conceptual framework 
for the whole system’.  He talks about the ‘mentality’ of jurists of given countries as linked to contextual 123
cryptotypes,  and the ‘cultural baggage’ of judges – and presumably, of all lawyers.  An example of this 124 125
could be the Turkish legal system, which is formally secular, but embedded in the social and political 
realities of a Muslim-majority community that inevitably shapes the interpretation of the positive secular 
laws enacted by the state.   126
‘Mute law’ coexists with, and tends to be overshadowed by, spoken (i.e. explicit) legal sources.  Thus, 127
unspoken elements that contribute to a legal system, such as cryptotypes, are especially hard to grasp for 
lawyers, who may have to draw from cognate disciplines to further their knowledge of a given legal system – 
as discussed previously in this chapter. Indeed, ‘comparative law thus becomes a go-between between legal 
scholarship and history, and between legal scholarship and general legal theory’.  Sacco identifies the 128
survival of certain legal rules ‘because they do not represent any value, do not correspond to any ideology, 
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are foreign to any moral systems and respond to an elementary necessity of social organization’.  To that 129
effect, he takes the prohibition of murder as an example valid in both capitalist and socialist contexts.  
That example, however, is not satisfactory. Homicide may be in fact lawful in a number of settings, whereas 
in others it may amount to murder; for instance, ritual human sacrifices, state-administered executions, 
private revenge in which the family of the victim execute the perpetrator, targeted killings in the context of 
the war on terror, death in police custody as a result of enhanced forms of interrogation, killings in the 
context of armed conflict, are all shielded by some sort of formal or informal legality, social acceptance, or 
indeed inability of those who disagree to counter the self-sustaining structures of a society that promote a 
certain view. In that sense, Sacco’s views seem to be naive, or at least out of tune with literature on ‘social 
dominance theory’.  This is perhaps the core unresolved flaw of Sacco’s otherwise valid theory: by 130
presenting itself as a neutral interpretative lens to identify the formants of a system, his analysis fails to 
recognise the deep-rooted structural imbalances that underpin all societies and consequently their laws. 
Mindful of this shortcoming, his approach can be reclaimed by ensuring a critical angle to what comparative 
law does.   
Against this backdrop, the cryptotypes that underpin a legal system are intimately linked with the prevailing 
social structures and patterns of inequality and marginalisation in society. The role of positive law in that 
regard may be duplicitous: one the one hand, enacted laws may both shield and be shielded by certain 
negative practices that determine the cryptotype; on the other, the law (e.g. constitutional principles, human 
rights, the protection of cultural heritage, etc.) may provide the very tools to bring about positive change, that 
may contribute to minimising or eradicating the effects of an ‘unethical’ cryptotype (e.g. social norms 
condoning domestic violence towards dependants, or positive social attitudes towards state-administered 
capital punishment). In the context of TJ, (newly) enacted law may carry this transformative potential, 
facilitating a break with an illiberal past. In light of this discussion, an ethical appraisal of cryptotypes may 
be necessary in certain settings, provided it is conducted by the comparative lawyer in a manner which is 
appropriate to her role and according to the tools provided cognate disciplines such as philosophy and 
criminology.  
A further typology of legal formants to take into account in a system is the process of borrowing and 
imitation, which contributes to ‘the course of legal change’.  Borrowing can happen for a number of 131
reasons at legislative level, by judges and of course through the work of scholars. Much attention has been 
dedicated to the phenomenon of legal borrowing in the comparative law literature, generally in relation to the 
reception of foreign law across domestic jurisdictions.  The following section will address the extent to 132
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which the international paradigm of TJ may borrow from Islamic jurisprudence in order to acquire additional 
relevance in Muslim-majority settings.  
Tacking stock of the discussion, the main contribution of comparative law to the relocation of transitional 
justice from international law to Muslim-majority settings is the attention it affords to the hidden normative 
forces that define a legal system. As such, comparative lawyers engage more readily with other disciplines 
than their international colleagues, enriching their understanding of a given context through an appraisal of 
its formants and cryptotypes as well as transplanted normative material. With reference to TJ, which is 
characterised by transformative legal uncertainties, comparative methods can assist international lawyers 
looking for local normative principles to complement global rules, when domestic law is inadequate for the 
purpose of transition. Mindful of the structural inequalities that may be perpetuated by legal formants and 
cryptotypes, international law approaches to transitional justice may find a valuable ally in comparative law’s 
ability to see more effectively (and strategically, from a political angle) into the legal systems of countries 
undergoing transition.  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4. International Law as a Cross-cultural Bridge for Transitional 
Justice 
Comparative legal analysis has been of great use in developing cognate disciplines, including PIL and IHRL. 
For instance, the ‘general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’ as a source of international law 
under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute can be discovered and elucidated by the employment of comparative law 
methods,  relevant also to the Rome Statute of the ICC (although the actual use of comparative law by that 133
Court beyond civil/common law is limited).   134
From a functionalist angle, the aims of comparative law include supporting lawmakers in finding and 
developing solutions, interpreting existing (national) laws, educating legal professionals more broadly and 
unifying law at the international level, by inducing national legal systems ‘to adopt common principles of 
law’.  Indeed, comparative law supports the development and determines the direction of international law. 135
The emergence of the right to the truth as a cornerstone of transitional justice through the comparative 
appraisal of legal developments to that effect in the Inter-American and European human rights systems and 
elsewhere, as discussed in chapter 3, illustrates as much. 
Some comparative law scholars have also suggested that PIL and the work of the United Nations, including 
international conventions, may help bridge the gaps between different legal systems.  These propositions 136
indicate that the relationship between comparative law and PIL is twofold: on the one hand, comparative law 
assists with the recognition of a common set of basic principles that are in turn reflected in international law. 
To that effect, it has been noted that ‘when international laws are drafted based on legal concepts that already 
exist at the domestic level, the latter can be helpful for the interpretation of the former’.  On the other hand, 137
the divergence of legal systems described in comparative analysis can be somewhat harmonised under the 
overarching influence of PIL.  
David Kennedy notably discusses the relationship between international and comparative law, whereby the 
former focuses on a ‘universal claim or project’ aimed at ‘governing’ whereas the latter concerns itself more 
with ‘understanding’.  He looks at comparative law ‘from the standpoint of [the] internationalist 138
governance project’ and considers comparativists ‘as legal specialists in difference, play in the broader 
international project of public and private governance’.  Instead, for international lawyers ‘law and culture 139
inhabit different frames’, ‘culture’ is neatly equated with the nation, and is problematic whenever it is not.  140
In essence, while the comparativist is sceptical yet tempted by governance, the internationalist feels the same 
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way about culture, and each discipline sees the other as ‘politics’.  Kennedy identifies that ‘critical 141
traditions exist in both’ and that enhancing the dialogue between the two would be fruitful.  In principle, 142
PIL is well equipped to respond to comparative law in a global sense (especially in identifying general 
principles of law); in practice, however, the dominance of ‘intra-western’ debates between civil and common 
law, teamed with political hegemonies of the west in international relations, have marginalised other legal 
traditions on the international plane. For the moment, it seems that other areas of international regulation 
(notably, finance) have been more responsive to global geographies.    143
The international legal system is based on a wider range of norms than the discrete package of enacted law; 
from a comparative angle (borrowing from Sacco), the sources of PIL are not just the legally-binding legal 
formants. Soft law constitutes an important part of the international normative framework and is a fertile 
ground for legal developments.  Though international law is conceptually distinct from domestic 144
jurisdictions, in terms of comparative law it can be viewed as just another legal system which can be 
analysed and evaluated in relation to others. Comparative law may play an important part in contributing to 
soft law advancements, which may then acquire a binding nature over time. With reference to TJ, this 
potential is especially useful. 
Given the ‘indivisibility of the local and international dimensions of transitional justice’, comparative law 
can operate as a shuttle between the global and the various particular applications of TJ that in turn feed back 
into the global.  Moreover, living in the ‘steady state of transitional justice’, normalised in permanent 145
institutions set out under international law, such as the ICC,  that can potentially embed comparative law in 146
their work, comparative analysis could become routine in developing and consolidating the global paradigm 
of TJ.  
A further argument in favour of embedding TJ as defined internationally in comparative law is linked to the 
role of human rights. The globalisation of human rights has enabled their diffusion through transplants 
through the international organisations that seek to promote them.  As such, a ‘global ethic and a dialogical 147
human rights discourse’ have been identified as the way forward to avoid ‘one-sided transplants of ‘Western’ 
human rights’, employing comparative law constructively to further the universal aims of basic rights in a 
multitude of cultural settings.   148
International jurisprudence (including case law analysis) on human rights topics can reveal emerging patterns 
of human rights throughout different settings. Commenting on the engagement of foreign law regarding the 
death penalty in courts around the world, Carrozza found that the notion and ‘globally recognisable 
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language’ of human dignity was a unifying aspect in the arguments accepted against this practice.  The 149
explanation of the reliance on foreign law in relation to human rights goes beyond functionalist attitudes. 
Calling for a jus commune of human rights (alongside conventional IHRL), he argues that cross-cultural 
communication based on human dignity fosters a ‘deeper and more genuine universality’ in which common 
principles adapt to different local settings.  In light of this analysis, the development of TJ seems both 150
flexible enough to accommodate local differences and yet maintain the universal tenets of human rights and 
dignity underpinning IHRL. On the basis of Carrozza’s general proposal for human rights, a jus commune for 
TJ could be envisaged which accommodates and includes PIL as well as local norms.  
Linked to the concept of jus commune, a global framework of TJ, predicated on international law and yet 
allowing room for domestic and local norms as well as cultural resonance, could be framed in relation to the 
notion of jus gentium: international law understood as the law of nations. Jeremy Waldron suggests that jus 
gentium carries a broader meaning than international law proper (jus inter gentes) as it is: 
Available to lawmakers and judges as an established body of legal insight, reminding them that their particular 
problem has been confronted before and that they, like scientists, should try to think it through in the company 
of those who have already dealt with it.    151
In that sense, the overlap with the functionalist method as one of the possible purposes of comparative law is 
apparent. The definition of jus gentium as a ‘law of nations in the more comprehensive sense – a body of law 
purporting to represent what various domestic legal systems share in the way of common answers to 
common problems’ is separate from natural law and looks at ‘what law ha[s] actually achieved in the 
world’.  In that sense, it reflects some of the ideas on the practical subject-matter comparative enquiry 152
presented by Sacco in the previous section.  
Although Waldron writes specifically in relation to American courts looking at foreign law,  his arguments 153
could be adopted in the context of the design and development of TJ initiatives which are not a priori blind 
to ‘foreign’ law, and can accommodate multiple normative forces. In support of a sustained engagement with 
experiences tested elsewhere, Waldron contends that jus gentium offers: 
The accumulated wisdom of the world on rights and justice. The knowledge is accumulated not from the 
musings of philosophers in their attics but from the decisions of judges and lawmakers grappling with real 
problems. And it was “accumulated” not just in the crude sense of one thing adding to another, but in the sense 
of overlap, duplication, mutual elaboration, and the checking and rechecking of results that us characteristic of 
true science. Jus gentium, conceived this way, is no guarantor of truth: a consensus in either the law or the 
natural sciences can be wrong. In neither field, however, is there a sensible alternative to paying attention to 
the established body of findings to which others have contributed over the years.   154
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Conversely, he argues that ‘to ignore foreign solutions, or to refrain from attending to them because they are 
foreign, betokens not just an objectionable parochialism, but an obtuseness as to the nature of the problems 
we face.  155
In non-transitional societies, domestic legal puritanism is short-sighted; but in transitional settings, defending 
fiercely vernacular attitudes towards indigenous justice may be impossible, given that the previous legal 
system ultimately permitted an intolerable degree of violence. Moreover, recent experiences of legal 
cooperation indicate that dialogue on best practices in TJ is commonplace. For instance, Libyan delegations 
have attended meetings in Kosovo to discuss disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
solutions, with a view to learning from best practice in another Muslim-majority transitional society.  156
Likewise, the official proponents of the draft TJ law for Egypt  have, equally, sought to consult with 157
foreign lawyers, academics and policymakers with experience of transitional justice to discuss the aims, legal 
framework and challenges of this type of process.  Conversations with Egyptian officials involved in the 158
tentative design of TJ mechanisms for the country have also illustrated awareness and interest in foreign 
experiences as disparate as the South African TRC, the experience of Sierra Leone, and the case law of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.   159
Yet, still in relation to the Egyptian transition, Reem Abou-El-Fadl argues that external interventions in TJ 
initiatives have not yielded desired results (for a lack of political will), recommending instead ‘indigenous 
alternatives to foreign models’.  She identifies the asymmetries inherited from the Nuremberg model as a 160
key limitation for TJ  – especially when external factors and actors influence the process.   161
To this critique, one could add the complexities of employing human rights discourse as the underlying 
philosophy of transitional justice; human rights might be ‘part of the problem’ (for many of the reasons listed 
by David Kennedy on human rights in general ) of TJ itself, regardless of whether the model is purely 162
indigenous (state-led or community-led), or an international imposition, or a mixture. This is because human 
rights may impose limitations to what can be dealt with as part of the transitional process, as discussed in 
chapters 1 and 2.  
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The real question for the purposes of this study, however, focuses on whether, and how, transitional justice as 
set out in international law can be responsive to the aspirations of beneficiary Muslim-majority societies. In 
relation to the countries involved in the Arab Uprisings, the localisation of the international paradigm of TJ 
necessarily engages the topic of Islamic law and jurisprudence, which together constitute a legal formant of 
all the Middle East and North Africa countries. In light of the foregoing discussion, the conceptualisation of 
TJ initiatives in relation to a given setting can be enriched by comparative law approaches which capture the 
nuance of relevant legal formants and which, cumulatively, reflect prevailing cultural understandings of 
justice and law. As such, when faced with Muslim-majority legal systems, TJ must be sensitive not only to 
enacted laws, but also to the intangible normative principles that underpin a society. By reinterpreting 
international law from a critical comparative perspective, local rules may reveal themselves as more 
responsive (but not subjected) to developing common global principles of transitional justice (such as the 
right to the truth) as well as contributing to the creation of international norms themselves.  
4.1 The Challenges of Giving Transitional Justice an Islamic Flavour 
Transitional justice as localised in Islamic settings will, most probably, embed legal formants derived from 
Islamic law and jurisprudence. Before exploring Islamic law in more detail in the next chapter, some 
preliminary considerations as to the challenges involved in localising international understandings of TJ in 
legal systems influenced directly and indirectly by forms of religious law are worth exploring. To this end, it 
is useful to recall Mattei’s description of the three main types of legal systems; all of the countries 
experiencing the Arab Spring and related initiatives of TJ fall in the category of transitional rule of law, 
which is predominantly based on the supremacy of politics, in which the professional rule of law (including 
norms based on international law) and the traditional (including religious) rule of law struggle to acquire 
greater influence.  
Mashood Baderin contributes to the debate as to how international law and religion may interact, offering 
some useful tools for comparative lawyers.  He argues that ‘religion is like a double-edged sword that 163
could be utilised either positively or negatively in its relationship with international law’.  Accordingly, the 164
comparisons and interactions between international law and Islamic law should not be approached 
disingenuously (through either a separationist or an accommodationist approach): Islamic law can be used in 
various ways – constructive as well as destructive – in relation to international law, and the conscientious 
comparativist should bear this in mind.  
The potential distinction between ‘ordinary’ TJ and ‘Islamic’ TJ remains unclear, though the interest in 
developing a shari’ah-derived model of transitional justice is gaining visibility, especially in the aftermath of 
the Arab Uprisings.  Nevertheless, the concern with developing an Islamic form of TJ does not fall within 165
the stated aims of this thesis; instead, this study is concerned with the extent to which TJ as understood in 
international law can be translated into Islamic settings and the modalities of this. Moreover, an Islamic 
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model of TJ would be as impractical as a model rigidly predicated on international law: TJ must retain its 
inherent flexibility and ability to adapt to each practical application it may face on a case by case basis. 
Instead, a study of the methods and approaches to localization, as well as of the key features of Islamic legal 
systems in relation to IHRL, form the basis for the adaptation of TJ to the described settings.  
Here, the expression ‘Islamic legal tradition’ is used to indicate the body of law, legal practice and 
established legal scholarship encompassing the traditional revealed sources and supplementary sources of 
Islamic law, as well as legal methods, discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. ‘Islamic legal 
settings’ denotes instead a broader context in which Islamic law and jurisprudence play a central role in an 
existing legal system, whereas the (preferred) phrase ‘Muslim-majority legal system’ more accurately 
describes legal systems of communities where the majority of the population identifies as Muslim, shifting 
the focus away from the formal state-declared religion to the spiritual identities of its citizens.  Given the 166
in(de)finite connotations of the terms shari’ah and ‘Islamic law’, the variety within what is generally 
denoted as ‘Islamic law’ (e.g. between the Sunni and Shia branches, and within the two) and the reality of the 
legal systems of Muslim-majority countries that present mixed systems (i.e. not solely derived from Islamic 
tenets), the expression ‘Islamic legal tradition’ seems to be a more appropriate choice of descriptor then 
‘Islamic law’. However, it must be noted that as these normative practices have evolved and have become 
incorporated into various legal systems they have enjoyed constant scholarly reinterpretations; thus, their 
‘traditional’ label should be understood with a pinch of scepticism, paving the way for novel readings to suit 
current (and transitional) needs. For these reasons, comparative lawyers should not misconstrue the Islamic 
label often used to designate merely the positive laws of self-declared Islamic states (such as Saudi Arabia or 
Iran) or of Muslim-majority communities: these norms are the outcome of ‘ordinary’ political processes of a 
given historical and geographic context which interprets what is ‘Islamic’. As such it is likely that the 
‘Islamic’ label is used strategically and (to a degree) ingenuously to shield political interests.  
What does this mean for giving transitional justice an Islamic flavour? The following list expresses a few 
unresolved concerns. Firstly, as mentioned, the ‘Islamic’ element may be employed as a conventional label 
for political gain and populist gratification. This means that the social force of the Islamic label – 
unchallenged and unchallengeable as ‘divine’, thus a potent political tool for oppression – is heightened and 
especially problematic where it promotes aims that do not match international human rights standards. 
Secondly, as a corollary of the first point, the ‘Islamic’ element may be based on contentious exegesis, to 
serve political interests, and may operate ultra vires or even contra legum (especially in terms of women’s 
rights, the punishment of hudud crimes, etc.). Regardless of whether this is acceptable or not for orthodox 
Islamic law scholars, the risks of political pollution are increased. However, the opposite argument could be 
made, inasmuch as progressive exegesis is made to meet IHRL. This remains a question for each TJ context 
and participants that cannot be fixed a priori in theoretical terms. Thirdly, following from the second point, 
the normative foundations available in the traditional sources of Islamic law are likely to be insufficient, 
given that they refer back to a dated stage of jurisprudence. Thus, it may be artificial to seek useful elements 
for contemporary transitional justice in old ideas about law.  
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Nonetheless, the study of the synergies between principles of the Islamic legal tradition and the objectives of 
TJ is necessary for both theoretical and practical purposes. A critical comparative study of the two systems 
will help localise international/human rights conceptions of TJ in Muslim-majority settings, and efforts to 
widen relevant sources to incorporate Islamic law would strengthen the jurisprudence of transitional justice 
as well as its implementation in Muslim-majority legal systems. Moreover, the diversification of authorities 
for TJ is likely to consolidate its standing as a more truly global set of rules under international law, 
developing its own form of jus gentium. Proponents of legal purism – either in international law or in Islamic 
law – are, however, likely to be critical of this approach. They may reject the indefinite range of sources 
considered in the critical comparative approach to relocating TJ from international law to Muslim-majority 
legal settings, or even be repelled by the pollution between the two systems. Yet the pressing realities of the 
resurgence of political Islam as realpolitik in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, as well as the doctrinal potential of 
critically using international law and Islamic jurisprudence in synergy for transitional aims (discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6) renders their reticence untenable. As such, a critically constructive comparative approach to 
TJ may engage fully and frankly with the Islamic law formants (and cryptotypes) of Muslim-majority legal 
systems.  
In essence, comparative law carries the potential to inform and advance international law, including soft law, 
which in turn frames transitional justice processes. The analysis of the emerging right to the truth in the 
previous chapter provided an example of this. Drawing from notions of jus commune and jus gentium 
discussed in existing literature, comparative law is able to contribute to the establishment of international law 
of global applicability and local resonance across societies – in a way that is likely to inform the global 
paradigm of TJ as well. This leads to the creative uses of comparative law in drawing on various legal 
systems to construct rules of international significance. With regards to relocating TJ from international law 
to Muslim-majority legal systems, comparative law may reveal how PIL and Islamic law (as a formant of 
Muslim-majority legal systems undergoing transition) cross-fertilise, thus strengthening the normative 
framework both in its abstract global dimension and in its local applications.  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5. Conclusions 
This chapter analyses some of the challenges faced by international lawyers seeking to localise transitional 
justice in general, with an eye to the Muslim-majority legal systems of the Arab Uprisings (discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6). By identifying that conceptions of transitional justice predicated on international/human 
rights law also face the universality v relativism debate, two main conclusions can be drawn: firstly, 
international lawyers engaging in comparative analysis trying to adapt the international paradigm of TJ to 
local (e.g. Muslim-majority) contexts should carefully consider the starting point of their own legal cultural 
perspectives. Secondly, the notion of TJ embedded in international/human rights law is more flexible than 
what is generally perceived and capable not only of being embedded into a specific context characterised by 
normatively different and diverse elements (domestic/traditional/religious) but also capable of actively 
embedding a diversity of sources at its core. Against this backdrop, the possibility of studying the 
localisation of TJ based on international/human rights law to the Muslim-majority contexts of the Arab 
Spring calls for an open, frank and constructive reckoning with Islamic legal traditions (in subsequent 
chapters). Comparative law, given its focus on understanding the complex workings of legal systems as 
opposed to only finding solutions to problems, is suited to the critical study of local settings in which 
(international) transitional justice may be localised.  
In that regard, the international lawyer approaching TJ in relation to the Arab Uprisings has the chance of 
becoming a conscientious comparativist. Given the complexities of analysing Islamic law vis-à-vis 
international/human rights law and standards, the international lawyer engages with another normative 
tradition and culture, partly religious, partly doctrinal, probably state-controlled. In doing so, a critical 
dialogue between coexisting norms helps the pursuit of the transitional aims of accountability, justice and 
reconciliation. By using comparative law strategically, international lawyers can add to the developing jus 
commune/jus gentium of transitional justice. Indeed, just as the South African TRC, the case law of the inter-
American Human Rights Court, the decisions of the Bosnian special War Crimes Chamber, the literature on 
the gacaca in Rwanda, etc. have all become topoi of global understandings of transitional justice, there may 
be interesting lessons to be taken from TJ conceptions and experiences of Muslim-majority legal systems. As 
such, TJ ideas developed in connection to Islamic jurisprudence and practice may contribute, though a 
critical, conscientious and pragmatic comparative approach, to the further global development of the 
discipline, enriching the global paradigm of transitional justice.   
In light of the perspectives and critiques set out in comparative law, the following chapters of this thesis will 
seek to analyse the notion of Islamic legal systems, and whether they are capable of receiving and 
appropriating some of the core elements of transitional justice outlined in the first half of this thesis – as well 
as contributing constructively to the consolidation of the jus gentium/jus commune of transitional justice (its 
emerging global paradigm).  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1. Introduction  
Following the overturn of authoritarian regimes in Arab countries with a Muslim-majority population such as 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, there is a pressing need to critically discuss the role of Islamic law in relation to 
TJ. In the context of the revival of political Islam in North African transitions and in light of the influence 
religion exercises on societies and legal systems, the international paradigm of TJ is likely to encounter 
Islamic law. Having outlined in the previous chapter some of the challenges faced by international lawyers 
seeking to localise TJ, the analysis can move on to the specificities of Islamic settings – called here Muslim-
majority legal systems – where the shari’ah carries a distinctive normative force.  1
The aim of this chapter is to explore how Islamic jurisprudence influences contemporary legal settings, 
organically and through the activities of institutions and individuals who exert agency over the legal system. 
For the purpose of this thesis, Islamic law and the Islamic legal tradition are dealt with not as a universal, 
static, religiously mandated normative system, akin to an expression of natural law which cannot 
accommodate internal variations. That position is easily rebutted by the diversity and doctrinal variety within 
Islamic law.  Equally, Islamic law cannot be understood as a purely political project contingent to the context 2
of early Islam: this would ignore the pull that it exercises on many religious people who seek to live by the 
principles of divine revelation, including lawmakers of Muslim-majority settings.  Instead, Islamic law is 3
understood here as a legal formant of Muslim-majority legal systems, informing both human behaviour and 
lawmaking activities. As such it may manifest itself through a variety of means identifiable through the 
comparative law methods discussed in the previous chapter. 
This chapter discusses some of the elements that make up Muslim-majority legal systems and evaluates the 
role of the actors that shape those systems through religious arguments. The first part draws on existing 
literature to introduce Islamic law and its sources. The second part outlines the evolutions and applications of 
Islamic law, its social function, as well as the process of radical reinterpretation of the divine sources and the 
possibilities of modernism, considering a contemporary TJ example from the Arab Uprisings. The third part 
will analyse the relationship between international law and Islamic law, setting the scene for the final chapter 
of this thesis, which addresses the possibilities offered by Islamic law in furthering transitional justice. In the 
broader context of the research questions, this chapter critically discusses the elements that make up Muslim-
majority legal settings and considers the function of Islamic law before moving on to how the key elements 
of TJ can be localised accordingly.  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2. Muslim-majority Legal Systems and Islamic Law  
The legal systems of Muslim-majority societies are typically informed, either directly or indirectly, by 
religious norms that guide a population’s spiritual beliefs and social interactions. In the context of human 
relationships – horizontally between equal citizens or vertically between individuals and groups in uneven 
power structures – the normative effects of faith acquire a fundamentally secular purpose. As such, Islam 
may provide sacred justifications for the very earthly pursuit of regulating human behaviours and 
interactions, both at an abstract level and in formal legal documents. This is not dissimilar from the impact 
that any given religion may have in a secular context, such as Christianity in national and regional European 
jurisdictions.  That being said, religion is unlikely to be the only driving rationale for lawmaking, given the 4
mundane (and far from spiritual) reality of politics. As noted in the previous chapter, in order to grasp the 
impact of religion in legal systems, sacred norms should be also seen as carrying an intently secular function 
– at least for academic purposes. This section will explore this proposition further in relation to Muslim-
majority legal systems and, relatedly, contextualise Islamic law (shari’ah).   
It may be tempting to describe a Muslim-majority legal system that coincides with a state whose citizens are 
for the most part Muslim as ‘an Islamic state’ predicated on shari’ah. This invitation has been convincingly 
refused in An-Na’im’s work on the relationship between Islamic law and the secular state.  Opposing the 5
notion of a self-styled Muslim state allegedly based primarily on the Islamic tradition, he argues that Islamic 
law, as understood by the elected representatives and civil society of a state, will find its natural place in the 
positive laws of a ‘neutral’ legal setting.  In other words, a secular state would be able to accommodate core 6
values associated with Islamic law as a legal formant of the system, in a variety of ways that reflect the 
identity and wishes of its society (and not as a rather unpalatable top-down political imposition). In light of 
the tools of comparative law explored in the previous chapter, Muslim-majority legal systems will be 
influenced, not determined, by Islamic law. And this proposition is value-free, as long as human rights 
principles enjoy a status equal to Islamic law principles. 
On this topic more generally, Habermas remarks that the ‘religious citizen’ ‘no longer lives as a member of a 
religiously homogeneous population within a religiously legitimated state’; instead, the ‘certainties of faith 
are always already networked with fallible beliefs of a secular nature; they have long since lost (…) their 
purported immunity to the impositions of modern reflexivity’.  So, as far as the specific topic of this thesis is 7
concerned, the two authors cited point in the same direction: to talk of an ‘Islamic state’ for a Muslim 
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population emanating an Islamic legal system based solely on Islamic law is a mere chimera. Historical 
support for this statement can be found in the coexistence of shari’ah and qanun (religious law and secular 
law) throughout the Ottoman Empire – indicating that reliance on Islamic law was not sufficient for the 
operations of a legal system.  An alternative stance based on a joint reading of An-Na’im and Habermas, 8
could be the following: if the majority of citizens of a state (or, more broadly, society) are Muslim and 
participate in the public sphere (including lawmaking processes) on the basis of their faith-based ideals 
(among other convictions), there may well be an ‘Islamic’ colour to the legal system, which does not 
however override the secular dynamics of politics and power that ultimately determine legal systems. 
Presuming the primacy of all things Islamic in Muslim-majority systems today would create a ‘fantasy 
effect’ which fails to take into account the extent of non-Islamic law in those settings (including legal 
transplants from the west).  Lama Abu Odeh rightly warns that:  9
Giving Islamic law an overarching status analytically in our approach to law in the Islamic world, 
distorts our understanding of legal phenomena in these countries.  10
Nevertheless, it would be impossible to talk about Muslim-majority legal systems without discussing Islamic 
law, jurisprudence and legal traditions. For the purpose of this thesis, the expression ‘Islamic legal tradition’ 
is used self-consciously to indicate the complex body of law, legal practice and established legal scholarship, 
developed throughout the history of Islam and based on the preservation of continuity, from the earliest 
jurists to contemporary enquiry expressly following in that vein.  The term ‘tradition’, however, is 11
misleading due to the variations of Islamic law and its current applications to contemporary societies which 
may pay lip service to a historical religious continuity but in practice simply seek to give a set of very 
ordinary rules of social control a divine – and thus untouchable – aura. Indeed, realpolitik is likely to use its 
own interpretation of what constitutes tradition for asserting power.  Consequently, nothing should be ‘a 12
priori’ received as Islamic law just because it is presented as such.  
The accepted structure of (sunni) Islamic law illustrated in the paragraphs that follow is to be understood in 
light of Sacco’s scepticism towards established sources. As such, the sources presented here paint only a 
partial picture of Islamic legal systems, also considering the historical developments of this topic (reviewed 
afterwards). Nevertheless, the acceptance in society (and endorsement by dominant actors) reaffirms the 
importance of these sources in understanding the legal systems of Muslim-majority contexts alongside 
complementary normative forces.  
The normative corpus of the Islamic legal tradition is based on the revealed sources of Islamic law, namely, 
the Qur’an and the Sunna/Hadith (traditions of the the prophet Mohammad), and also the supplementary 
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sources, namely ijma’ (juristic consensus) and qiyas (legal analogy). It also includes subsidiary legal 
methods, such as ijtihad (legal reasoning), istihsan (juristic preference), istislah or maslahah (welfare/
common good/public interest), urf (custom) and darurah (necessity).  The supplementary sources – which 13
are themselves also methodological approaches – and the subsidiary legal methods are ‘products of human 
reasoning’ through which the revealed sources ‘could be extended to cover new developments of life’.  14
Therefore, the phrase ‘Islamic legal tradition’ can be seen as indicating a sort of Islamic normative acquis 
(borrowing, mutatis mutandis, an evocative term from EU law), capturing the rich discourse around Islamic 
law, encompassing its sources and methods, as well as its tendency to preserve the findings proposed by the 
classical jurists.   
In the development of Islamic law, there has been traced the gradual establishment of four essential 
attributes:  
(1) The evolution of a complete judiciary, with a fully-fledged court system and law of evidence and 
procedure; 
(2) The full elaboration of a positive legal doctrine; 
(3) The full emergence of a science of legal methodology and interpretation which reflects, amongst 
other things, a large measure of hermeneutical, intellectual and juristic self-consciousness; 
(4) The full emergence of the doctrinal legal schools, a cardinal development that in turn 
presupposes the emergence of various systemic, juristic, educational and practice-based elements.   15
Wael Hallaq dates these attainments to the middle of the tenth century, referring to subsequent developments 
as ‘accidental attributes’ which ‘did not affect the constitution of the phenomenon we call Islamic law’.  The 16
rise of doctrinal legal schools constitutes, according to Hallaq, the last feature of Islamic law to develop.  17
Each one of these characteristics highlights the predisposition of Islamic law to absorbing secular (i.e. non-
revealed) formants contextual to specific times and places. What is particularly striking about this picture is 
the centrality of human effort in establishing the discipline of Islamic law both theoretically and practically, 
through the work of judges, lawmakers, scholars and teachers. In the same vein, therefore, one could argue 
that the four categories of lawyers implied in Hallaq’s list of attributes of Islamic law have been (and perhaps 
still are) the earthly gatekeepers of Islamic law as it is understood today.  
The historic duality of theory and practice in the Islamic legal tradition is a central feature of its 
jurisprudence. In The Spirit of Islamic Law Bernard Weiss distinguishes between two parts of classical 
Muslim jurisprudence: fiqh, described as ‘practical jurisprudence’, which concerns itself with ‘the 
articulation of actual rules of law’, and usul al-fiqh, described as ‘theoretical jurisprudence’, ‘concerned with 
questions having to do with the theory of law and the methodological principles governing the formulations 
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of rules of law’.  Likewise, for Mohammad Hashim Kamali, fiqh is ‘the law itself’; usul al-fiqh is the 18
methodology of the law and in particular ‘the science of the sources and methodology of the law’, whereby 
‘the Qur’an and Sunnah constitute the sources and the subject-matter to which the methodology of usul al-
fiqh is applied’.  In describing usul al-fiqh, Kamali goes a step further: he identifies a theoretical approach, 19
concerned with ‘the exposition of theoretical doctrines’, and a pragmatic approach, concerned with ‘theory 
(…) formulated in the light of its application to relevant issues’.  All of this complicates the translation of 20
Islamic law into positive norms, which remain distinctively (and openly) intertwined with aspects of 
theoretical jurisprudence, methods and interpretative tradition. For the purposes of this thesis a clear answer 
will not be necessary; however, the dynamic and multifaceted nature of Islamic law – which goes beyond 
strict positive law – provides much potential for the effective localisation of transitional justice from 
international law to Muslim-majority legal settings, as will be discussed in the final chapter.   
2.1 Sources of Islamic Law 
Building on the analysis and cautionary notes presented above, the sources of Islamic law are to be 
understood broadly and interpreted in light of the ongoing dialogue between sacred and secular principles 
entrenched in Muslim-majority legal settings. From its beginnings, Islamic law was intimately connected to 
local Arab customary norms.  The two commonly recognised branches of Islamic law – ‘ibadat and 21
mu‘amilat – deal respectively with religious duties and human transactions.  As such, in its second meaning, 22
Islamic law has been described as ‘a man-made law and has no pretense to being a religious law except that 
it may be said to lay more emphasis on moral considerations than is usually the case with other legal 
systems’.  Moral considerations that define praiseworthy and blameworthy actions guide the applications of 23
Islamic law.  Indeed, the strong ethical component of Islamic law impacts the regulation of human 24
transactions, instead of Islamic ethics being limited merely to guiding the relationship between the individual 
and divinity. Islamic ethics, therefore, are a key cryptotype of Muslim-majority legal systems in light of 
Sacco’s comparative law theories.  
Like other types of religion-based law such as Buddhist law,  Jewish law  or Canon law,  Islamic law has 25 26 27
worked its way into society and taken on a contextual meaning which varies across time and space. But 
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unlike Canon law, Islamic law is not a formal code produced by designated scholars of an organised clergy. 
Alongside its main sources, the Qur’an and the Sunna, Islamic law has creatively regulated human 
interaction on the basis of its religious ethics and legal methods mentioned previously.  
The classical jurist-theologians agreed that the infallible revelation of the Qur’an were an unquestionable 
source of law; but, as Khadduri reports:  
Here agreement ended, since the Koran provided no clear guidance for further legislation. As a 
result, the controversy that followed was essentially one of the sources, rather than the substance, of 
legislation. The character of this controversy was not, strictly speaking, legal; at bottom it was 
theological, since an inquiry into what would constitute an authoritative "supplement" to the 
Koranic revelations is a doctrinal, not a legal argument.  28
Qur’an 
In mainstream interpretations, the Qur’an is the primary and most important source of Islamic law: this 
divine text constitutes the basis of the religion and according to Muslims it was divinely revealed to the 
prophet Muhammad through the angel Gabriel.  Hinting at the human decision to give effect to the 29
centrality of the holy book as a source of law, Fazur Rahman suggests that the Qur’an ‘must be made the 
primary and indeed the sole director of human life and the source of law’, regardless of its relatively small 
portion of ‘strictly legislative’ verses.  Kamali indicates that out of a total of 6,200 ayat (verses) roughly 350 30
are legal in nature, and were generally revealed in response to practical problems faced by the community.  31
Other authors cite even more conservative figures suggesting only 190 verses (3% of the total) contain legal 
provisions.  But the real question is how to deal with textual uncertainties present in the Qur’an. Kamali 32
distinguishes between definitive text, which is clear, specific and not open to interpretation, and speculative 
text, which is open to interpretation and ijtihad, informed by the overall meaning and purpose of the holy 
book and the guidance provided in the Sunna (traditions of the prophet).  More radical approaches to textual 33
uncertainties – with reference to the change in tone between the verses revealed in Mecca and those 
transmitted in Medina – have been proposed by Taha and An-Na’im.  According to this position, it is 34
possible to extricate the former verses that indicate the immutable corpus of norms, from the latter, revealed 
at a time of great strife, which are contextual to a historical situation of conflict and uncertainty, and as such 
may be understood as having a partial application to politically unstable contexts.  
Other contentious issues surrounding Qur’anic interpretation include the distinction between literal and 
metaphorical meanings of the text and the relationship between general principles and specific applications.  35
Kamali argues that ‘the Qur’an is specific on matters that are deemed to be unchangeable, but in matters that 
Page    of  134 216
 M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Johns Hopkins University Press 1955), 54; and also M. Khadduri, 28
‘Islam and the Modern Law of Nations’ (1956) 50(2) AJIL 358
 See the description by Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 18. 29
 Fazur Rahman, Islam (2nd Revised edition edition, University of Chicago Press 1979), 68 et seq30
 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 2631
 Badr, ‘Islamic Law’, 18832
 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 27 et seq and 35 et seq33
 Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, The second message of Islam (Syracuse University Press 1987), translated by An-Na’im34
 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 35 et seq35
Chapter 5 
are liable to change, it merely lays down general guidelines’.  This point remains open to debate if one 36
recalls the socio-historic-geographic context in which the text was delivered, and to what extent the 
injunctions in the Qur’an are relative to those settings. As such, much of the Qur’anic normative matter is in 
fact conveyed in general terms, as noted by Kamali, ‘which need to be specified in relation to particular 
issues’.  He argues that ‘the general in the Qur’an has a value of its own’ and provides guidance, validity 37
and ‘substance for an ever-continuing series of commentaries and interpretations’.  Thus, ‘commentators 38
throughout the centuries have attempted to derive a fresh message, a new lesson or a new principle from the 
Qur’an that was more suitable to the realities of their times and the different phases of development in the 
life of their community’.  Kamali, considered a fairly orthodox contemporary Islamic scholar (but not shy of 39
flexible interpretations), stresses a quintessential feature of the Qur’anic message: the broad principles of the 
text, generally, facilitate an adaptation of the Islamic message to the specificities of each context.  
The Qur’an itself warns the believers against seeking the regulation of everything by the express terms of 
divine revelation, as this is likely to lead to rigidity and cumbersome restrictions: ‘O you believers, do not keep 
asking about things which, if they were expounded to you, would become troublesome for you’ (5:101).   40
This analysis suggests that the general principles in the Qur’an are sufficiently flexible to adapt to the aims 
of transitional justice processes explored in previous chapters of this thesis. Moreover, according to the 
proposition that ‘what the Qur’an has left unregulated is meant to be devised, in accordance with the general 
objectives of the Lawgiver, through mutual consultation and ijtihad’,  there would be ample scope to 41
explore transitional justice rules in the absence of clear textual injunctions. Thus, it would be possible to 
develop transitional justice in a manner which, on the one hand, is founded on a secular international legal 
framework, and on the other, matches the objectives of Islamic law, known as maqasid as-shari’ah, 
discussed below.  
Finally, Kamali discusses the function of the purpose/cause of an Islamic injunction.  He evaluates whether 42
the existence of a purpose ‘gives the mujtahid [i.e. the scholar performing ijtihad/independent legal 
reasoning] the green light to enquire into the causes and reasons behind its injunctions, or whether it exists 
simply to facilitate a better understanding of the text’.  In that regard, he reports that opponents of further 43
enquiry into the rationale of a proposition may consider it an affront to the submission to god. To contrast 
this position, Kamali reports that the majority of scholars hold that there is not only a possibility but a ‘duty 
to make an effort to identify and implement them’. This is because: 
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Since the realisation of the objectives (maqasid) of the Shari’ah necessitates identification of the cause/
rationale of the ahkam, it becomes our duty to discover these in order to be able to pursue the general 
objectives of the Lawgiver.   44
Therefore, Kamali states, ‘the Qur’an invites the believers to rational enquiry, as opposed to blind imitation, 
in the acceptance of its messages’.  This point is relevant for the purpose of this study, as it stresses the 45
importance of critical analysis of the normative propositions of Islam. Bearing in mind the objectives of 
Islam, the depth of rational enquiry at theoretical and practical levels enables the exploration of transitional 
justice principles in Muslim-majority legal settings, to be considered in the next chapter. This enquiry, 
however, is not only based on the norms contained in the Qur’an: it requires a more dynamic engagement 
with Islamic law itself as a system made up of legal formants, some coded and others less recognisable. That 
system, with its inherent contradictions based on competing sources and interpretations, will furthermore 
differ from one Muslim-majority state legal system to another. Nevertheless, exploring the utopian notion of 
(discrete) Islamic law based on Qur’anic principles is helpful to ascertain the compatibility of relocating 
international transitional justice to Muslim-majority legal settings.  
Hadith 
After the holy book, the second most important source in Islamic law are the hadith (Sunna), which carry the 
normative effect of ‘the Prophet’s lifetime sayings, deeds and tacit approvals on different issues, both 
spiritual and temporal’.  The hadith are considered the complementary revealed source of Islamic law 46
alongside the Qur’an; their applications, however, are inherently contested, as attested by the complex 
methods to ascertain their accuracy and authenticity.  Each hadith supposedly reflects a saying or a practice 47
of the prophet which was witnessed directly or indirectly by one of his contemporary followers (male and 
female) and transmitted to subsequent generations of Muslims until later codification.  Consequently, the 48
margin of uncertainty of such normative statements varies according to a variety of factors, first and 
foremost the perspective and intention of each commentator. As such, legal certainty deriving from the 
hadith is inherently deficient, at least from the perspective of the secular function of Islamic law.  
For these reasons, hadith-based norms of Islamic law accepted in the positive legal framework of a given 
society reflect the force of legal formants (as described in chapter 4) even when they are not counted among 
formal sources of a system. Moreover, the belief in the validity of certain hadith will influence the 
interpretations and applications of positive law in Muslim-majority settings: for instance, a secular positive 
law, not based on an Islamic principle, may be understood in light of a given hadith commonly accepted by 
the majority of stakeholders of that legal setting. In that regard, Sacco’s statement ‘whatever affects the 
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convictions of the interpreter [and interpretation] is thus a source of law’  gives us a sense of how the hadith 49
may affect applications of formal law – including PIL provisions underpinning the international frame of TJ. 
Even processes of ‘sacralisation’  of secular law through references to hadith and to the practices of the 50
early Muslim leaders may also contribute to the consolidation of secular norms in Islamic societies. 
Additional sources 
Additional sources complement Islamic law beyond the divine revelations; these are man-made rules based 
on applications through ijtihad of normative principles based on the Qur’an and hadith in a given spacial and 
temporal context.  The exact number of these additional sources varies between scholars; for example, 51
Cherif Bassiouni, lists twelve supplemental sources of Islamic law:  
1. Ijma, consensus of opinion of learned scholars and judges 
2. Qiyas, analogy 
3. ‘Urf, custom and usage 
4. Istislah or Maslahah, consideration of the public good 
5. Istihsan, reasoning based on the best outcome, or equity 
6. The practices of the four first “wise Khulafa”, a form of authoritative precedent 
7. The decisions of learned judges 
8. Treaties and pacts 
9. Contracts  
10. The edicts of the Khulafa and local rulers which are in conformity with the Shari’ah 
11. Fatawa (plural of fatwa) of the most learned scholars 
12. Ijtihad.  52
On the basis of this list, many of the concerns expressed earlier about the status of the hadith in light of 
inherent legal uncertainties are repeated. Some of the sources listed may contradict each other: for instance, 
the practice of a medieval khalifa may be incompatible with present-day human rights treaties in force in 
Muslim-majority states;  or the decision of a (wealthy male) judge from an Ottoman court on commercial 53
transactions may contradict a business contract stipulated in the current socio-economic environment.   54
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The fact that these sources are not divine revelations allows for a radical critique of their present uses. We are 
then free to ask: does the imposition of the death penalty guarantee the best outcome (istihsan)?  Does 55
gender inequality in court achieve public good (maslahah)?  Additionally, a previously accepted fatwa of a 56
learned scholar may lose its value today and thus be discarded; likewise, primitive customs not mandated in 
the Qur’an or hadith, such as FGM or child marriage, can be repealed through new laws expressed through 
ijma’ – which could be the outcome of a democratic legislative (Parliamentary) process.  
The degree of arbitrariness encoded into the supplementary sources of Islamic law is a double-edged sword: 
on the one hand it may be used to oppress minorities or impose old-fashioned rules of early Muslim leaders, 
but on the other it enables a range of progressive possibilities to further social justice and human rights. As 
such, the additional sources may provide means to transpose international transitional justice into Muslim-
majority legal settings – as long as they do not contradict the objectives of shari’ah.  
2.2 Objectives of Islamic Law (Maqasid as-Shari’ah) 
The objectives of shari’ah – maqasid as-shari’ah – provide an illustration of the core principles of Islamic 
law while at the same time illustrating the deeper meaning of the shari’ah beyond literal aspects, the ‘higher 
intents of Islamic law’.  Kamali considers how Islamic scholars place justice and the concept (and sources) 57
of maslahah (described as public interest or benefit or common good) at the heart of Islam and Islamic law, 
supported by the duty to elucidate and promote these objectives.  According to Kamali, maslahah is ‘the 58
summa’ of the objectives of Islamic law, and justice and education are corollaries of it. Thus, he argues ‘the 
Qur’an is expressive (…) of the rationale, purpose and benefit of its laws so much so that its text becomes 
characteristically goal-oriented’.  This flexibility and purposiveness are significant features of Islamic law 59
and inform how it relates to TJ, as discussed in the final chapter.  
There are five essential aims of shari’ah: faith, life, lineage, intellect and property, as described by the 
medieval jurist Abu Hamid al-Ghazali.  These also reflect the ‘criminology’ of the Qur’an.  A sixth aim 60 61
was introduced by another jurist (from the Maliki tradition), Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi: the protection of 
honour (linked to ‘lineage’).  Complementary (secondary) aims may achieve the status of a primary one if 62
the public at large is concerned, and thus maslahah can be invoked. Likewise, if two competing aims of 
different ranks come into conflict, the lesser-order one yields to the higher-order one. An example of this 
type of aim is the suspension of a criminal punishment in cases of doubt and evidentiary uncertainty.  The 63
third category of aims expresses the desirable conduct to facilitate the attainment of essential objectives; 
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these provisions include the principle of fairness in all human interaction, gentleness and pleasant speech.  64
An example reported by Kamali is the recommendation of leniency in imposing penalties for judges and 
heads of state. He also stresses how, far from being restricted to religious affairs, maslahah informs all 
aspects of human interaction.  This makes Islamic law inherently dynamic in society.  65
The centrality of promoting common benefits for society is also found in the opinions of classical Islamic 
scholars. Abd al-Salam al-Sulami, for instance, analysed the relationship between the public interest 
(maslahah) and the effective cause (‘illah) of an Islamic proposition; Kamali reports his argument: 
The greatest of all the objectives of the Qur’an is to facilitate benefits (masalih) [plural of maslaha] 
and the means that secure them and that the realisation of benefit also included the prevention of 
evil.  66
If the objectives of Islamic law are not sufficient for effectively regulating society, additional normative 
principles can also be found in Islamic values. This step was taken by the classical jurist ibn Taymiyyah, who 
departed from the notion of a finite number of maqasid, expanding to ‘an open-ended list of values’; his 
contemporaries, remarks Kamali, seem to have generally accepted this novel approach.  Among those, 67
Yusuf al-Qaradawi expanded the list to include social welfare, freedom, human dignity and fraternity.  68
Kamali himself adds economic development and research in technology and science to enrich this list.  This 69
open-ended list of values is remarkably reminiscent of the debate in human rights law to expand the list of 
rights worthy of protection.  
Kamali draws from the work of Shatibi to discuss the identification of maqasid, who notably extends 
maslahah to encompass all benefits ‘of this world and the hereafter, those of the individual and the 
community, material, moral and spiritual, and those that pertain to the present as well as the interests of the 
future generations’, including the prevention and elimination of harm.  Kamali stresses a novel aspect 70
introduced by Shatibi: ‘inductive conclusions and positions that are so established are the general premises 
and overriding objectives of the Shari’ah and thus have a higher order of importance than specific rules’.  71
This proposition further problematizes the relationship between lex specialis and lex generalis as contained 
in Qur’anic provisions, and may help develop TJ processes in Muslim contexts on the basis of the higher 
order interests of the social benefits of justice and human rights after a period of violence or 
authoritarianism.  
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Finally, Kamali explores the relationship between maqasid and ijtihad, stating that the former is essential to 
the latter.  In his analysis and selection of authorities, he makes one point clear: literal textual examinations 72
are insufficient without a broader understanding of the general aims of Islamic law. Moreover, he stresses 
that the aims of ijtihad through maqasid must also take into account the consequences of interpretative 
efforts.  Thus, the possibility to conduct purposeful readings of sources is encouraged.  73
The analysis set out so far suggests that Islamic law is to be understood as a key formant of Muslim-majority 
legal settings, in which the religious and secular purpose of Islamic principles are inextricably intertwined. 
Nevertheless, the divine character of Islamic law can be qualified on the basis of two main reasons: firstly, a 
sizeable chunk of shari’ah addresses the regulation of human relations and not specific religious principles; 
secondly, Islamic law owes much of its development to human endeavours which have provided an earthly 
gloss to the ethics contained in the revealed sources. Against this backdrop, the Qur’an and the hadith are 
complemented by additional sources of Islamic law derived through masterful employment of legal methods 
to answer normative gaps. Moreover, the objectives of Islamic law provide further orientation of legal 
interpretations and developments: a dynamic list of Islamic values – and above all the guiding light of 
common good/public interest (maslahah) of a community – are better suited to directing positive law in 
Muslim-majority legal settings than static religious dogma (even in formally secular systems). The question 
to consider is how TJ aims and its international paradigm fit with Islamic law and whether this is desirable 
for either.  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3. The Evolution and Contemporary Practice of Islamic Law 
Applications and practice of Islamic law face an unresolved challenge: how can the certainty of divine 
revelation (for Muslims) of the Qur’an and hadith coexist with uncertainty and multiplicity of applications in 
concrete settings today? As previously noted, classical scholars have navigated this quandary successfully 
through normative developments that fill gaps left by the main sources of Islamic law, responding to societal 
needs guided by the maqasid as-shari’ah. This section will discuss the flexibility inherent to Islamic law by 
reviewing the potential of Islamic legal modernist approaches, the centrality of jurists in developing the 
discipline to suit the needs of society and providing an example of how a millennial religious institution has 
responded, in that vein, to the Arab uprisings.   
The adaptability of Islamic law throughout history and its ability to provide religious rules to suit given 
contexts from its earliest days has guided an important strand of critical scholarship from Schacht onwards.  74
But other western scholars of Islamic law, such as Weiss, have highlighted some of the limitations imposed 
by ‘Muslim juristic thought’ that might hinder its elasticity: 
Espousal of divine sovereignty (the basis of everything else); a fixation upon sacred texts that are the 
repositories of divine revelation; an uncompromisingly intentionalist approach to interpretation of these texts; a 
frank acknowledgement of the uncertainty and fallibility of all individual human endeavour to capture the 
divine intent and a consequent acceptance of probabilism as the foundation of valid interpretation; a tolerance 
of legal diversity and a willingness to disseminate juristic authority among multiple schools; a moralistic bent 
grounded in a particular social vision; and, last, a preoccupation with the affairs of private individuals, and 
especially with family relations and contracts, coupled with a concern to define the limits of the power of 
government.  75
Earlier orientalists had already established, unjustly, the immovability of Islamic law in Muslim-majority 
legal settings; for example, Coulson remarks that: 
Law, in classical Islamic theory, is the revealed will of God, a divinely ordained system preceding and not 
preceded by the Muslim state, controlling and not controlled by Muslim society. There can thus be no notion of 
the law itself evolving as an historical phenomenon closely tied with the progress of society.  76
According to Coulson, the Islamic law doctrine (understood as dogma) possesses two distinctive traits:  
Firstly, it is a rigid and immutable system, embodying norms of an absolute and eternal validity, which are not 
susceptible to modification by any legislative authority. Secondly, (…) the divinely ordained Shari’a represents 
the standard of uniformity as against the variety of legal systems which would be the inevitable result if law 
were the product of human reason based upon the local circumstances and the particular needs of a given 
community.  77
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But as discussed in the previous section, Islamic law and jurisprudence have been addressed throughout 
history at policy-level in many Muslim-majority countries and contexts; likewise, its principles have been 
transformed into positive laws and administered by courts that are unquestionably embedded in a given time 
and place. Therefore, Islamic law as understood today can express either an ideal type of classical Muslim 
jurisprudence which is non-existent in reality, or a more nuanced understanding of those principles as 
employed in context by jurists throughout history and today. Coulson stresses the inherent distinction 
between ‘ideal doctrine and actual practice’, and laments the ‘grave lacuna in our knowledge of Islamic legal 
history’ to the ‘extent to which the ideal law has been translated into actuality in a given area at a given 
period’.  This lacuna has been amply filled since 1964, at the time when Coulson made these observations.  78 79
An example of the renewed attention afforded to Islamic law and traditions in relation to contemporary 
contexts is the quest for a shared universal basis of international law principles, with a particular emphasis on 
human rights.  Contemporary work on the translation of Islamic legal principles into practice to ascertain, 80
for instance, the extent to which divine precepts match international human rights law standards and 
requirements, has shed light on Islamic jurisprudence in its totality: jurisprudence qua abstract legal theory, 
and jurisprudence qua case law and other practical developments of the law as influenced by adjudicatory 
processes in actual dispute-settlement.  81
Today, a belief of rigidity of Islamic law can be convincingly rebutted. Already in Coulson’s work there is 
evidence of a significant variety in the opinions of legal scholars; moreover, the existence of local customary 
laws alongside shari’ah courts throughout time and space exemplifies how Islamic law has demonstrated the 
ability to dialogue with its surroundings.  In addition to this, the rise of (Islamic) legal modernism has 82
inspired debates as to how ‘the Shari’a can be adapted to support the social upheavals and progress of 
modern times’, acknowledging that the law is shaped by societies seeking to answer social problems.  Even 83
Kamali acknowledges ‘a measure of flexibility in usul al-fiqh [the methodology of law] which allows for 
necessary adjustments in the law to accommodate social change’ alongside the permanent sources of 
shari’ah which ‘may not be overruled on grounds of either rationality or the requirements of social 
conditions’.  All of this points to the flexibility that characterises Islamic law both in its development and in 84
its current applications.  
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Recent examples of the social-functionalist potential of Islamic law are found in the statements issued by Al-
Azhar in relation to the Egyptian uprising in 2011, in which the most authoritative centre for Islamic (sunni) 
studies provides detailed legal reasoning in support for the removal of despotic leaders.  However, modern 85
and contemporary legal philosophers do not completely step away from notions of natural law.  Likewise, 86
there seems to be only a margin of appreciation inside permissible boundaries within which Islamic lawyers 
may respond to societal needs creatively whilst upholding the mandated principles and spirit of Islamic 
law.  In that sense, Coulson makes a strong case in support of the renewal of Islamic jurisprudence in light 87
of contemporary needs, which seems to have materialised given the proliferation of studies by Islamic legal 
modernists  in the decades that followed his 1964 work.  88
The direction taken by Islamic legal modernism – better described as contemporary exegesis of Islamic law 
in light of a given social context – might enable Muslim-majority legal systems to adapt to current realities 
while retaining an Islamic character. In the context of contemporary modernism, as noted by Suha Taji-
Farouki, ‘tradition is recruited either to legitimise change, or to defend against perceived innovation and to 
preserve threatened values’.  Modernist approaches, however, are not an entirely new phenomenon.   89
3.1 The Potential of Islamic Legal Modernism 
The basic claims of Islamic legal modernism can be traced back to earlier debates in Islamic jurisprudence 
between traditionalists (ahl al-hadith) v rationalists (ahl al-ra’y).  Hallaq describes rationalism as ‘a 90
perception of an attitude toward legal issues that is dictated by rational, pragmatic and practical 
considerations’.  Through time, rationalist reasoning (ra’y) was considered in opposition to (desirable) strict 91
textualism: therefore, with the increase in the spread of hadith, ra’y lost its neutral connotation of 
‘discretionary reasoning’ and acquired the negative connotation of arbitrariness and fallibility of human 
thought.  In addition to the conceptual tensions between favouring the development and interpretation of 92
Islamic law as based on either the reported traditions of the prophet or the independent reasoning of jurists, 
an additional factor to take into account in the formation of Islamic jurisprudence is the standing afforded to 
the good examples of predecessors (sunan).  
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Hallaq discusses the sunan at length, suggesting how earlier judges based their decisions on their ra’y, 
having given due consideration to the sunan of the forbearers, resulting in the ra’y being ‘an extension of, 
and based upon’ ‘ilm (knowledge of precedent).  Contextually, Hallaq notes a crucial element of Islamic 93
jurisprudence: by incorporating the authority of the sunan – which takes into account both the prophetic 
traditions (hadith), the traditions of his companions and potentially any pre-Islamic tradition not repealed by 
the prophet – Islamic jurisprudence departs from the centrality of Muhammad’s message (be it the revelation 
of the Qur’an or his own traditions).  In light of this analysis, the sources of Islamic law discussed 94
previously seem to be merely an ‘established, continuous practice’ that became ‘a model to follow’  – quite 95
distinct from divinely-ordained principles.   
In a contemporary expression of Islamic legal modernism, An-Na’im makes a case for studying Islamic legal 
theory in relation to the needs of contemporary societies.  An-Na’im argues that shari’ah as is it known 96
today ‘was in fact constructed by Muslim jurists over the first three centuries of Islam’ through human 
interpretation.  Thus Islamic legal modernism is ‘modern’ inasmuch as it is a contemporary discipline with 97
an eye to contemporary social needs; but its purported sources still are the Qur’an and the hadith. These 
sources, however, may be accessed and interpreted directly, without necessarily having to conform to the 
earlier scholarly writings of the classical Islamic jurists serving societies different from those today.  
The reform methodology proposed by An-Na’im was first developed by Mahmud Mohamed Taha in The 
Second Message of Islam.  It involves ‘establishing a new principle of interpretation that would permit 98
applying some verses of Qur’an and accompanying Sunna instead of others, (…) breaking the deadlock 
between the objectives of reform and the conception and techniques of historical Shari’a’.  This is possible 99
because there are ‘two levels or stages of the message of Islam, one of the earlier Mecca period and the other 
of the subsequent Medina stage’; the ‘earlier message of Mecca is in fact the eternal and fundamental 
message of Islam, emphasizing the inherent dignity of all human beings, regardless of gender, religious 
belief, race, and so forth’.  This was a time of peace, as opposed to the subsequent Medina period, 100
characterised by conflict. An-Na’im draws extensively on Taha’s detailed textual analysis to illustrate and 
explain the shift in normative principles between the Mecca and Medina periods; he calls for the return to the 
Meccan verses, more in line with the principles of human rights as espoused by the international community 
today, to unlock much-needed reform potential.  He also calls for the consideration of naskh – the Islamic 101
technique of abrogation of the ruling and wording of certain contradictory Qur’anic verses in order to 
‘suspend the application of a clear and definite verse of the Qur’an under appropriate circumstances’.  102
Though these arguments are convincing and have contributed greatly to the constructive debate about Islamic 
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law and human rights, the interpretative propositions put forward by An-Na’im and Taha have unfortunately 
not been received with universal enthusiasm by commentators. For example, Kamali, a ‘centrist’ on the scale 
of conservativism, rejects the possibility of critical textual analysis:  
The Qur’an is an indivisible whole, and a guide for belief and action that must be accepted and followed in its 
entirety. Hence, any attempt to follow some parts of the Qur’an and abandon others will be totally invalid.  103
For the purposes of this thesis however, the approach proposed by An-Na’im seems to be the most 
constructive and convincing in light of the renewal of Islamic law and its survival as a constructive 
normative force today. As such, this potential for flexibility – in the name of maslahah of contemporary 
societies – presents Islamic law as a potentially constructive force for developing transitional justice in 
Muslim-majority legal settings today. 
But what about the contribution of non-Muslim scholars to this debate? Coulson, as a western orientalist 
scholar of Islamic law at the service of Muslim modernist legal activities, answers affirmatively: 
Western scholarship has demonstrated that Shari’a law originated as the implementation of the precepts of 
divine revelation within the framework of current social conditions, and thus provides the basis of historical 
fact to support the ideology underlying legal modernism.   104
In light of this assertion, though open to accusations of orientalism,  it could be suggested that contact 105
between Muslim and non-Muslim scholars of Islamic law has been fruitful in the past in developing 
contemporary Islamic legal theory which introduces contemporary social needs alongside the precepts of 
divine revelation. Leaving divinity to one side would enable scholars to engage more openly with the social 
function of Islamic law – which could also include the facilitation of a transitional justice process. Fostering 
actual dialogue and debate between Muslim and secular scholars, in that regard, is much needed.   106
On the other hand, it is essential to recall that contributions by non-Muslim scholars to the study of Islamic 
law have not always been well-received. For example, Joseph Schacht's famous separation between law and 
religion in the Islamic tradition  has been strongly criticised by some Muslim scholars of Islamic law.  107 108
However, Muslim scholars of Islamic law as well as non-Muslim scholars have successfully developed novel 
approaches to the discipline that cross-reference each other and enrich the conversation. As always, the 
optimal solution is to allow everyone to have their say – academic spirit and human reason (whether or not 
guided by divine providence) will determine the debate.   
!
!
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3.2 The Role of Jurists in the Formation of Islamic Law  
In their attempt to understand Islamic law, western scholars have identified the centrality of lawyers as a key 
feature of this system. Schacht has famously referred to Islamic law as an ‘extreme case of a jurist’s law’.  109
Likewise, Sacco posits that ‘the revealed texts are only the historical starting point of the shari’a which is a 
scholarly creation’, strengthened by the lack of a central authority mandated with the task of defining an 
official theology that forms the basis of Islamic law and the absence of ‘a cult of judicial precedent’.  110
Although the two justifications proposed by Sacco can be questioned as the following section of this chapter 
suggests, the role of jurists in advancing and dispensing Islamic law is worth exploring further. Muslim 
scholars have also described Islamic law as ‘lawyer’s law’, whose provisions ‘are to be sought first and 
foremost in the teachings of the authoritative jurists’.  Discussing the power of legal authority, Hallaq 111
explains the primacy of lawyers in Islamic law ‘because the jurists are the carriers of the authority that 
sustained it for over a millennium’.   112
Following on from the earlier discussion, this suggests that Islamic law is based more on human reasoning 
than divine injunctions. The paragraphs that follow explore the three main groups of jurists that have 
contributed to the formation of Islamic law, namely the judiciary, the juristic schools and the jurisprudents 
whose independent legal reasoning has traditionally filled normative gaps. Just as their classical 
predecessors, jurists of different kinds can, today, advance Islamic law for the real needs of Muslim-majority 
legal settings, including those facing transitional justice.  
Judiciary 
Still today, alongside the secular court system of Muslim-majority societies, the notion of the ‘Islamic judge’ 
remains important to characterise the way judges see their own profession in relation to (and constitutive of) 
the legal system.  Historically, the professionalisation of the judiciary and the establishment of courts 113
constitutes a turning point across legal systems.  In Islamic legal theory, ‘the judge represents the authority 114
of the Imam (head of the state) and exercises power in the capacity of his wakil (representative)’.  By the 115
middle of the eighth century, the judiciary had become professionalised and separate from administrative, 
policing and fiscal bodies.  Hallaq identifies the consolidation of judicial independence from the appointing 116
agency at around the same time as a turning point for the Islamic legal tradition.   117
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The composition of the qadi’s (judge’s) court is also illustrative of the role of the judiciary in early Islam, 
and the extent to which that has contributed to the development and consolidation of Islamic law. Hallaq 
provides a comprehensive list of court staff which reflected the needs and function of the bench, including 
scribes, assistants such as the court chamberlain to ensure order and supervise litigants, court interpreters and 
witness examiners (ashab al-masa’il), whose job it was to: 
Enquire about the integrity of character witnesses whose function it was in turn to attest to legal 
records, contracts and all sorts of transactions passing through the court.    118
The (relative) binding force of a judgment  and the possibility to appeal or reverse a decision exemplifies 119
the possibility of error even by the prophet Muhammad.  Thus, if a judge has exerted sound legal reasoning 120
in good faith, that decision is enforceable and cannot be reviewed by another judge, only by the original 
one.  However, if the error amounts to a ‘gross error of judgment’ ‘that could not be the result of sound 121
ijtihad and leads to a manifest miscarriage of justice’, then the decision is reviewable.  This suggests that 122
the judiciary was tasked with two important responsibilities, in addition to adjudication: firstly, the exercise 
of sound legal reasoning, and secondly, subsequent reflection – and one presumes dialogue – as to the 
shortcomings of one’s own or someone else’s conclusions. In that regard, judges could also rely on the 
analysis provided by scholars and jurisconsults,  as discussed in the paragraphs that follow.  123
Juristic Schools  
Scholarly writings are given prominence in Islamic law.  Around the eleventh century, four schools of 124
Islamic law were ‘recognized as orthodox’: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali schools.   This was 125
contemporary to the limitation of independent legal reasoning (ijtihad), described as ‘the maximum effort 
expended by the jurist to master and apply the principles and rules of usul al-fiqh (legal theory) for the 
purposes of discovering God’s law’.  126
The door of ijtihad was closed and the efforts of the jurists were reduced to taqlid (literally, 
"imitation") or submission to the canons of the four schools. The writings of the founders of these 
schools (or their disciples) became the standard textbooks for all students of law and any effort to 
depart from them was denounced as bid’a (innovation)”.  127
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The four schools, however, ‘were not formal educational institutions or officially-sanctioned law-making 
bodies’; instead, ‘they were rather groups of jurists each following a certain doctrine that can be traced back 
to a prominent pioneer of the second century of the Muslim era whose name the school carries’.  The 128
eventual formalisation of legal schools marks ‘one of the most defining characteristics of Islamic law’.  129
Their doctrinal influence emerged alongside their institutional capacity.   130
Jurists possess what Weiss calls ‘interpretative or declaratory authority’, which has the actual force of 
influencing positive law as opposed to legislative authority, which instead belongs to god.  The mujtahids 131
(performers of ijtihad) derived law from the sacred texts, whereas non-mujtahids interpreted secondary 
sources.  These jurists employed all the techniques of legal reasoning, the principles of text criticism and 132
intentionalist hermeneutics.  Their knowledge included ‘legal theory, Quranic exegesis, hadith and its 133
criticism, legal language, the theory of abrogation, substantive law, arithmetic, and the all-important science 
of juristic disagreement’.  Hallaq stresses the ‘dynamic and vibrant nature’ of taqlid (authority) emanating 134
from the doctrinal schools,  suggesting that a diverse and active community of legal scholars was 135
traditionally present.  
Jurisconsults (Muftis)  
As a third category conceptually distinct from both judges and scholars engaged in Islamic law questions, the 
mufti is a ‘jurisprudent who issues fatwas’, formally non-binding legal opinions, which however may be 
adhered to by judges.  ‘The fatwa represented a legal opinion stated in universal terms, reflecting both the 136
most authoritative law in the school as well as legitimised legal practice’.   137
Messick has situated muftis in the ‘interpretative interface of theory and practice of Islamic law’, filling the 
‘niche between the jurist as teacher and the jurist as judge’.  This describes: 138
The tension between the dictates of textual theory and the circumstances of actual cases results, in a 
fatwa, in a ‘reading’ of a textual theory, while in a judgment it leads to a ‘reading’ of a practical 
fact.  139
Page    of  148 216
 Badr, ‘Islamic Law: Its relation to other legal systems’, 189128
 Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 150 et seq129
  Bernhard Weiss, ‘The Madhhab in Islamic Legal Theory’ in PJ Bearman, Rudolph Peters and Frank E Vogel (eds), 130
The Islamic school of law: evolution, devolution, and progress (Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School 
Harvard University Press 2005). See also Wael Hallaq, ‘Can the Sharia Be Restored?’ in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and 
Barbara Freyer Stowasser (eds), Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity (Altamira Press 2004) for a discussion of 
the madhab
 Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law, 114 131
 Ibid, 115 et seq and 135132
 Ibid 133
 Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 156 et seq134
 Wael B Hallaq, Authority, continuity and change in Islamic law (CUP 2001), 120135
 These definitions are taken from the glossary in Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law136
 Hallaq, ‘Juristic authority vs. state power’, 248 137




The relationship between theory and practice is important both historically and at present. In a detailed 
historical examination of the role of fatwas in developing substantive law, Hallaq refutes the claim that ‘after 
the formative period Islamic substantive law became increasingly rigid, eventually losing touch with the 
political, social, and economic developments’,  suggested by scholars such as Coulson and Schacht.  140 141
Instead, he defends the ‘important role that the fatwas played in the development of legal doctrine as 
embodied in the furu’ (substantive law) works’, establishing a ‘connection between fatwa as a legal 
discourse and fatwa as a social instrument’.  As such, a functionalist intent can be seen as deeply embedded 142
in a fatwa.  
To describe how fatwas developed in connection to society, Hallaq suggests they ‘were the outcome of a 
concrete and particular reality that originated outside the jurists’ minds’, revolving ‘around (…) persons in 
highly particular circumstances’  Later Ottoman manuals on fatwas were ‘highly practical and pragmatic’, 143
and a dictum linked to fatwas recites that ‘no fatwa should be issued with regard to a problem that has not yet 
occurred in the real world’, and as such they ‘emanated from a particular social reality involving real people 
with real problems’.  Only the fatwas ‘that added new material to the current body of legal doctrines’ were 144
then incorporated into substantive law.  145
On the basis of this, Hallaq argues that it was the mufti, and not the qadi, ‘who was responsible for the 
development of the legal doctrine embodied in the furu’ works’ after the second century of Islam (the eighth 
century), breaking from the function of the early judges in developing substantive Islamic law.  The 146
relationship between the mufti (issuing fatwas) and the qadi (issuing a judgement in relation to judicial 
disputes) ‘is explained by the fact that the judge depended heavily upon the mufti’s opinions’ – to the extent 
to which often muftis were attached to a court and their fatwas became binding.  Thus: 147
The stipulation that the judge must resort to the mufti for legal advice underscores the fact that it is the mufti, 
not the qadi, who is the ultimate expert on the law.  148
Muftis enjoyed numerous advantages over qadis: the mufti performed ijtihad (independent legal reasoning); 
he was independent from government authorities and thus was less likely to be involved in political 
corruption; moreover, a mufti’s fatwa could question or reverse a qadi’s judgment, on the basis of the fact 
that the mufti’s duty was ‘discovering and applying the law’.  In relation to the prominent role of muftis in 149
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developing Islamic law through fatwas, Hallaq concludes that ‘our current perception of Islamic law as a 
jurists’ law [as argued by Schacht] must now be further defined as a mufti’s law’.  Today, this proposition 150
is still valid, though the relationship between muftis and authorities has become more politicised, explaining 
the more recent phenomenon of state muftis.  The ‘independent’ role of muftis seems to be exercised 151
through new media – as attested by the appearance (and success) of internet fatawa.  
This summary overview of the historic standing of jurists – judges, scholars and muftis – in developing 
Islamic law and, relatedly, Muslim-majority legal systems, supports arguments in favour of their greater 
involvement even in contemporary settings. Jurists have the potential to influence the law of present-day 
nations states – regardless of whether or not those states are formally presented as ‘Islamic’ – to the extent 
that the balance of powers permits. Without romanticising the potential role of jurists in promoting the 
Islamic aim of maslahah discussed above, intellectual arguments based on Islamic law that counter abusive 
executives may be one of the few non-violent tools in furthering the objectives of transitional justice. The 
following paragraphs will discuss the role of Al-Azhar, a leading scholarly collective, in shaping transitional 
justice in Egypt.   
3.3 The Voice of Al-Azhar in Transitional Justice in Muslim-majority 
settings 
Having set out some historical illustrations of the role of jurists as formants of Islamic law, the paragraphs 
that follow demonstrate how they have an influence today. A striking example drawn from the transitional 
justice context of the Arab Uprisings beginning in 2011 can be found in the (intellectual) support offered to 
the revolutionaries by the millennial Islamic institution of Al-Azhar.  Founded in the 900s as a centre of 152
Islamic learning, Al-Azhar has been described as a religious institution by Malika Zaghal in these terms: 
“the humanly devised constraints” that shape the interaction between men and God, or to be more 
precise, a structure of mediation between the divine and the human that offers interpretation of 
scripture to the faithful, manages religious ritual and transmits religious knowledge.  153
Throughout history, and more so in the twentieth century, the relationship between Al-Azhar and (Egyptian) 
politics has been complex, bringing to the fore some of the most sensitive issues linked to the authorities’ 
control of the religious sphere.  Notably, the Egyptian authorities in the latter part of the 1900s have 154
championed Al-Azhar as the voice of moderate Islam, approved by the politicians and theologians alike; this 
has helped distance national Islam from the positions held Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, as 
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well as secular forces.  Its leaders enjoy the prerogative to ‘speak for religion in public life’ as recognised 155
learned scholars, and are separate from the state-run dar al-ifta, the fatwa-issuing body (also) consulted by 
the institutions.   156
Breaking loose from its institutional masters, since the fall of Mubarak Al-Azhar seems to have for a moment 
taken on a different role, using Islamic jurisprudence to shield the revolutionaries from accusations of baghi 
(the Islamic hudud crime of rebellion, analysed in the final chapter of this thesis) and in support of a regime 
change not only in Egypt, but across the MENA region. Al-Azhar’s engagement in the Arab uprisings has 
been  described as a ‘good example’ of its ‘latent reform potential (…) for the development of Islamic 
principles’,  which may help further transitional justice goals.    157
The Al-Azhar declaration on Support of the Arab Revolutions  and the Al-Azhar Document on the Future of 158
Egypt  provide a fitting example of how an institution of Islamic scholars has actively participated in the TJ 159
process. Egyptian commentators, such as judge Adel Maged have welcomed these developments: 
Both documents should have an influence on the constitutional structure of the emerging Egyptian 
regime and the legal rules governing the right to protest and revolt against authoritarian regimes 
throughout the Arab world.  160
The text of the Al-Azhar Document on the Future of Egypt refers to the general principles of shari’ah, 
leaving ‘considerable room for a modern interpretation of Islamic concepts and values rather than citing 
specific provisions in the traditional Islamic rules’.  That modern (functionalist?) interpretation would be 161
justified by maslahah, with the common benefit to transitional Muslim-majority societies as a goal. Siding 
with the revolutionaries, the Document calls for the establishment of ‘a modern and democratic state’ 
supported by ‘Islamic precepts’ that ‘include pluralism, rotation of power, determining specializations, 
monitoring performance, seeking people's public interests in all legislations and decisions, ruling the state in 
accordance with its laws, tracking corruptions and ensuring the accountability of all people’ (Articles 1 and 
2). The institution openly promotes its own important role in ‘guiding toward right moderate Islamic 
thinking’ (preamble). Thus, Al-Azhar offered an Islamic-compliant argument to oppose authoritarianism in 
Egypt and across the region – upholding the values of democracy and faith in the same breath. 
The Al-Azhar Declaration in Support of the Arab Revolutions has a similar purpose. It broadens Al-Azhar’s 
influence on Arab transitions beyond the Egyptian uprising (Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen are expressly 
listed) recalling the ‘spirit of freedom in Islam and the Islamic rules on the legitimacy of authority and 
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reform, and the achievement of the objectives and the supreme interests of the nation’ (preamble). This 
document engages directly and critically with literal Quranic provisions, informing its audience of the correct 
or spurious interpretations of specific verses on obedience towards rulers (Article 1). The Declaration also 
absolves peaceful demonstrators (termed ‘patriotic protesters’ in the text) against unjust rulers from the 
classic Islamic crime of baghi (the transgression or rebellion against the legitimate leader through the use of 
force) (Article 2). The Declaration goes a step further, highlighting the positive synergy between Islamic law 
and international human rights law in guaranteeing freedom of assembly and political protest: ‘national 
peaceful movements constitute the core of human rights in Islam, as confirmed by all international 
conventions’ (Article 2). Article 3 then divests the authorities from power after violently oppressing civilians 
– and gives a Quran’ic reference to support this proposition.  162
These documents are truly remarkable in terms of how Islamic principles can be used to further TJ, going as 
far as accusing dictators of violating the ‘spirit of freedom’ of Islam, alongside the protection of the ‘supreme 
interests of the nation’, which perhaps encompasses maslahah understood in a contemporary Muslim-
majority legal system. The success of Al-Azhar has been explained as follows: 
 Unlike the Islamists, al-Azhar was scholarly and not mired in politics. Unlike the Salafists, its approach to  
 religion could be presented as more consistent with the needs of a twenty-first-century society. And unlike  
 both, Ahmed el-Tayeb [the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar] posed as a promoter of consensus, leading national  
 dialogues and issuing widely supported statements and documents to guide the tumultuous political process.  163
Interestingly, the Grand Imam had also served as Grand Mufti of Egypt – whose chief role was to deliver 
official fatwas requested by the institutions. The factors outlined here may have contributed to Al-Azhar’s 
eagerness to participate in the TJ debate. Moreover, the two documents presented carry a doctrinal (but not 
legally binding) force relevant to other Muslim-majority contexts facing authoritarian rule. This example 
may also provide an illustration of Hallaq’s argument on the continuity of ijtihad throughout Islamic history 
into the twenty-first century.  The reception of this activism, however, should be understood from a 164
political angle, as well as from the perspective of its normative significance, as politics will ultimately decide 
the strength of Al-Azhar’s voice in the TJ debates.  
In sum, recent events in the Muslim-majority Arab World and the role played by Islamic institutions such as 
Al-Azhar provide further proof of creative interpretations of the sources by jurists facing pressing 
contemporary social requirements – including those of transitional societies. As such, the functionalist 
impact of scholarly opinions is reaffirmed, demonstrated by the political solidarity expressed by Al-Azhar to 
the revolutionary cause through a dynamic and purposive reinterpretation of Islamic law. The Islamic 
blessing of a legitimate, yet fundamentally political position sets the scene for further dynamic and strategic 
uses of shari’ah in connection to TJ.  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4. International Law in Muslim-majority Legal Settings 
The juxtaposition and interaction between PIL (and specifically for the purposes of this thesis, ICL and 
IHRL) and the Islamic legal tradition is a reality – explicitly or latently so – of all Muslim-majority 
countries. Indeed, virtually all contemporary states present a multi-tier legal system that encompasses 
international obligations, a centralised domestic normative framework, local regulations, religious norms and 
customary elements. Islamic law and International law (among other law, of course) necessarily coexist as 
formants of Muslim-majority legal systems. 
A recurrent and widespread misconception regarding the relationship between PIL and Islamic law assumes 
the two legal domains as dichotomous. This attitude seems to reflect that peculiar tendency of some 
comparative (and non-comparative) legal commentators who set out to highlight differences in order to select 
a clear prevailing model (generally that of their own tradition), instead of engaging in a more balanced 
evaluation, which tends to be more conducive to an informed, nuanced and constructive approach to much-
needed dialogue.  Notably, in the wake of 9/11 there has been a creeping demonisation of Muslims qua 165
Muslims in the context of ‘western’ international law based on their supposed adherence to radically 
different normative values.  Even the ECHR has fallen into the trap of superficial comparativism, 166
suggesting that ‘sharia is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy’ set out in the European 
Convention.  Conservative scholars and politicians in both camps have fallen into the trap of prejudice 167
towards the other.  Fortunately, numerous other scholars have argued convincingly that there is not only a 168
significant theoretical overlap between the methods and objectives of international law and shari’ah 
(regardless of the sources – which are clearly of different philosophical inspiration),  but also that the two 169
may legitimately draw upon each other both in the interest of justice and to reflect and appreciate the multi-
stratified complexity of the globalised legal order.   170
The convergence between international law and shari’ah can be cemented doctrinally through Islamic 
jurisprudence. The adoption of valid international treaties through the ordinary diplomatic channels provides 
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acceptance of general international law through the means of Islamic international law.  This is based on a 171
theoretical division in classical Islamic law (9th- 12th century) according to which a community was either 
under dar al-islam, i.e. the territory of Islam, ruled by Muslims under shari’ah for the benefit and security of 
the faithful, or under dar al-harb, i.e. the territory of war, where Muslims were under foreign domination or 
threat, and thus the shari’ah could not be guaranteed, or, still, under dar al-suhl, a territory which had a pact 
(of peace) with the Muslims.  Under this third category as well as under dar al-islam, valid international 172
treaties could form part of the sources of applicable laws to a community.  
During the course of his life, prophet Muhammad entered diplomatic agreements with numerous non-
Muslim rulers, paving the way for subsequent treaties between Muslims and Christians throughout the 
Middle Ages and early Modernity.  And in the 20th century, ‘the active participation of Muslim states in 173
international conferences, in the League of Nations, and the United Nations and its agencies, demonstrated 
that the dar al-islam has at least reconciled itself to a peaceful coexistence with dar al-harb’.  Shaheen 174
Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman describe the connection between dar al-sulh and international peace and 
security.  Similarly, Mohammad Fadl also explains why in the new world order the category of dar al-harb 175
has become obsolete: 
The rise of international law and institutions such as the United Nations (…) radically changed the political 
environment (…) from one in which war and conquest was the default rule to one in which peace and 
friendship was the default rule. (…) Islam could fulfil its universal aspirations simply by virtue of international 
guarantees of religious freedom and the commitment by non-Muslim States to maintain a posture of neutrality 
with respect to the Islamic religion. (…) Any State that committed itself to providing Muslims freedom of 
religion and permitted Islam to be taught freely could not be considered part of dar al-harb.  176
As a result of this paradigmatic shift, Fadl suggests that Islamic international law is a ‘set of rules that 
enables the creation of binding international agreements rather than the imposition of a set of mandatory 
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universal rules’.  Thus, Islamic law protects international agreements, provided that the particular 177
obligations are consistent with the principles of shari’ah. As such, as argued by Rehman, Islamic 
international law (siyar) has contributed to the development of PIL.  178
Where does this leave Islamic law in relation to the remaining non-treaty-based sources of PIL as outlined in 
Article 38 of the ICJ Charter?  In principle, from the international law angle, there is no justification to 179
marginalise the contribution of Islamic legal thought and practice with regards to customary international 
law, general principles of law, case law and scholarly writings. In fact, however, more frequent references to 
it would lead to a greater sense of inclusion within the international community.  The explicit inclusion of 180
Islamic law among the legal systems to consider in the 2004 UN report on The rule of law and transitional 
justice  encourages TJ scholars and practitioners to engage with shari’ah when relevant.   181
At least theoretically, the analysis presented by Fadl may be applicable to countries that have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ and thus freely entered into an international treaty that binds them to international 
custom (including jus cogens), general principles, select case law and scholarly writings.  The Organisation 182
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and some of its members have presented written statements to the ICJ when an 
OIC member was affected.  The outstanding problem, however, is the extent of the participation afforded to 183
states with a Muslim-majority population in the identification and application of non-treaty sources of PIL. 
Important third-world critiques have uncovered neocolonial undertones in PIL.  As such, in order for the 184
international paradigm of TJ to remain globally relevant, the inclusion of non-western approaches to 
international law, including those of Islamic law, is fundamental.  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5. Conclusions  
This chapter used the notions of formants and cryptotypes to discuss the role of Islamic law in relation to 
Muslim-majority legal systems, such as those facing TJ in the context of Arab uprisings. By recognising the 
social function of Islamic law and the agency carried by jurists in expounding the theories of divine norms in 
given contexts, it is possible to conduct a critical examination of shari'ah without the risk of entering 
theology. In relation to the relocation of TJ from international law paradigms to Muslim-majority legal 
systems, engaging with Islamic law as a formant of those settings may respond to the calls for integration of 
religious principles in the process by the local beneficiaries. While no precise definition of Islamic law was 
provided, its analysis offers tools to understand it and use it constructively in relation to TJ – as the final 
chapter of this thesis will explore in more detail.  
By analysing Muslim-majority legal systems through the component of Islamic law, this chapter found that 
its modernising potential has been a constant feature throughout history up to the present day. This enables 
Islamic law to respond effectively to contemporary societal needs as long as the political leaders and the elite 
of jurists are committed to pursuing and implementing the common good for society as mandated in 
shari’ah. The example of Al-Azhar’s involvement in the TJ debates of Egypt and across the MENA region 
demonstrates that jurists of religious institutions can make an impact on TJ in relation to the Arab uprisings – 
at least at doctrinal level. Moreover, in light of the social purposes of Islamic law for both local and 
international communities, its relationship with PIL can be interpreted from a constructive angle and thus 
reject blanked assumptions of incompatibility.  
With a specific view to the relocation of TJ from the international law paradigm to Muslim-majority legal 
systems, the analysis de-mystifies our understanding of Islamic law through the lens of the comparative 
methods. The shari’ah is but a formant, and Islamic jurisprudence and legal tradition just cryptotypes, of 
Muslim-majority legal systems, not a sacred and irrefutable set of religious norms that dominate Muslim-
majority legal systems. At the same time, Islamic law constitutes a recognisable normative force in the 
secular domain of Islamic communities. Therefore, by desacralising – but not desecrating – the normativity 
of Islamic law in specific contexts, we are free to observe its social function, maintaining our focus on 
critical legal inquiry, and not on timid theological apology. So ‘does Islamic law exist?’ – asked Knut Vikør; 
‘no, and that is why studying it is so exciting’ was his short answer.  In this spirit, the final chapter will 185
continue to explore how to bridge TJ from international law into Muslim-majority legal settings, where a 
strategic use of Islamic law may be key to success. This chapter has contributed to resolving the research 
questions of this thesis by providing an interpretation of Muslim-majority legal systems in which TJ can be 
relocated. It emerges that Islamic law is inherently creative in the pursuit of the common good (maslahah) of 
the communities it guides, but exploring those possibilities in relation to TJ aims is based on the decision of 
elite jurists and political leaders to do so.  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1. Introduction 
The relocation of transitional justice from the international paradigm to Muslim-majority legal systems calls 
for an engagement with Islamic law as well as political forces that define the process. Increased international 
attention towards the Arab uprisings encourages a deeper reflection on the possible role of Islamic law in TJ, 
whether this would ensure a greater cultural ownership by the affected communities, or if, instead, 
transitional aims would be hindered by religious norms. The temptation to devise a form of ‘Islamic 
transitional justice’ to satisfy the presumed cultural needs of the beneficiary population should be resisted as 
a form of disingenuous concession by international donors, or as an expression of local political interests 
cloaked in religious language. Accepting without critique certain versions of Islamic law risks placing 
‘Western adherents of cultural relativism or Orientalism’ on ‘the side of the undemocratic governments’.  1
Instead, local and international actors can jointly develop forms of TJ that fit the requirements of the 
international paradigm and shari’ah to suit the needs of specific contexts if there is the political willingness 
to do so.  
The simplistic solution to this enquiry is to acknowledge that each Muslim-majority TJ context is different, 
and no general propositions on the engagement of Islamic law should be advanced from the outside. 
Nevertheless, some further considerations on the employment of Islamic law as part of TJ processes can be 
made to ensure the potential of shari’ah-based norms and practices are not discarded if they support and 
strengthen transitional aims and the applicable international legal framework. Building on the elements 
presented and analysed earlier, this chapter will not provide one-size-fits-all answers, but point to some 
general possibilities offered by Islamic law in TJ that may be explored further – in theory and practice alike.  
The first three chapters of this thesis discussed the international paradigm of TJ based on IHRL, ICL and (to 
a lesser extent) IHL, focusing on the notions of collective memory, legal truths and the right to the truth as 
cornerstones of the transitional process. Chapter 4 considered comparative law approaches to translating 
international understandings of TJ into specific local settings, and in particular Muslim-majority societies. 
Then, chapter 5 considered the main formants of Islamic legal systems as relevant to TJ. This final chapter 
will address three unresolved questions: (1) can Muslim-majority legal settings accommodate international 
law based TJ processes, and how? (2) Are Islamic law mechanisms able to uncover legal truths about past 
abuse and thus contribute to historical TJ? (3) Is the emerging right to the truth (as a cornerstone of TJ) 
resonant in Islamic legal systems? And if so, can Islamic jurisprudence contribute to the global consolidation 
of the right to the truth? In answering the core research questions, this chapter analyses specific overlaps 
between the international paradigm of TJ and Islamic law which guide the relocation of TJ in Muslim-
majority settings. It also explores specifically how Islamic law can inform the notions of legal truths and the 
right to the truth, which in turn contributes to the establishment of a global paradigm of TJ based not only on 
IHRL, ICL and IHL, but also local understandings of justice and unofficial norms around the world, of which 
shari’ah is but one example.   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2. Transitional Justice from International to Muslim-majority Legal Systems 
This thesis outlines how the international framework of TJ draws on IHRL, ICL and IHL alongside state law 
and, notably, unofficial local law, including religious norms. It also considered how local understandings of 
justice inform the relocation of TJ from international law to local settings, from a comparative law angle. 
The final chapter goes back to the notions of legal truths and right to the truth explored previously, and 
investigates how unofficial norms emerging from Muslim-majority legal systems contribute to the global 
paradigm of TJ, addressing the second part of the overall research question in more detail.  
Translating TJ into local social and legal language may contribute to facilitating its process. Therefore, 
taking into account the specificities of each experience and contexts of application in Muslim-majority 
settings, the three questions to ask in designing and implementing a mechanism are: (1) does this mechanism 
serve the aims of the transition? (2) does this mechanism meet the standards set out in PIL, and in particular 
IHRL? (3) does this mechanism fit the requirements of Islamic law which are held by the society facing TJ, 
and do the principles of Islamic law meet IHRL standards? If the answer is three times affirmative, then the 
mechanism may stand a chance of success. This chapter refers broadly to the third question and invites 
further case-study research on the matter.  
The compatibility between Islamic and international law is a prominent hurdle to address in the localisation 
of TJ in Muslim-majority settings. Islamic law has been found to be compatible with PIL in general as well 
as with IHRL, IHL and ICL provisions; any remaining tensions can be discussed and negotiated. 
Nevertheless, concerns may still be raised by both international lawyers and Islamic lawyers that the meeting 
of the two systems is problematic. The former may assume that the latter’s system is excessively oriented 
towards the imposition of harsh punishments, the exclusion of women and non-Muslims from the process, 
and the tendency to theocratise instead of democratise. The latter, instead, may fear that the former will 
denature the cultural values of a Muslim society, impose external forms of justice that will promote vice and 
ultimately be framed in a normative language alien to the beneficiary community. In order to counter 
preconceptions and sentiments of suspicion, as Baderin would say, ‘with good faith everything can be 
discussed’.  As such, the decision to explore the compatibility between the international paradigm of TJ and 2
Islamic law is essentially political.  
Numerous authors have analysed and even celebrated the relationship between human rights and Islamic 
law.  Based on a review of that work and the understanding that Islamic law is inherently flexible, it is 3
possible to ascertain a general compatibility between the two systems. Although specific tensions may 
remain in areas of fundamental importance for TJ – notably, the harshness of certain forms of punishment for 
the hudud crimes, and the unequal status of women in personal status laws and in testimony – notable efforts 
have been made to ensure alternative interpretations to mainstream understandings. The system’s 
unattainably high standards of proof requirements suggest that there is no imperative under Islamic law to 
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impose inhumane punishments (including the death penalty).  Likewise, gender inequality can be redressed 4
in light of renewed textual exegesis and contemporary human rights advancements, as attested by the 
diversity of interpretation across Muslim-majority settings.  Therefore, discrepancies between the IHRL 5
requirements of TJ and Islamic law principles which appear, upon first reading, to fall short of international 
standards, can and should be addressed doctrinally in scholarship as well as politically to explore possible 
synergies.  
An unresolved limitation of Islamic law vis-à-vis IHRL applicable to TJ is the lack of a readily discernible 
corpus of Islamic human rights law which reflects the centrality of human rights principles in Islam. Mayer 
addressed the question of whether Islamic culture mandates a distinctive approach to human rights over two 
decades ago, opposing Huntington’s clash of civilisations thesis and suggesting instead that Muslim human 
rights documents are determined more by politics than divinity.  She does not, however, discuss similarities 6
or differences with regards to human rights law, understood as the special relationship between the individual 
and the state, which leaves the question as to the distinctiveness of an Islamic form (as opposed to Islamic 
substance/principles) of human rights open. Borrowing from Rawls’ doctrine of ‘overlapping consensus’ (i.e. 
the decision to focus on the end results of different processes starting from contrasting theoretical 
justifications ) Bielefeldt adds to Mayer’s position by rejecting (passive) lowest common denominator 7
approaches in favour of (proactive) ‘changes, self-criticism, and reform’ to enable human rights.  He also 8
underlines that human rights ‘cannot compete with cultural and religious traditions’ because their focus is on 
‘political and legal justice’.   9
In discussing the relocation of TJ from the international paradigm to Muslim-majority settings, this chapter 
relates to two aspects of the relationship between IHRL and Islamic law. Firstly, as TJ draws heavily on PIL, 
human right standards establish a framework of reference. Secondly, the emergence of the right to the truth 
as a distinctive feature of TJ is contextualised in IHRL. As such, Islamic law interacts at a general level with 
the IHRL framework of TJ and more specifically with the right to the truth. But although the normative 
aspirations theoretically converge, Islamic law and jurisprudence (or any other religious-traditional 
normative system) may be insufficient in providing a discrete and exact comparator to IHRL in the context of 
TJ and more generally. Instead, a comparison is made possible on the basis of content. As noted by 
Bielefeldt:  
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The idea of human dignity that can connect human rights with different religious, philosophical and cultural 
traditions because the insight into the unalienable dignity of every human being constitutes both the basic 
ethical principle of human rights and a central element of the teachings of various religions and philosophies.   10
One must resist the temptation to talk about a separate notion of Islamic human rights, for (1) there seems to 
be no identifiable (formal) corpus of such law and (2) even if there were, the gap between the religious aims 
of shari’ah and the political aims of TJ law prevent interchangeability – although in effect the ends of both 
might equally promote transitional aims. So how can the compatibility between Islamic law and TJ be 
ascertained? The proposed solution to this impasse is to draw from Islamic criminal law as a more readily 
discernible corpus of law applicable to TJ. Discussions on TJ in the MENA region  indicate that the 11
remedies of criminal justice are relied on much more than human rights, which are generally non-justiciable 
in domestic courts in the region.  
From the international TJ paradigm angle, the choice of criminal justice principles over human rights as a 
comparator in Islamic law is insignificant: the aim of the comparison is to consider the similarities between 
the international framework of TJ and a legal system (made up of various components) which does not 
originate from PIL. As demonstrated earlier in this thesis, the interconnection between ICL and IHRL in TJ is 
apparent, the provisions now contained in the Rome Statute are guided by human rights considerations and 
both are used in furthering transitional goals. Moreover, the aims of ICL specifically feed into TJ when they 
include ‘the telling of the history of a conflict, (…) reconciling societies and capacity building in domestic 
judicial systems’.  This links into the centrality of truth-seeking in TJ discussed previously, which is guided 12
mostly by IHRL but also informed by ICL.  
On the basis of these considerations, there are sufficient relevant norms in Islamic law, which includes 
Islamic criminal justice, to compare with the legal provisions of the TJ international paradigm which draws 
on the interconnected rules of IHRL and ICL (as part of PIL). Furthermore, the rich literature on Islamic 
criminal law and ICL from an Islamic perspective  takes into account IHRL developments and TJ themes. 13
Although this scholarship tends to present itself as apologetic, it uncovers a wealth of arguments 
demonstrating the compatibility of shari’ah with ICL and is thus relevant to TJ contexts.  
2.1 The overlap of substantive aims of Islamic law and ICL/IHRL 
Writing about the international criminal justice system seen from the perspective of Islamic shari’ah, Adel 
Maged provides a list of shared objectives:  
– To prevent the commission of serious crimes and acts of aggression; 
– To bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for committing such grave crimes; 
– To protect the civilians and other protected groups; 
– To render justice to the victims; 
– To deter criminals from committing crimes; 
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– To contribute to the restoration of peace by achieving justice and promoting reconciliation”.   14
This tentative list suggests that Islamic criminal law is arguably compatible with the core purposes of ICL 
itself (and other systems) – bearing in mind that the peculiarity of the latter involves dealing with mass 
criminality.  The main goals of ICL are retribution and deterrence, as well as rehabilitation of the 15
offenders,  which are comparable to those proposed by Maged for Islamic criminal law. 16
As noted above, given the links between ICL and IHRL in the context of TJ, the rich literature on human 
rights and Islamic law informs this comparative analysis.  The conventional distinction between categories 17
of crimes under Islamic law is threefold: hudud, qisas (diyya) and ta’azir. Though this classification is 
religious, it also reflects socio-political interpretations of criminal justice which in turn have determined the 
punishments applicable to each offence.  
Hudud crimes are considered to be crimes against god, are prescribed in the Qur’an and Sunna, and 
constitute the backbone of the Islamic criminal order.  This group includes six/seven specific crimes (though 18
there are differences of opinion among the four Sunni schools and with the Shia scholars): apostasy, 
transgression (baghi) , theft, highway robbery, adultery (zina), slander, drinking alcohol. The penalties for 19
these types of crimes are considered excessively harsh by contemporary standards, as they include corporal 
punishments as well as the death penalty; a procedural remedy to this is that the standard of proof for these 
crimes is set at a particularly high threshold.  The application of the hudud offences has become highly 20
political and their reintroduction in certain Muslim-majority societies has been deeply divisive.  With 21
regards to TJ, enforcing hudud penalties would most likely result in inhumane forms of punishment inflicting 
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physical pain, which would probably violate the prohibition of torture as set out in the CAT (Article 1) and 
the ICCPR (Article 7).   22
Besides the problematic execution of hudud penalties in light of ICL and IHRL, the very fact that these 
crimes are considered the gravest of all crimes may pose a challenge to the aims of TJ and the requirements 
of human rights. For example, zina – the punishment of extramarital sexual relations – has been understood 
by some conservatives as encompassing instances of rape and gender-based assault.  This approach is 23
completely out of tune with IHRL and with regards to TJ,  given the gravity of GBV as part of conflict and 24
widespread abuse, and its recognition as a war crime in IHL and ICL.  Although not much has been said 25
about the relationship between the hudud crime of zina, GBV and TJ, it is clear that traditional patriarchal 
readings require a radical shift, if this area of Islamic law is to comply with the principles of human dignity 
upheld by shari’ah as well as applicable IHRL standards (and of course the survivor’s right to see justice 
done and uncover the truth about their pain in a socio-political context).    
Another example of the challenges posed by the application of hudud crimes in transitional justice settings is 
related to baghi – transgression, or revolt against the righteous leader, described by Al-Azhar:  
Baghi in Arabic language and Islamic Shari’a is the transgression or rebellion against the legitimate 
leader by the use of force. The crime of baghi includes for example the outset of the ruler by the use 
of force and violence and acts of destruction of public property.  26
Unlike zina, this hudud crime has recently faced a radical reinterpretation from within the Islamic 
establishment in relation to the Arab uprisings.  The senior Al-Azhar scholars and other intellectuals 27
responded publicly to ensure that the protestors against Mubarak were not considered as having committed 
baghi – which in the present-day Egyptian legal system heavily reliant on shari’ah may have resulted in 
religiously-motivated public condemnation and the imposition of corporal (and capital) punishments. The Al-
Azhar Declaration in Support of the Arab Revolutions of 31 October 2011 eagerly provides the following 
analysis to protect protesters:    
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When the voice of national popular opposition and peaceful protest arises, this is the inherent right of people to 
correct and guide their rulers when they (…) ignore legitimate demands which call for freedom, justice and 
equity. Those patriotic protestors are not considered as committing baghi; (…) national peaceful movements 
constitute the core of human rights in Islam, as confirmed by all international conventions. Furthermore, it is 
the people’s duty to reform their society and correct their rulers.  28
This passage is both politically significant and legally striking: the Al-Azhar scholars link the right to 
peaceful protest to the understanding of human rights in Islam and in international law – actually referring to 
the duty of civil dissent in the face of authoritarianism. Doctrinally, it raises the expectation that similar 
reform will be pursued by Islamic lawyer-theologians with regards to other hudud crimes which are relevant 
to TJ (including zina) in light of IHRL standards. Indeed, the choice of arguments in revising the commonly 
held view of baghi is noteworthy: Al-Azhar instrumentally employs a shari’ah based argument alongside an 
IHRL argument, without hesitating as to the full compatibility of the two normative systems. This example, 
however, also reveals the deeply political character of Al-Azhar as an institution and, relatedly, in its 
willingness to take sides in situations leading to TJ. 
The second category of crimes in Islamic law, qisas, regulates murder, manslaughter, battery and other 
crimes against the physical integrity of the person.  The primary sources of Islamic law (Qur’an and Sunna) 29
do not set out specific or mandatory penalties for these, but the wrong is regulated at human level, either 
through the ‘talion law’ (eye for an eye) or diyya, victim compensation.  Unlike hudud crimes, these crimes 30
‘infringe upon the claims of human beings’ and not of god.  Therefore, the victim or his family have the 31
right to pardon the perpetrator, in addition to the right to request blood money or other forms of 
compensation. The peculiarity of qisas is the discretion left to the victim and their family in determining and 
applying the penalty to the perpetrator. In stark contrast to the management of criminal justice in European 
jurisdictions – which place criminal law within the sphere of public law – the Islamic crimes of qisas are set 
out as a private law relationship between offender and offended parties. The participation of families in the 
resolution of the dispute and the application of the penalty, however, renders this type of crime a semi-public 
matter, elevating it beyond what may be viewed as a prima facie private affair. In that regard, it is worth 
noting again that the imposition of harsh corporal punishment is at odds with IHRL – but it is not an 
imperative. Thus, for Muslim-majority states undergoing transition that have ratified the core IHRL the 
decision to leave the resolution of offences against the person to private forms of justice may simply reveal a 
political unwillingness to uphold international obligations. This category of crime may also carry a hidden 
potential in relation to restorative justice as well as its role in acknowledging the truth about past abuse.  As 32
such, by reinterpreting the right to diyya of a victim and her family under qisas from an IHRL perspective, it 
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may include the right to know the truth and the related state obligation to carry out effective investigations 
(instead of applying the talion law).  
The third category of Islamic crimes, ta’azir, describes residual – yet potentially infinite – offences against 
community interests or public order ‘punishable by penalties left to the discretion of the ruler or the judge’.  33
These include certain criminal acts related to the hudud but not amounting to hudud, or that do not pass the 
standard of proof test, as well as ‘all acts under the provisions of law, which are not punished by hudud’.  It 34
is under this category that one may place the bulk of statutory criminal provisions in many Muslim countries. 
With regards to TJ, the ta’azir crimes pose no unsurmountable challenge to IHRL requirements, inasmuch as 
their application does not involve religious imperatives, just purely political obstacles. Therefore, no divine 
argument can trump the necessity of aligning ta’azir to IHRL as applicable in TJ contexts: this category is a 
pure expression of secular politics.  
The three categories of criminal offences described above are understood and supplemented by a multitude 
of legal maxims (al-qawa’id al-fiqhiyah) (that Sacco may call cryptotypes – as described in chapter 4 of this 
thesis), that offer an indication as to the general principles of law that support the judicial function and 
highlight the key objectives of Islamic law.  Different schools of Islamic jurisprudence reflect the nuances 35
of diverse interpretations of the holy sources and early applications of Shari’a.  It ought to be noted 36
however, that legal maxims are a result of the work and views of (human) Muslim jurists and not holy 
revelations per se; thus, as suggested by Sadiq Reza, they are ‘truly opinions rather than judgments; they are 
approximations or understandings of God’s law rather than definitive statements of it’.  In light of this, they 37
may be employed as supplementary arguments if appropriate to the aims of TJ and the standards of IHRL. 
But as they do not constitute a religious imperative, there is no requirement to uphold them.  
2.2 The convergence of procedural standards of Islamic law and ICL/IHRL 
Additional arguments have been put forward to illustrate the overlap between core procedural principles of 
Islamic criminal law and IHRL-sensitive ICL. Writing in relation to the ICC, Mohamed Elewa Badar 
identifies three principles and two defences in ICL which resonate with the shari’ah, and are, in turn, 
relevant to the international TJ paradigm. These are: the principle of legality and non-retroactivity, the 
presumption of innocence, and equality before the law; the defence of superior orders and official capacity 
immunity.  In human rights terms, the right to a fair hearing and due process as set out in Article 14 ICCPR, 38
as well as Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 UDHR have been analysed and found compatible with the principles 
of Islamic law by numerous comparative scholars such as Mashood Baderin  and Sultanhussein Tabandeh.  39 40
Page    of  165 216
 Badar, ‘Islamic Law (Shari’a) and the Jurisdiction of the ICC’, 414. See also Lippman, ‘Islamic Criminal Law and 33
Procedure’, 44
 Ibid34
 Ibid, 416 et seq35
 See inter alia NJ Coulson, History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh University Press 1964)36
 S Reza, ‘Torture and Islamic Law’ (2007-8) 8 Chicago Journal of International Law 21, 2637
 Badar, ‘Islamic Law (Shari’a) and the Jurisdiction of the ICC’, 419 et seq; MC Bassiouni, ‘The Sharia, Islamic Law, 38
and Post-Conflict Justice’ (distributed at the 11th Specialization Course in International Criminal Law, International 
Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (ISISC) Siracusa, 2011) at 42 et seq 
 Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law, at 97 et seq (Sunni background)39
 S Tabandeh, A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1970) (Shia background)40
Chapter 6
The following paragraphs present the most significant procedural overlaps between Islamic criminal law and 
the ICL principles of the TJ framework, which may be used to design TJ initiatives that meet the 
requirements of both.  
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege is enshrined in article 22 of the Rome Statute;  in the Islamic 41
tradition, it is reflected in the Qur’anic verses 17:15,  28:59,  4:165,  6:19,  and 5:98,  and supported in a 42 43 44 45 46
number of legal maxims and in the traditions of the Prophet.  Given their nature and source derivation, 47
hudud crimes must respect the principle of legality, as do the qisas, through fixed procedures and 
punishments.  Conversely, the ta’azir crimes do pose a prima facie concern given the wide discretion 48
accorded to the rulers (and law-makers) and judges. However, this criticism has been rebutted in favour of 
the flexibility needed to deal with residual crimes.  Moreover, it could be argued that this category operates 49
in practice on a statute-based model, thus incorporating the guarantees of the principle of legality: the ruler 
(or Parliament) in his/her legislative capacity would draft a criminal norm to reflect social needs, then it 
would be implemented through executive capacity, and enforced by the judiciary after the normative 
provision comes into force. Thus, following the structure of the creation of a ta’azir crime as set out in 
classical terms, and adapting it to contemporary realities, it would not appear inconsistent with the 
requirements of the principle of legality, which could in fact be imported into the process and become an 
integral part of it.  
The presumption of innocence until proven guilty is set out in article 66 of the Rome Statute.  In the same 50
spirit, under Islamic law, Badar reports, ‘no one is guilty of a crime unless his guilt is proved through lawful 
evidence’.  With specific reference to the hudud, the presumption of innocence is upheld in a hadith 51
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transmitted by Aisha.  Consistently, ‘it is also a well-established principle in qisas crimes […] that 52
circumstantial evidence favorable to the accused is to be relied upon, while if unfavorable to him it is to be 
disregarded’.  The same is also applicable to the ta’azir.  Bassiouni reports that in the Farewell Sermon, the 53 54
Prophet said: ‘Your lives, your property, and your honor are a sacred trust upon you until you meet your Lord 
on the Day of Resurrection’, which some interpret as evidence of a requirement for ‘positive proof of crime’ 
to interfere with an individual’s interests and freedoms.  According to the hadith ‘everyone is born 55
inherently pure’, teamed with the legal principle of istishab (presumption of continuity), Baderin argues that 
under the Islamic legal tradition ‘an accused person is considered innocent until the contrary is proved’.  56
Similar arguments are found in the recent study on doubt in Islamic criminal law by Intisar A. Rabb.  Article 57
19(e) of the OIC Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam also reaffirms the presumption of innocence. 
Thus, as this principle can be found in Islamic law, the international paradigm of TJ based on ICL would not 
raise questions of compatibility in that instance.  
The presumption of innocence in Islamic law, moreover, is corroborated by the related ‘right to 
compensation of a person who suffers injury or is punished through judicial error or miscarriage of justice’ 
which is recognised in the Islamic legal tradition.  This point is especially relevant in the context of TJ, in 58
which the course of justice may be affected by the turn of political events to the detriment of certain people 
involved in trials. The significance of the existence of the right to compensation for wrongful conviction in 
the Islamic legal tradition suggests that states may not hide behind Islamic injunctions for their decision or 
failure to provide compensation, and it may very well be argued by Muslim voices in positions of authority 
or impact that the right to compensation in these cases is in fact mandated.  
Equality before the law is enshrined in the UDHR,  in the ICCPR  and in numerous subsequent 59 60
international law documents, and thus applies to the international paradigm of TJ. Likewise, as stated in the 
Qur’an, crimes, punishments and criminal proceedings must apply equally, in order to limit the judge’s 
discretionary power.  Moreover, as noted by Baderin, ‘the Prophet himself and the righteous Caliphs after 61
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him demonstrated the principle of equality before the courts and tribunals both in words and in deeds’; for 
instance, Caliph Umar reprimanded a judge for treating him more favourably due to his status and political 
power.  This suggests that in Islamic law political elites do not fall outside the scope of applicable law, 62
much like the standards set out in the international paradigm of TJ.  
The principle of equality before the courts becomes more problematic when women are giving evidence, 
given the Qur’anic verse indicating that a man’s testimony is equal to that of two women.  However, 63
Baderin points to two main factors to challenge this proposition: firstly, the context of this verse seems to 
refer specifically to commercial transactions, typically conducted between men at the time of Qur’anic 
revelation; secondly, the rationale behind this rule seeks to serve the interests of substantive justice, and as 
such can be re-tuned to meet the needs of contemporary society.  For instance, this rule has been 64
circumvented by the Pakistani Federal Shariat Court.  Therefore, there is scope for reinterpretation to reflect 65
the standards of gender equality necessary in any attempt to uncover the truth as part of TJ efforts – the 
principle of maslahah (discussed in the previous chapter) should be able to accommodate this. Arguably, the 
economic and social rights taken into account by the international paradigm of TJ provide a reason to uphold 
the principle of maslahah and revise any outstanding gender-discriminatory rules of evidence that hinder the 
transitional aims of truth, justice and reconciliation.  
As to the defence of superior orders, Art 33 of the Rome Statute sets out the ICL rule, which clearly rules out 
the ‘possibility of the plea of superior orders for the most odious and egregious international crimes, i.e. 
genocide and crimes against humanity, offences which normally involve widespread attack on innocent 
civilians’.  Under Islamic law, it is understood that ‘Islam confers on every citizen the right to refuse to 66
commit a crime, should any government or administrator order him to do so’.  As such, there seems to be no 67
plausible Islamic justification for non-compliance with the ICL rule which informs the international 
paradigm of TJ.   
The second ICL defence considered by Badar is official capacity immunity, enshrined in the III Nuremberg 
Principle,  and now in Art 27 of the Rome Statute. This provision informs the international paradigm of TJ, 68
which is often used to bring to justice those state officials responsible for grave human rights abuse. In his 
comparative appraisal, Badar confidently states that ‘in Islamic law, there is no recognition of special 
privileges for anyone and rulers are not above the law’.  This approach is supported by the traditions of the 69
Prophet; Caliph Umar reports that the Prophet himself did not expect any special treatment that would place 
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him above the law.  Therefore, even for this aspect the ICL and Islamic law would be mutually supportive in 70
a transitional justice context dealing with accountability of state officials for gross human rights violations. 
To sum up, there seems to be scope for the alignment of Islamic law to the standards set out in IHRL-based 
TJ in general terms, even when norms may seem to be deeply contested. This section considered how, in the 
case of hudud crimes, radical revisionism of the application of existing norms (specifically, baghi) has been 
undertaken by Al-Azhar scholars in light of the political necessities of the Arab uprisings and with reference 
to the international paradigm of TJ. As such, other Islamic institutions (as well as Al-Azhar) may follow in 
actively engaging traditional dogma to adapt it to the reality of present-day TJ based on IHRL standards. 
With regards to qisas/diyya, the private law relationship between offending and offended parties – which 
may result in unacceptable physical violence (extrajudicial or through the authorities) – requires further 
political willingness by the state (or political elites in positions of authority during transitions) to uphold 
existing IHRL obligations to provide a fair trial and eliminate inhuman or degrading punishment. Moreover, 
this category could be reinterpreted to replace the talion rule with a different form of penalty administered by 
the authorities. This policy shift would not be hindered by religious imperatives, as both the qisas and the 
ta’azir categories do not involve offences against god (conversely to the hudud) and may be more flexibly 
reassessed in political processes (and not necessarily by religious institutions). Moving from substantive 
aims to procedural rules, this section also considered some of the key procedural overlaps between Islamic 
law and IHRL/ICL relevant to TJ. The findings suggest that remaining differences can be solved as part of a 
political choice: Islamic jurisprudence is sufficiently flexible to accommodate a variety of solutions to social 
needs. As such, the international paradigm of TJ predicated on IHRL, ICL and IHL can be accommodated by 
Islamic law if there is the will to acknowledge and pursue the existing synergies between the two. Equally, 
on the basis of the legal principles scrutinised here, there seems to be no specific shari’ah exception to the 
rules that facilitate transitional aims and related international standards. Therefore, there is no cause to ignore 
Islamic law arguments that converge with the international paradigm in localising TJ in Muslim-majority 
legal systems.   
!
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3. Legal truths and historical transitional justice through Islamic law 
Legal truth can be derived from legal rituals – in the case of TJ, these will generally be trials and truth 
commissions – which present similarities to religious rituals. A weakness to be reckoned with, however, is 
the dominance of narratives promoted by those actors who are in a position to shape the process. And 
furthermore, the very procedures guiding the process may bring about the duplicitous result of uncovering as 
well as masking the truth sought in the context of TJ. In transitional Muslim-majority settings, similar 
(secular) considerations will arguably hold true. This section will outline the means to uncover legal truths in 
Islamic law, drawing from existing literature on the derivation and formalisation of legal truths, and evaluate 
their possible use in transitional contexts. To do so, it will consider how Islamic law as a characteristic 
formant of those legal systems may strengthen historical TJ and the quest for collective memories. 
Historically, the written word has played an important role in recognising and regulating relationships 
between individuals in Muslim-majority settings, inasmuch as documents can be produced to prove a legal 
title, right or interest before society. For example, in the early shari’ah courts, the judge’s scribe ‘recorded 
the statements, rebuttals and dispositions of the litigants, and, moreover, drew up legal documents on the 
basis of the court records for those who needed the attestation of the judge’.  Outside the court, private 71
notaries (shuruti) drafted legal documents for individuals entering into contracts, upon payment of a fee.  72
These legal documents formed the backbone of the legal narratives both inside and outside the courtroom, 
with an impact on society that went beyond the individual case or transaction. With reference to TJ, written 
records of both private and public law (including criminal matters) contribute to uncovering the truth about 
past abuse and archiving information.   73
Islamic law practice has also systematised information. Alongside court scribes and private notaries, by the 
eighth century AD we have reports of established diwan and collections of court records (sijillat).  These 74
included the judge’s decision on each case, based on the claims made by the parties, as well as registers 
including prisoners names and terms of imprisonment.  Hallaq has described the diwan as embodying ‘the 75
complete record of the judge’s work in the court, and the chief tool by which judicial practice preserved its 
continuity’.  The diwan contained a court’s case law, its motivations and supporting documents, and as such 76
it was passed on to successive judges: this allowed the continuation of protracted cases as well as a means to 
review the work of the predecessor judge, also enabling appeals procedures.   77
Keeping written evidence of formal legal matters meant, as Hallaq notes, that it could be consulted by others, 
in relation to the ratio decidendi or legal title; however, this necessarily required a truth-seeking effort 
alongside admission and selection of documents. This also suggests that if an error of fact was incorporated 
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in a court record, it acquired the connotations of legal truth for others to rely on (or appeal against) in future 
proceedings. By recording and filing documents through an established and recognisable process, given legal 
statuses, rights and interests were awarded authenticity both between parties to a case and at societal level. 
As such, legal truths could be (and have been) formed and formalised in Islamic legal settings for over 
twelve centuries, consolidating the parallels between the formation of legal truths in secular and religious 
systems. This, in turn, enables Islamic law and tradition-informed legal truths to be compared to other types 
of legal truths (and critiqued accordingly).     
Legal truths contribute to the development of narratives which in turn feed into historical TJ processes in 
building collective memories. With reference to legal truths in Muslim-majority legal systems, Baudouin 
Dupret and Barbara Drieskens separate ‘the law as a topic of inquiry in its own right and legal texts and 
stories as a resource for social history’.  They divide the former between ‘law as a tool for further legal 78
practical purposes’ (e.g. statutes, jurisprudence, etc.) as ‘used by law practitioners (…) to perform their 
activities’, and ‘the description of these legal practices in their manifold dimensions, that is the rendering of 
the many activities that led to the production of the law’.  Dupret and Drieskens stress the centrality of 79
understanding legal stories in their context, described as ‘the many cultural, institutional, substantive and 
procedural practicalities, relevancies and technicalities that concurred to constraining the specific course of 
action’.  They argue that legal texts ‘are both contextualizing and contextualized’.  This echoes the TJ 80 81
notion that law is both backward-looking and forward-looking in dealing with the past and providing 
foundations for the future. And much like in non-religious contexts, actors who contribute to constructing 
legal truths as well as their intended present and future ‘audiences’ have a role in historical TJ processes. In 
contrast to those actors, however, in Muslim-majority settings (or any context where religious norms inform 
politics) political agents with a recognised religious character are likely to enjoy a higher standing in society 
than mere political actors – as discussed earlier in relation to Al-Azhar.  
Discussing the formation of legal narratives in shari’ah courts, Brinkley Messick recalls that ‘all lawsuits are 
built of conflicting narratives’ and at the conclusion of the litigation, ‘the judge’s ruling selectively evaluates 
these conflicting narratives and either finds for one or imposes his own final narrative’.  For example, the 82
mid-20th century Yemeni hukm (final judgment records) included: 
The opening claim and response texts, any later responses (by either party), primary evidentiary texts 
(including, as sub-varieties, both oral testimony and a range of written documents, including notarial 
instruments), and the judge’s concluding ruling itself (hukm in the narrow sense), all of which were quoted in 
the terminal judgment record.  83
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Messick contends that the court makes strategic decisions as to what to include in the official narrative of the 
records, which is perceived as bearing greater legal significance.  However, the records can be very detailed, 84
containing long passages taken from the statements of the parties; Messick believes the reason for this is the 
wish to present an exhaustive process.  Social historians, admonishes Messick, ought to be ‘mindful of the 85
dictates and emphases of specific archival cultures, aware of the forms imposed by legal genres and also 
attentive to the ongoing dialogic developments between opposing narratives in the course of a given trial’.  86
Therefore, ‘what is left is the judges ruling, which may identify one of the narratives, or at least a relevant 
part of it, as being in the right, providing a basis for the ruling’.  This again points to the fact that the judge 87
sets the legal truth on which his or her decision is made. As discussed previously, the formation of the legal 
truth and subsequent collective memories of past violence in TJ processes cannot afford to marginalise 
survivors. So in order to counter that risk, the bottom-up push for the legal truth may be exercised on the 
basis of the international paradigm of TJ as well as on the basis of Islamic practice of recording judicial 
documents and making them accessible.   
But what if the courts are inclined to protect the interests of the authorities, and thus skew the legal truths 
developed throughout the transitional justice process (or indeed mask the blame that international actors 
should be held responsible for as well)? Can a special administrative court or procedure be set up under 
Islamic law? Historically, alongside the ordinary judiciary, a new set of tribunals standing at the margins of 
shari’ah courts appeared, known as mazalim tribunals (i.e. boards of grievances), for the purpose of 
‘correcting wrongs committed by state officials’.  Hallaq describes these courts as a supplement to the 88
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and their jurisdiction was limited and sporadic.  
The Mazalim (or Dar al Mazalim) are described as:  
Courts that served as tribunals of administrative law where the public directly appealed to the ruler or his 
deputies against the abuse of or failure to exercise power by other authorities, as well as against decisions 
made by judges.  89
This type of court is separate from the ordinary court in which the qadi judge sits, and is akin to an 
administrative tribunal. Ido Shahar notes that the mazalim courts, operating alongside the qadi courts, 
illustrate a division of legal labour that changed throughout time across the Muslim world.  A distinguishing 90
feature of the existence of the mazalim courts noted by Mawardi (and reported in Shahar) is the different 
degree of freedom accorded to the litigant according to the type of claim involved.  91
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In criminal cases involving the “rights of man” (huquq adami), plaintiffs are free to choose whether to apply to 
the qadi court or the governor in his capacity as mazalim judge. However, cases involving violations of the 
“rights of God” (huquq Allah), which belong to the sphere of public interest, fall under the jurisdiction of the 
governor (and the not qadi).   92
This suggests that the mazalim courts exercised jurisdiction upon claimants’ action where their interest had 
been interfered with, as opposed to the automatic jurisdiction exercised by the ordinary courts involving 
huquq Allah violations (i.e. hudud crimes). In particular, the mazalim tribunals operated mainly within four 
spheres:  
(1) They prosecuted injustices committed in the performance of public services, such as unfair or oppressive 
collection of taxes, or non-payment of salaries by government agencies; 
(2) They dealt with claims against government employees who transgressed the boundaries of their duties and 
who committed wrongs against the public, such as unlawful appropriation of private property; 
(3) They heard complaints against Shari’a judges that dealt mainly with questions of conduct, including abuses 
of office and corruption; 
(4) They enforced Shari’a court decisions that the qadi was unable to carry out.    93
The mazalim courts, according to Hallaq, were ‘sporadic and ephemeral’ compared to the established 
shari’ah courts.  He reports an Egyptian experience of the ninth century, in which the mazalim was 94
established due to a lack of qualified men to serve as shari’ah judges and subsequent shari’ah courts 
overturned the mazalim decisions. The value of these courts seems to be their added flexibility compared to 
the ordinary courts, which, however, in today’s fair trial and due process standards, may pose a challenge to 
the human rights considerations of the international TJ paradigm. That said, it may be possible to envisage a 
mazalim court which is both flexible and in line with human rights requirements to serve the interests of TJ 
in situations where ordinary courts may not have the capacity to adjudicate on cases which exceed the 
ordinariness of justice and injustice – especially where state officials are concerned. In mazalim courts, 
therefore, the construction of legal truths which reflect the experience of victims of institutionalised abuse 
may be likelier that in ordinary courts. This in turn would also better inform the narratives that make up 
historical TJ processes – especially if the findings of the mazalim are accompanied by extrajudicial truth-
revealing acts. Similarly to the gacaca in Rwanda and parallel proceedings in national courts and at the 
ICTR discussed previously in this thesis, the juxtaposition of legal truths emerging from a variety of 
proceedings in Islamic law offers a more complete picture of historical violence in context.  
The contextualisation of the legal truth shifts the focus of the discussion away from the courtroom and 
towards other normative and adjudicatory formants of a given Muslim-majority legal system. Just as legal 
truths can be sought and discovered through avenues other than trials available within the arsenal of TJ 
mechanisms (most notably truth and reconciliation initiatives), similarly, means of truth-finding in Islamic 
legal settings are not restricted to trials. The paragraphs that follow will introduce by way of example two 
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additional means to extract the legal truth in Islamic law, namely independent scholarly opinions (fatwa) and 
arbitration (sulh). 
3.1 Extrajudicial legal truths in Islamic law 
Notwithstanding the importance of the work of courtrooms in determining legal truths, extrajudicial 
mechanisms may also inform historical TJ in Muslim-majority settings. The first example discussed presents 
itself as a-judicial more than extrajudicial: fatwas, as discussed in chapter 5, are non-binding legal opinions 
emanating from an established scholar, which may (or may not) be relied upon in the adjudication of a 
dispute.  95
Offering an insight into the historical function of fatwas, Amalia Zomeño analyses how fatwas were 
‘constructed as a legal story’, in which the question and the answer to a legal question ‘were considered legal 
precedents and compiled as such, so that the social and legal stories were transformed into pieces of 
jurisprudence’.  She notes how (western) historians have used fatwas to study the Islamic world in the 96
middle ages; however, she recalls Mohamed Fadel’s admonishment that ‘a fatwa falls somewhere between 
the ideal and the real’, as it constitutes ‘the empirical manifestation of his [the mufti’s] opinion and it 
emerges from a unique set of empirical facts’.   97
Zomeño illustrates how the formulation of the fatwa question – the ‘translation of the facts in legal terms’ – 
is ‘embedded in a legal frame’ – determines the need to understand the interaction between the social and the 
legal issues at stake.  Subsequently, the formulation of the response by the mufti – a legal scholar himself – 98
is imbued with the complex persona of his role which includes the administration of justice, teaching and 
debating the law, advising the judge in court.  The mufti could also be called upon by a judge on a case to 99
provide independent expert answers to legal questions; his (presumed) independence ‘reinforced the moral 
qualification of his function and gave authority to his opinion, since he was outside the political powers that 
influenced the judges’.  Therefore, argues Zomeño, fatwa compilations are meant to last throughout 100
history: after the answer by the mufti is compiled, fatwas went through a process to establish the ‘official’ 
version.  She concludes by tracing the relationship between the role of the mufti/jurist and history, which is 101
as relevant to the study of the past as it is to recent histories underpinning TJ: 
The only access we have to knowing what really happened in society comes from a text constructed by a jurist. 
Our access to this record happens only after the mustafi, who is in most cases a judge, makes a selection of the 
relevant events in the legal sphere. Historians depend on the job of the mustafi, who, in principle, should be 
objective and provide the mufti with accurate information on the story.  102
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Although one could be more sceptical as to the primacy and infallibility of jurists (both inside and outside of 
the courtroom) as described in the quotation, with reference to historical TJ efforts it would seem that the 
role of the mufti as a qualified, institutional recipient of factual complaints, is well-placed for developing a 
version of the truth which feeds into the legal truth. 
The second example of extrajudicial processes uncovering the legal truth is found in the sulh mechanism, 
reflecting the private nature of justice in Islamic law (discussed in the first part of this chapter with reference 
to criminal law and qisas). Sulh, roughly translated as ‘amicable settlement’, constitutes an alternative 
dispute settlement mechanism under Islamic law ‘grounded upon compromise negotiated by the disputants 
themselves or with the help of a third party’.  As an alternative to trials, it encompasses the concepts of 103
‘conciliation’ and ‘peacemaking’,  resonating with transitional aims. In conjunction to trials, sulh provides 104
the procedural option to ‘defer disputants to mediation before trying their case or at any stage of trial’.  105
Although the primary aim of sulh is reconciliation between parties, it also results in the discovery and 
crystallisation of a narrative in order for the dispute to be solved; this truth is provided by the parties and 
accepted by the adjudicator. Indeed, just like in proceedings before a judge, the ‘third party’ of sulh must be 
satisfied with a narrative based on accepted evidence in order to construct a legal truth and adjudicate 
between parties. Aida Othman argues that under Islamic law ‘the trial process is not regarded as an ultimate 
truth-finding mechanism that will lead to substantive justice’.  Therefore, even the outcome of a suhl 106
settlement can offer a reading of facts that synthesises the parties’ competing narratives, demands and 
positions as accepted by the adjudicator – resulting in the formation of legal truth.   
The scope of potential applications of sulh extends to ‘conflicts between members of society’ when this ‘is in 
the public’s interest (al-maslahah al-mursalah)’.  It appears in medieval and modern penal codes.  Today, 107 108
sulh is notably used in commercial arbitration.  Indeed, on the basis of Qur’anic exegesis, it has been 109
argued that the doctrine of ‘sulh is best’ is valid ‘in all instances of discord, even those conflicts triggered by 
homicide’ (i.e the most serious).  This position was held historically by the Hanafi school of Islamic law, in 110
contrast to the more restrictive Shafiis,  revealing: 111
Page    of  175 216
 For an historical overview of amicable settlements as an alternative to trial in the Islamic tradition, see Aida Othman, 103
‘“And Amicable Settlement is Best”: Sulh and Dispute resolution in Islamic Law’ (2007) 21 Arab Law Quarterly 64, 65 
et seq, 68
 Aseel Al-Ramahi, ‘Sulh: A Crucial Part of Islamic Arbitration’, (2008) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 104
Papers 12/2008 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153659 [accessed 10 December 2012] 
 Othman, ‘And Amicable Settlement is Best’, 65105
 Ibid, 69 citing Q 4:128: ‘If a wife fears cruelty or desertion on her husband's part, there is no blame on them if they 106
arrange an amicable settlement between themselves; and such settlement (sulh) is best. And Q 4:35: If ye fear a breach 
between them [the spouses], appoint (two) arbiters, one from his family and the other from hers; if they wish for peace, 
Allah will cause their reconciliation: For Allah hath full knowledge, and is acquainted with all things’
 Ibid and Essam A Alsheikh, ‘Distinction between the Concepts Mediation, Conciliation, Sulh and Arbitration in 107
Shari’ah Law’ (2011) 25 Arab Law Quarterly 367, 369, and fn 8 citing Q3:35: ‘And if you fear a breach between the 
two [spouses], then appoint a judge from his people and a judge from her people; if they both desire agreement, Allah 
will effect harmony between them, surely Allah is knowing, aware’
 Othman, ‘And Amicable Settlement is Best’, 72, citing the Dulkadir in Anatolia and the Ottoman Mejelle (1885)108
 Al-Ramahi, ‘Sulh: A Crucial Part of Islamic Arbitration’109
 Othman, ‘And Amicable Settlement is Best’, 69. 110
 Ibid, 83, 85111
Chapter 6
A collision of two sets of ethical and religious ideals: that of forgiveness and setting aside the 
misunderstanding and mistakes of another in favour of reconciliation; and that of ensuring the lawfulness of 
gain as well as preventing unjust enrichment of an untruthful party.  112
The favour afforded to sulh in the Islamic legal tradition is based on the Qur’anic encouragement to solve 
disputes amicably,  preferring forgiveness and reconciliation:   113
The recompense for an injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree): but if a person forgives and makes 
reconciliation, his reward is due from Allah, for (Allah) loveth not those who do wrong.  114
Further confirmation of this preference is found in the hadith. A tradition attributed to the caliph Umar 
corroborates the view that adjudication without an amicable settlement leads to bitterness.  Othman recalls 115
that ‘the Prophet was said to have encouraged compromise and to have mediated both public disputes, such 
as those between fighting clan members, and private ones, including those between his Companions and their 
creditors’.  This is especially interesting for the purposes of TJ, as it confirms the flexibility of the sulh 116
method of dispute settlement both for private and for public affairs. Similarly to the gacaca in Rwanda and 
other forms of local, informal dispute-settlement discussed previously in this thesis, sulh allows for a greater 
degree of openness than ordinary court proceedings, partly freeing the parties from the constraints of 
established procedural norms; consequently, a greater range of truths can be uncovered.  
On the basis of this description, the possibilities of favouring (and achieving) reconciliation and forgiveness 
through sulh could be used to trump the retribution carried in the qisas penalties discussed earlier. More in 
general, as a core aim of TJ, reconciliation through a recognised process can also contribute to accountability 
and justice – and thus be instrumental in uncovering the legal truth about past abuse, as discussed in chapter 
2. Provided basic rights guarantees are met and ensuring justice does not become solely a private affair, sulh 
may participate in uncovering the truth about past violence and in giving formal recognition to the accounts 
emanating from a recognised process. Though the resulting legal truth is unable to offer a comprehensive and 
neutral account of history for the same reasons discussed with regards to the legal truth in chapter 2, among 
which are the restrictions imposed by an inter partes dispute, it nevertheless is able to contribute to historical 
TJ. Firstly, much like trials, sulh uncovers truths as part of a legal ritual, setting down a historical record 
about past abuse and legitimising its discovery in official/legal language. Secondly, its findings provide a 
synthesis of competing narratives mediated by a third party in painting an inherently nuanced (and 
conflicted) version of the past.  
The resulting legal truth depends heavily on the actors that shape the sulh process – as an example of a truth-
seeking initiative. Thus, unless the resulting truths are able to be challenged again, they may enable (or 
perpetuate) social violence. If truths uncovered through sulh are given public effect through archiving or 
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publication, they can help reconstruct and challenge historical accounts. Moreover, by linking them into the 
formal judicial system and providing parties with a joint procedural right to access sulh, victims may be able 
to activate this process to uncover truth and apportion responsibilities about past abuse without the negative 
effects of judicial sentencing. In this light, sulh could operate analogically to truth commissions, which have 
already been experimented in Muslim-majority contexts.  This reflects the options potentially available to 117
policy-makers today in designing TJ initiatives to uncover the truth which also resonate with Islamic law 
practices, including the extrajudicial means of sulh. The ethical considerations that may affect the formation 
process and validity of the legal truth are critical to understand the following paragraphs.  
3.2 Ethics and legal truths in Islamic law 
The preceding discussion hints at the tension between legal truth and historical/factual truth in the Islamic 
legal tradition, also reflected in TJ. The dichotomy between legal truth and historical/factual truth in Islam 
reflects the gap between legal validity based on judicial-procedural formality, and the ethical dimension of 
reality, which in the Islamic tradition constitutes the cornerstone of religious obligations towards God. Some 
of the challenges of truth-finding (and more broadly adjudication) through trial and other formal mechanisms 
are summarised in the following hadith:  
You bring me lawsuits to decide, and perhaps one of you is more skilled in presenting his plea than the other 
and so I judge in his favour according to what I hear. He to whom I give in judgment something that is his 
brother’s right, let him not take it, for I but give him a piece of the Fire.  118
The legal truth conceals these inequalities and thus risks reasserting unequal social structures in the course of 
trials and other truth-seeking initiatives, rendering the truth uncovered in secular or Islamic processes 
equivalent. Under Islamic law, a qadi’s decision based on incorrect facts is problematic, as ‘the execution of 
the title or the obligation is licit only if the judgment concurs with the truth of the facts’, because ‘even if the 
qadi ignores this truth the parties' memory preserves it’.   119
Baber Johansen has analysed the different positions of classical jurists on ‘legally and procedurally 
impeccable judgment[s] which [are] blatantly wrong in [their]appreciation of the facts’.  In the Hanafi and 120
Hanbali traditions there seems to be a confirmation of ‘the notion of the sacred character of the judiciary’s 
verdict: the judge’s decision is God’s norm as revealed by his deputy and the believers have to abide by it’.  121
Nonetheless, on the basis of Qur’anic provisions and hadith, later Hanafi scholars objected to the doctrine of 
the ‘ethically binding character of the judge’s verdict which is based on error in fact’, upholding the 
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‘believer’s ethical and religious duty to behave according to his knowledge of the truth of the facts’.  As 122
such, an important distinction is introduced between internal and external forums, i.e conscience and 
expression, of knowledge of factual truths, providing a new ethical perspective on how legal truth can be 
understood in Islamic legal settings. According to Johansen: 
In the relation 'between the individual and God' the 'forum internum' is governed by the knowledge which the 
parties have of the truth of the facts. Only in referring to his or her knowledge of the facts can the individual 
person define his or her responsibilities before God. If the judge's decision does not correspond to the truth of 
the facts it cannot, before the forum internum, determine the individual's ethical responsibility.  123
For the Shafii doctrine (and Maliki ), there is no dividing line between legal and ethical validity, and an 124
erroneous judgment ‘may even loose its legal validity in face of ethical opposition’, as the forum internum 
rules over over the forum externum.  Thus, the qadi must ‘do justice to both dimensions, the legal and the 125
ethical one’.  This approach consolidates the religious significance of the truth, which may influence the 126
formation of the legal truth and its subsequent uses. 
In general, Johansen demonstrates that the vast majority of Sunni scholars concur in that the ‘qadi's judgment 
constitutes a legal title, the confirmation of a legal claim’.  However, the parties to a case must act 127
according to ‘ethical considerations’, as ‘it is his or her religious duty to act according to the truth of the 
facts’, based on the significance of forum internum religious considerations that guide Muslims: 
The truth of the facts as preserved by the parties' memory is recognized by the jurists as the decisive criterion 
of the forum internum for the legitimacy of the verdict's implementation by the parties. It is on the level of its 
implementation by the parties that the qadi's judgment remains related to and dependent upon the truth of the 
facts. Before the forum internum the qadi's decision is valid only if it is based on true assumptions as far as the 
facts of the case are concerned.  128
Thus, ‘legal and the ethical dimension of religious normativity have to co-exist’ for Islamic law.  Relatedly, 129
Johansen presents the distinction between ‘the authority of the judicial verdict which is based on correct 
procedure and independent legal reasoning’ and ‘the truth of the facts which remain hidden to the qadi’.  As 130
such, uncovering the legal truth is a question of procedure, whereas revealing the factual truth is one of 
ethics in the context of Islamic law; however intimate, their relationship remains conflictual.  
Taking stock of this analysis, two main points can be drawn with regards to the relationship between legal 
and factual truth in Islamic law: (1) how to find the truth – there is no obligation to derive the truth (both 
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legal and factual) only through a qadi-led trial. And (2) why to find the truth – on the basis of the ethics that 
underpin the distinction between forum internum and forum externum, factual truth is valued more highly 
than the legal truth, which may lead to a more flexible approach to uncovering the truth about past abuse as 
long as the requirements of IHRL are met.  
Firstly, as noted above, there is no trace of naivety among the early jurists of all the four main Sunni schools 
with regards to the conceptual and practical distinction between legal truth and factual truth and its 
implications in terms of workability of the legal system. There is an understanding that the legal system must 
– to a reasonable degree – operate regardless of the inherent and insurmountable fracture between legal and 
factual reality, even in cases where the former does not match the latter. The early Sunni approaches reported 
by Johansen illustrate the initial ambiguity in relation to which type of truth to follow; however, eventually 
the Sunni tradition elevated the ethical dimension of factual truth above the simple legal truth as derived 
through established judicial procedure. This suggests that there is no overarching obligation under Islamic 
law to override factual truth with procedurally-sound legal truth. Similarly to secular law (such as 
international law that underpins TJ), the legal truth uncovered through Islamic law instruments is subject to 
the same risks of domination of the prevailing narrative by the elites and those in positions of relative power 
vis-à-vis victims in trials and truth commissions. Thus, Islamic law is not only comparable to secular and 
international law for its benefits, but also for its shortfalls.  
In the context of TJ in Muslim-majority legal systems, there are no strict obligations to establish the truth 
through trials alone, especially if courts were unable to deliver legal truths which matched factual (and 
ethically sound) truths. As such, transitional truth-seeking mechanisms can, in light of the Islamic legal 
tradition, depart from ordinary, qadi-led justice in uncovering legal truths more closely linked to factual 
truth. This confirms that truth commissions and other non-judicial enquiries do not contravene Islamic law; 
instead, the existing practices of fatwas and sulh may inform their design and implementation.  
Secondly, the preceding discussion revealed the ties between the forum externum and the forum internum of 
those involved in the proceedings. Given that there is no obligation for the qadi to coerce the parties or 
anyone else into revealing factual elements to construct his final legal truth, it must follow that the factual/
ethical truth may also be derived outside the courtroom. In other words, if the forum externum as driven by 
the qadi delivers an unsatisfactory form of factual truth then transposed into legal truth, the forum internum 
of the individual’s ethical and religious dimension may still be able to act on the basis of the factual truth – 
which could include the participation in other truth-seeking initiatives. For TJ, this means that if a trial 
proves to be inadequate in finding the truth, this will not constitute a barrier to individual (and collective) 
endeavours to seek the truth through alternative mechanisms – such as a truth commission.  
The value of finding the truth and dealing with it internally might hold a special religious significance which 
also contributes to the formation of the legal truth for the purposes of TJ. For instance, there may be 
compelling reasons to establish truth-finding mechanisms that better suit the needs of the forum internum as 
mandated by religious imperatives, which may also include truth commissions and other similar mechanisms 
of enquiry. On the basis of Qur’anic injunctions, there may be further incentives for believers to participate 
in (and promote) truth-seeking initiatives by establishing religious rewards: 
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O you who believe! Be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness for God’s sake, even if though it be against 
your own selves, you parents, or your near relatives, and whether it be against [the] rich or [the] poor. 
O you who believe! Be upright to God, bearers of witness with justice.   131
The special relationship between truth and ethics in Islamic law provides additional arguments to pursue the 
truth as part of historical TJ processes in Muslim-majority settings. Giving truth-seeking initiatives a 
religious justification might, furthermore, increase the local ownership of TJ by drawing on the language of 
local norms and customs. Although, in practice, political considerations and the personal interests of those 
who dominate the transitional processes may override religious principles, the ethical underpinnings of the 
truth may help guide the process and even develop a discourse about the right to the truth in Islamic law.   
The combination of the elements discussed in relation to formation of the legal truth in Islamic settings 
highlights the possibility of uncovering the legal truth through a variety of means and with the participation 
of many stakeholders of the legal system. Just like secular international TJ truth-seeking initiatives, 
variations drawing on the Islamic tradition encompass both trials as well as non-judicial mechanisms. With 
regards to trial-based truth-seeking, the preservation and further use of official documentary records in courts 
indicates a broad effect of the legal truths uncovered in litigations between (private and public) parties, 
which contributes to the formation of historical TJ. Extrajudicial means to uncover truths include fatwas 
(scholarly opinion in relation to a set of facts) and sulh, Islamic law’s own alternative dispute mechanism, 
that both contribute to the formation of legal truths and thus to historical TJ. Moreover, these mechanisms 
can provide some justification within the Islamic legal tradition and practice for non-judicial truth-seeking 
mechanisms, such as truth commissions and inquiries.  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4. Time to look for a right to the truth under Islamic law? 
Chapter 3 made a case for the existence of the right to the truth under CIL and as an emerging general 
principle of international law. To consolidate this claim, it concluded that there should be a widespread 
acceptance of the right to the truth across jurisdictions and legal systems – domestic, regional and 
international. As such, Islamic law may also contribute to the consolidation of the right to the truth as a 
general principle of law, alongside civil and common law (among others).   132
On the basis of the earlier discussion of the influence of the ECHR and Inter-American jurisprudence on the 
global establishment of the right to the truth, it is important to stress that its further consolidation relies on 
the identification of comparable references in other jurisdictions and legal traditions, to ensure a greater 
inclusivity of different perspectives. With regards to the right to the truth in Islamic law, to date there is no 
specific literature on the topic in the English language, making this enquiry particularly challenging. For this 
reason, this author is unable to outline clearly what the right to the truth may look like in Islamic law; future 
research based on exegesis of the (Arabic) main sources of shari’ah in that regard – which falls beyond the 
scope of this thesis – will hopefully fill this gap.  
Mindful of how a shari’ah-derived right to the truth in Islamic settings may complement the global 
consolidation of this key aspect of TJ, three key considerations set the scene for further enquiry by scholars 
of Islamic law. 
(I) Reaching the (Islamic) right to the truth through ICL (and not IHRL)  
A victim’s individual right to the truth for abuse suffered at the hands of public officials or third parties 
(where the authorities failed to protect or investigate) could be brought within the scope of Islamic criminal 
law – and, specifically, under the category of qisas. Based on the centrality of criminal law and the relative 
marginalisation of human rights in Islamic legal systems, employing the penal category of qisas and the 
victim’s right to compensation may yield more fruitful results than attempts to use human rights language to 
promote the right to the truth in Islamic law. In particular, as discussed previously, the victim’s right to 
compensation under qisas empowers not only the direct victim, but also his or her family, in the 
determination and application of the penalty to the perpetrator. Notably, discretion leaves room for leniency 
and forgiveness (prized in Islamic law) and can avoid corporal punishments. This approach would enable the 
offended parties to request, instead of the application of corporal punishments or blood money (diyya), an 
account of the truth about the incident and situation through an ordinary trial, or through one of the 
extrajudicial means permitted in the Islamic legal system which contribute to the aims of TJ (also discussed 
previously in this chapter).  
The perpetrator’s participation in truth-seeking mechanisms could be seen as a substitute for the traditional 
penalties. In this context, the human rights abiding state authorities leading TJ processes could provide an 
appropriate institutional and legislative framework for the implementation of the right to the truth through 
trials, truth commissions and other means. In light of the IHRL guarantees that can be voluntarily embedded 
into this approach by the state, this model may creatively allow for the victims and their next of kin to 
request trials, truth commissions and other forms of truth-seeking connected to their individual suffering 
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which will at the same time contribute to uncovering the truth in the context of historical TJ. Therefore, the 
right to the truth for victims can be constructed as part of criminal proceedings through qisas in cases that 
involve offences agains the person. For crimes falling within the scope of tazir, instead, the discretion 
afforded to lawmakers in determining penalties and procedures poses no apparent challenge to including 
provisions for the right to the truth as part of the proceedings.  
(II) Making strategic use of the principle of maslahah 
In TJ settings, the right to the truth bears significance at societal level – identified in chapter 3 of this thesis 
as an additional layer to the right to the truth that goes beyond the direct victim of abuse. Collective benefit is 
an important part of Islamic legal systems, discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis: drawing from Kamali, 
maslahah – public benefit and common good – can be understood as ‘the summa’ of the objectives of Islamic 
law.  In light of this, the right to the truth in TJ contexts could be arguably situated within the scope of 133
maslahah, given its importance both for direct victims and their families as well as for society as a whole in 
achieving the end goals of truth, accountability and reconciliation. Accordingly, TJ policies that acknowledge 
and are responsive to the right to the truth may find support through the principle of maslahah. This paves 
the way for further commitment to truth-seeking mechanisms allowing victims to exercise their right to the 
truth and the rest of society to find out about past abuse through public inquiries and other mechanisms.  
The challenge posed by this approach, however, falls within the political sphere: although the principle of 
maslahah is recognised as a central feature of Islamic law and as such informs the implementation of TJ in 
Muslim-majority settings, there is no common understanding of what constitutes public benefit or common 
good in a society. Instead, that standard is determined politically according to historical and geographical 
contexts by actors with agency to decide as part of a democratic process or as an expression of new 
authoritarianism. The latter instance risks reproducing old patterns of marginalisation and social violence in 
deciding what social values ought to be and whose voices may be heard. For example, a post-transitional 
elite may decide that the silencing of the previous regime and preventing them from accessing truth-seeking 
mechanisms falls within the scope of the common good for society – TJ processes will be designed 
accordingly, and the truths uncovered are likely to be partial or misleading. The law-based solution to this 
challenge may be found in the dialogue between the international framework of TJ that underpins the pursuit 
of legal truths and equivalent principles and practices of Islamic law that resonate with local understandings 
of justice. Nonetheless, political backing remains crucial for this approach to be successful.   
(III) Gaining support from authoritative scholarly voices  
Finally, authoritative voices can help radically revisit the understanding of Islamic law to suit contemporary 
TJ needs, as demonstrated by the opinion of Al-Azhar scholars in revising the (hudud) crime of baghi in the 
recent Arab uprisings. If the right to the truth is brought to the fore of the debate and supported by said 
authorities, there may be additional encouragement to embed this right in the TJ processes underway in 
Muslim-majority settings. This would enable the establishment of appropriate judicial and extrajudicial 
mechanisms to respond to the victims’ right to the truth and society’s need to know about past violence.  
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The problem with that, however, is the connection between scholars, the old regime and the new one. Certain 
actors may cloak political interests in transitional contexts with seemingly theoretical arguments presented as 
seemingly neutral. With reference to the right to the truth, arguments to limit the scope of enquiry by 
excluding certain forms of violence and victimhood from scrutiny may in fact limit TJ. This places scholars 
in an ambivalent position in TJ depending on what their recommendations are and how they influence policy. 
Thus, the influence of scholarly voices should be understood primarily as political and not as doctrinal (or 
religious).   
The outlined three-way approach to developing the right to the truth in Islamic legal settings and then 
feeding them into the international paradigm of TJ still faces the hurdle of cultural relativism and related 
arguments, both among international lawyers and proponents of Islamic law, who may dismiss this attempt 
as unorthodox, unnecessary or unattainable. The political context is also key to understanding the extent to 
which stakeholders explore synergies. In TJ, these concerns may be rebutted thanks to the distinctive 
flexibility of the applicable legal framework which, as discussed earlier, demonstrates the workability of 
competing norms in a context of legal pluralism.  
At this point it is important to note that if, in its origins, PIL had been more explicitly designed to be 
receptive to laws other than those of some powerful nations in the West, this issue would not be so apparent 
today. And consequently, the international paradigm of TJ would be more readily applicable to local settings, 
including Muslim-majority contexts. By engaging its internal potential for legal pluralism in TJ, PIL may 
move beyond being ‘international’ (i.e. focusing on the official laws and interests of states) and become more 
truly global and look at a broader range of norms and actors, which is already happening in relation to human 
rights. The legal framework of TJ may provide an opportunity to propel this process of normative inclusivity, 
which in turn will feed into general PIL.  
The inherent adaptability of PIL by virtue of its nature and subject-matter is apparent in previous TJ 
experiences that have provided opportunities for redirecting international law at key moments in history. But 
the tendency to impose forms of victors’ justice in transitional contexts has enabled specific narratives to be 
exalted over others, and preserved only certain accounts through trials.  Any discussion of TJ today should 134
be mindful of the possible manipulations of historical accounts to annihilate the memory of certain groups of 
victims and survivors. For this reason, the relocation of TJ from international law to Muslim-majority legal 
systems is useful if it helps uncover the truth about past abuse suffered by all victims and survivors, 
consolidating and adding to the achievements of PIL. Thus, if a norm of Islamic law helps further the aims of 
transition in Muslim-majority settings, the principles upheld are capable of informing the evolution of the 
global paradigm of TJ. The transitional theme of legal truths to build collective memories provides an 
example of how Islamic law and practice could advance this element in the global TJ paradigm.   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5. Conclusions 
This chapter discusses the localisation of some of the core aspects of the international paradigm of TJ in 
Muslim-majority legal systems – especially the notion of legal truth and the emerging right to the truth. It 
focuses on the potential of Islamic law and practice compared to TJ concepts based on PIL, but also how it 
may contribute to an emerging global paradigm of TJ that looks beyond official state laws. A critical and 
constructive approach to the tensions between Islamic law and the PIL standards of TJ can ensure the two 
sets of norms complement and support each other in pursuing transitional aims in a pluralistic legal system. 
This analysis provides new ways of thinking creatively about the overlap between the norms of shari’ah and 
TJ to consolidate the legal framework for channelling transitions in Muslim-majority legal systems.  
By ensuring that the relocation of TJ into Muslim-majority legal systems meets IHRL standards, it is possible 
to explore and develop strategies for converging the Islamic law and the international paradigm of TJ. As 
IHRL is now the main source and overarching requirement of TJ, establishing the general compatibility 
between human rights and Islamic law is essential. To enable this comparison in the absence of a discrete 
body of human rights law in the Islamic legal tradition, the analysis uses criminal justice, which is 
sufficiently developed in Islamic law and fully embedded in human rights themes. Thus, when a given 
substantive or procedural principle of IHRL/ICL applicable to TJ finds an Islamic equivalent, Muslim-
majority legal systems are able to accommodate TJ based on international law. With particular reference to 
the truth-seeking focus of TJ which contributes to the formation of collective memories of past abuse, 
Islamic law offers a variety of trial-based and extrajudicial mechanisms to uncover and record legal truths. 
The peculiarity of the relationship between Islamic law and the legal truth can be identified in the ethical 
considerations that provide religious backing to truth seeking activities. Consequently, both international and 
Islamic arguments can be adopted in implementing transitional truth-seeking activities.  
Building on those findings, there seems to be no immediate barrier to exploring the right to the truth in 
relation to Muslim-majority legal systems. It is significant that jurisprudence and practice drawn from 
shari’ah affirm the importance of uncovering factual accounts in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings and 
record them in formal legal language; this contributes to the recognition of legal truths in Muslim-majority 
legal systems, which are relevant to both non-transitional and transitional contexts. This recognition of the 
truth paves the way for enquiring into the right-bearers of the truth: future research will help clarify the 
possibility of an equivalent victim’s right to the truth in Islamic law. That would feed directly into the 
consolidation of the right to the truth in the global paradigm of TJ as well as offering a useful tool for the 
design of transitional processes in Muslim-majority settings actionable by survivors. As such, Islamic law 
may feed into the discussion around the right to the truth under international law. 
This analysis leads to the conclusion that it is possible to purposely interpret the relocation of TJ from the 
international paradigm based on PIL to Muslim-majority legal systems – taken as a specific example of a 
local setting. Indeed, comparative methods enable a deeper engagement of Islamic law as a formant of 
Muslim-majority legal systems alongside PIL, thus both sets of norms guide the design and implementation 
of TJ processes in those contexts. As such, the framework of reference for TJ in Muslim-majority legal 
systems is incomplete without looking at the unofficial (i.e. non-state) norms set out by Islamic law, 
jurisprudence and practice, which influence the way a community facing transition conceptualises the aims 
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of accountability, justice and reconciliation. By exploring the compatibility of international standards that 
underpin TJ and the Islamic law equivalents, this thesis finds that there are sufficient substantive and 
procedural overlaps between the two to support a more strategic use of shari’ah to further transitional aims. 
The variety of mechanisms in Islamic law, jurisprudence and practice suggests that its creative engagement 
could strengthen and facilitate TJ in Muslim-majority legal systems.  
The overall research question also investigates the contribution of norms emerging from local settings – in 
this case, Muslim-majority legal systems – to the global paradigm of TJ, which does not restrict itself to the 
formal laws of states. In particular, the formation of collective memories about past violence, legal truths and 
the related right to the truth are taken here as the cornerstones of the international paradigm of TJ; this thesis 
argues that the unofficial norms of Islamic law may help consolidate those concepts globally. In fact, more 
broadly, the Islamic law contribution to the global paradigm of TJ feeds into the idea of a jus commune/jus 
gentium of TJ which no longer relies on state law and is more responsive of informal norms. This shift helps 
TJ overcome the challenges of the universality debate: if its global paradigm is understood as inherently (and 
incrementally) pluralistic, then TJ relocation to specific settings is necessarily less strained, because it can 
draw from its own contextual unofficial norms as well as leaving a legacy of those principles within an ever-
evolving framework of reference. While further theoretical research will refine these claims, the ultimate 
proof of validity of such propositions will become apparent in the TJ processes designed and implemented in 
Muslim-majority legal settings, such as the countries facing legacies of violence after the Arab Uprisings. 
!
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Conclusions 
Analysing the relocation of transitional justice from the international paradigm to Muslim-majority legal 
systems demonstrates that the two sets of norms are not as distant as one may expect. The substantive and 
procedural rules of IHRL and ICL that define TJ generally have an equivalent in Islamic law; when this is 
not apparent, shari’ah is still flexible enough to provide a normative justification for the transitional aims of 
accountability, justice and reconciliation on the basis of the principle of public benefit (maslahah). In 
principle the jurisprudence and practice of Islamic law also offer support to the emerging global paradigm of 
TJ – which has already been enriched by transitional experiences across different societies. More 
specifically, the importance afforded to truth-seeking and the legal truth in Islamic law strengthens the right 
to the truth and the concept of collective memory in the framework of reference for TJ.  
This thesis contributes to understanding the localisation of transitional justice by looking at the roles played 
by coexisting local and international norms. Partly overcoming the feared relativism-universality deadlock, 
the characteristic legal pluralism of TJ reveals how competing sets of norms overlap as formants of any legal 
system, seen from a comparative law perspective. As such, international law applies alongside forms of local 
justice and may even draw on them to boost its own legitimacy; at the same time, local rules and practices of 
specific contexts – such as Islamic law in Muslim-majority settings – inform the uses of international law. 
Together, they feed into the development of a global paradigm of transitional justice which is increasingly 
sensitive to bottom-up normative influences in addition to those introduced top-down. 
Considering the dialogical relationship between international and local rules of transitional justice, this thesis 
argues that the two sets of norms cross-fertilise in practice as well as conceptually, departing from the belief 
that the influence is uni-directional and that it is local justice which responds to PIL but not vice versa. The 
discussion of Muslim-majority legal systems provides an example of how these propositions may operate in 
a given setting, adding a new perspective to the study of transitional justice in the Arab Uprisings. In addition 
to informing our thinking about TJ in the MENA region and other Islamic contexts, the implications of this 
research add to the broader question of localising transitional justice to any given specific setting. For these 
reasons, scholars and practitioners in law as well as non-lawyers involved in the analysis, design, 
implementation and evaluation of specific applications of transitional justice are likely to find this research 
useful.   
The rules applicable to TJ are unique to each setting and, for the most part, defined by the key stakeholders 
of the process whose interests and position affect the rules for pursuing accountability, justice and 
reconciliation after a history of violence. The risk of dominant actors marginalising survivors’ voices has 
been partly addressed in international law through the emergence of a victim’s right to the truth in the context 
of TJ. In parallel, local justice, such as Islamic law, also provides tools for empowering survivors through 
truth-seeking and other mechanisms. The combination of international and local approaches that give victims 
a greater role feeds into the development of a global jus commune/jus gentium of transitional justice. 
!
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Conclusion
Towards a Global Paradigm of Transitional Justice where 
International and Local Norms Meet  
This thesis offers a conceptual framework to interpret the relocation of TJ from international law to local 
settings, such as Muslim-majority legal systems. The research question inquires into whether it is possible 
for the development of a global law of transitional justice to draw from the local norms that support from the 
bottom-up what PIL defines from the top-down. This analysis avoids simply viewing the relationship either 
as a one-way vertical imposition of international law over other legal systems, or as a context-specific 
explanation of how local law could complement from the bottom-up the framework that PIL determines from 
the top-down. Instead, it captures the complexity of combining international and local norms in TJ processes 
from a comparative law angle, critically reassessing the range of applicable laws.  
The findings indicate that the relocation of transitional justice from international law to a specific context, 
such as Muslim-majority legal systems, occurs in the context of legal pluralism in which key stakeholders in 
the process determine the applicable normative framework. As such, the localisation of TJ is not simply 
based on the inherent prevalence of local forms of justice or of international law, but rather on their 
combination. For these reasons, international and local laws are theoretically equal in normative terms within 
the framework of TJ; their applications, however, differ according to the politics of a given setting. Thus, 
local justice is not only relevant to specific settings, but also has the potential to acquire significance in the 
emerging global paradigm of transitional justice.  
After setting out the framework of reference for transitional justice, the first chapter considered international 
and local norms alongside each other as coexisting sources, where the latter also carry the vital effect of 
facilitating cultural ownership of the initiatives and conceptions of justice by the beneficiary community, 
when the language and operation of international law seems distant from the local understanding of rules and 
values. The second chapter then looked at the notion, functions and limitations of the legal truth as part of 
collective memories in transitional justice, focusing on how it is moulded and even distorted away from 
factual/historical truth by dominant actors in the truth-seeking process - often to the detriment of victims and 
survivors of abuse. To counter the marginalisation of victims’ voices in uncovering the truth about the past, 
the emerging right to the truth was discussed in chapter three as a new tool to counter dominant narratives of 
historical violence that ignore survivors’ accounts; the gradual affirmation of the right to the truth, while not 
limited to transitional justice settings, is apparent in international law (and in particular human rights) as the 
result of the comparative appraisal of its existence in global as well as regional settings. Chapter four argued 
that the under-utilised methods of comparative law can help understand the law of transitional justice both in 
its local applications as well as in its global delineation. The last two chapters concluded that Muslim-
majority legal systems are capable of receiving TJ based on PIL; and most significantly, principles and 
practices of Islamic law also add to the formation of global rules of TJ, including in relation to truth-seeking.  
!!!!
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Conclusion
Taking Transitional Justice to Muslim-majority Legal Systems - 
And Finding Something to bring back to International Law 
With reference to localising TJ in Muslim-majority contexts, by stripping the shari’ah of its divine nature 
and focusing on its secular normative effects in the regulation of society, it can be appreciated on a par with 
other legal formants of a system, such as relevant international law, domestic law, case law and the opinions 
of jurists. This enables a discussion of the possible creative uses of Islamic law in applying TJ in Muslim-
majority legal settings, as well as the contributions it could make to the global rules of transition. As such, 
the findings reveal that transitional justice is generally capable of being relocated from international law to 
specific settings, which in turn feed into the development of a jus commune/jus gentium of transitional 
justice drawing on multiple traditions. In that regard, the methods of comparative law seem to help 
understand the legal formants of a given system, viewing the social functions of norms in the context of 
transition, instead of a hierarchy of clearly-defined formal sources.    
These findings renew our understanding of how transitional justice is and can be localised from PIL to 
specific settings in two main ways: firstly, by evaluating the compatibility between international and local 
rules, it suggests that they are normatively equal in a given legal system; secondly, it postulates that local law 
and practice contribute to the emerging global paradigm of transitional justice. The originality of this thesis 
lies in the reassessment of the relativism v universality debate in relation to transitional justice from the 
perspective of comparative law, a proposition then tentatively tested in relation to Muslim-majority legal 
systems. This particular context was chosen because, on the one hand, it addresses contemporary scenarios 
for transitional justice emerging in the wake of the Arab Uprisings, and on the other, because of the ongoing 
disputes around Islam and human rights. This thesis proposes a new reading of the tensions between local 
and international norms applicable to transitional justice, demonstrating that the former actually contribute to 
the latter, with the pivotal effect of reducing the pervasiveness of the universality question. The ideas 
explored here also lend themselves to other legal systems influenced by faith, socially-normative 
philosophies (like Confucianism) and ideologies.  
In light of this work, transitional justice reveals its local and global features as complimentary not only in 
practical applications but also in theory. As such, the emerging jus gentium/jus commune of TJ is enriched by 
both sets of norms as well as by the outcomes of their interplay. Therefore, the tensions between local and 
international conceptions of justice applicable to transitions, though not disappearing altogether, seem to be 
defused in this area of law. The discussion around relocating international understandings of TJ in Muslim-
majority legal systems provides an example of how Islamic law does not pose unsurmountable obstacles to 
its implementation, and instead may be used creatively to channel international standards through local legal 
culture. But the general argument of this thesis goes one step further: if a local legal system which relies 
heavily on unofficial norms has the potential to adapt the international paradigm of TJ to its own specific 
setting successfully and effectively, it may also contribute to the way of thinking about TJ globally. So, just 
as the innovative truth-seeking mechanisms of contexts as disparate as Latin America, Rwanda and former 
Soviet countries have redefined the framework of reference for TJ and countered the dominance of the 
Nuremberg model inherited by the ICC, likewise, even original experiences in transitioning Muslim-majority 
societies (and many others) can feed into the ongoing debate.  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